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This is a comprehensive study of the growth and impact of agricultural futures market 
traders.  The growth of financial investment in commodities has introduced participants and 
raised both new questions and warranted revisiting old questions; these include the impact on 
commodity prices, the profitability of traders, and the existence of trading skill.  To address these 
questions twelve commodity markets are chosen to capture the majority of agricultural trading 
on organized futures markets and encompass the agricultural commodity index trading activity.  
The data used are from the proprietary large trader database of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) that details individual trader end of day positions and covers the years 2000 
to 2009. 
The growth of index fund investment from $12 billion in 2002 to over $200 billion by 
2008 initiated a debate on whether index funds are “too big” for the current size of commodity 
futures markets.  Concerns emerged regarding their adverse effects on prices and volatility.  The 
impact of the financial investment of index traders is analyzed using Granger Causality tests.  
The analysis investigates three different scenarios: (i) aggregated commodity index trader 
positions impacts on returns or volatility, (ii) changes in returns or volatility effects on aggregate 
commodity index trader positions, and (iii) disaggregated commodity index trader positions 
effects on contract returns or volatility during the roll period.  Results show index traders do not 
have a widespread impact on returns or volatility and in some cases actually decrease volatility 
bringing stability to the marketplace.  The futures markets have adjusted to the presence of the 
new financial participants and continue to provide price discovery and risk management.  The 
results have important implications for the ongoing policy debate surrounding index investment; 
in particular, the results do not support limiting participation of index fund investors. 
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The returns to traders are analyzed to determine if a risk premium in agricultural futures 
markets exists, where hedgers pay speculators for protection against adverse price movements.  
The existence of a risk premium is often touted as a motivation factor for speculative trading.  
The long, passive index traders that emerged as major participants in 2004 and 2005 provide a 
natural experiment to determine if naïvely holding positions opposite of hedgers results in 
positive profits and thereby evidence of a risk premium.  Even in the presence of increased prices 
and volatility that encourage the transfer of risk, no risk premium is found.  CITs do not display 
evidence of receiving a risk premium by earning consistent positive returns but rather experience 
large losses in aggregate whereas noncommercial traders experience positive profits.   The 
absence of a risk premium may occur because an infinitely elastic supply of speculative services 
results in the risk premium being bid to zero or the risk absorbing role is usurped by liquidity 
demands of index traders. 
Finally, speculative, noncommercial traders are analyzed to determine if they persist in 
making profits or if profits are randomly generated.  The study focuses on three important and 
representative commodities; corn for field crops, live cattle for livestock, and coffee for soft 
commodities.  Two methods are used to analyze the persistent ability of traders to generate 
positive outcomes: (i) the first is the Fisher Exact test, a nonparametric two-way winner and loser 
rank contingency table analysis, and (ii) the second is the testing of trader by magnitude of 
profits using the rank of trader profits in the first period to identify top and bottom deciles.  The 
results indicate that the top 10% of traders have substantial ability to persistently perform; this is 
about 5-8% more traders than identified in other studies of agricultural futures traders.  The 
rigorous out-of-sample procedures used in this essay provide compelling evidence of the 
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importance of skill in trader returns, and may help explain their continued presence in futures 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The organized futures exchanges we see today developed gradually, emerging first as 
informal forward markets in the geographical marketing area for a commodity.  Financing 
requirements grew apace with the increasing trade activity which motivated merchants to find 
buyers for their commodities on a forward basis.  These early forward contracts were informal 
agreements between two parties and specified only quantity, price, and time of delivery.  The 
need arose for more formal markets and multiple exchanges emerged in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  For example, in 1859 the Chicago Board of Trade was chartered and 
homogenous contracts were created specifying quality standards, size, delivery times, and 
margin rules that resulted in easy entry and exit of contracts and little default risk.  Active futures 
markets emerged in other locations including the New York Cotton Exchange, New York 
Produce Exchange, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and Chicago Produce Exchange.  Today 
many of these exchanges have been consolidated or eliminated as business models and needs 
changed. 
Since their inceptions, the growth of futures exchanges and the pace of product 
innovation have been phenomenal.  In the 1960s the futures markets were limited to agricultural 
and metal products; today a variety of futures markets exists ranging across agricultural, credit 
derivatives, interest rates, energy, equities, environment, and foreign exchange contracts.  In 
1970 a mere 12.6 million futures contracts were traded on the principal commodity exchanges 
(Peck 1985), in 2009 the CME Group traded 2.2 billion contracts and ICE Futures traded 253 
million contracts. 
Commercial firms use futures markets for arbitrage, operational, and anticipatory hedging 
in an attempt to manage price risks inherent in commodity ownership.  Following Peck (1985), 
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the first commercial use is arbitrage; the most common example of an arbitrage hedging 
transaction focuses on seasonal storage of an agricultural commodity and the use of futures 
markets to secure a return to storage through a predictable change in relation between cash and 
futures prices.  A second reason for commercial use of futures markets is operational; the futures 
markets are more liquid than the cash market and allow large commercial transactions to be 
priced quickly with minimal effect on prices.  Firms can then search for specific grades or 
quantities in suitable locations.   A third reason for the business use of futures is anticipatory 
hedging; a sale or purchase cannot be carried out today in the cash market so the hedger conducts 
the upcoming transaction in the futures market.  This allows the commercial firm to buy or sell 
as market judgment dictates without the physical operation constraints.   
Speculative (noncommercial) firms absorb the frequently unbalanced demands of 
commercial buyers and sellers and employ three forms of participation in futures markets: 
position trading, spreading, and market making.  Position trading is accumulating a position 
based on the expectation of making a profit from price changes over time; this absorbs the 
imbalance between aggregate commercial buyers and sellers of futures contracts.  Spread trading 
is taking opposite positions in two contract maturities to profit from the relative change in prices; 
this absorbs the future hedging needs of commercial buyers and sellers.  Market making 
noncommercials trade in large volumes during the daily trading sessions and rarely hold 
positions overnight.  They profit by ‘scalping’ fractions of a cent on trades and provide liquidity 
to the market by always being ready to buy or sell. 
The commercial use of futures markets is the primary reason for their existence (Working 
1954).  When a futures contract market is not performing correctly or is perceived to be 
manipulated, a volley of complaints and comments ensue.  Most recently, a world-wide debate 
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has erupted about the price impact of the new ‘index fund’ speculators in commodity futures 
markets.  A number of observers (e.g., Masters and White 2008) assert that buying pressure from 
index funds created a bubble in commodity prices during 2007-2008, which resulted in market 
prices far exceeding fundamental values and excess volatility.  The bottom-line of this argument 
is that the size of index fund investment is “too big” for the current size of commodity futures 
markets.  During this same time, non-convergence of cash and futures prices in corn, soybeans, 
and wheat markets became a major concern (Irwin et al. 2009), further fueling the controversy 
over speculation in commodity futures markets. 
Based on these concerns, a number of bills have been introduced in the U.S. Congress to 
prohibit or limit speculation in commodity futures markets.  The U.S. Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations stated that “…there is significant and persuasive evidence to 
conclude that these commodity index traders, in the aggregate, were one of the major causes of 
“unwarranted changes”—here, increases—in the price of wheat futures contracts relative to the 
price of wheat in the cash market…Accordingly, the Report finds that the activities of 
commodity index traders, in the aggregate, constituted “excessive speculation” in the wheat 
market under the Commodity Exchange Act.” (USS/PSI 2009, p. 2).  This and other research 
(e.g. Robles, Torero, and von Braun 2009, p.7) are used as justification for the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protect Act that provides the CFTC with broad 
authority to set on-and-off exchange spot month, single maturity, and aggregate contract position 
limits in commodity markets in an attempt to prevent, “Excessive speculation in any commodity 
under contracts of sale of such commodity for future delivery…..causing sudden or unreasonable 
fluctuation or unwarranted changes in the price of such commodity, is an undue and unnecessary 
burden on interstate commerce in such commodity. …” (Dodd-Frank 2010).  The concerns over 
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speculation and manipulation facilitated the passage of unprecedented regulations on commodity 
derivate trading. 
The provided background on the importance of the futures markets and the controversy 
surrounding them motivates further research of the role of commodity index traders and the 
functionality of these markets.  The essays within will address two main questions, (1) with the 
introduction of commodity index traders, what is the impact on commodity prices and (2) what 
traders are making money and why?  To address these questions 12 commodity markets are 
chosen to capture the majority of agricultural trading on organized futures markets and 
encompass the agricultural commodity index trading activity.  The 12 markets include cocoa, 
coffee, cotton and sugar traded on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE); corn, soybeans, soybean 
oil, and wheat traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT); feeder cattle, lean hogs, and live 
cattle traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME); and wheat traded on the Kansas City 
Board of Trade (KBOT). 
The end of day positions in the 12 markets for all “Large Traders”, those traders required 
to report to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), are analyzed from 2000 to 
2009.  The propriety data is collected by trader at the end of each day and is used in this analysis.  
This important data set, called the Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS), is released in an 
aggregate form to the public each Friday, with reporting as of the previous Tuesday.  The public 
looks to this data set called the Commitment of Traders Report (COT) to determine the 
proportion of open interest held by general trader groupings aggregated across maturities.  This 
study utilizes the disaggregated data behind this public report to probe into the details behind the 
open interest by trader group and by individual trader. 
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Previous research on agricultural commodities has used the proprietary LTRS detailed 
data or the public COT aggregated data to analyze futures markets.  Several studies have 
examined the relationship between large trader positions, including speculators, and subsequent 
commodity futures returns (e.g., Buyuksahin and Harris 2009; Brunetti and Buyuksahin 2009; 
Irwin and Sanders 2010b; Stoll and Whaley 2010).   These studies generally do not find large 
trader positions cause prices but certain large trader categories do follow price changes.  Another 
set of studies analyze if speculative traders make money due to a risk premium paid by hedgers 
to speculators for absorbing the risk hedgers offset in the market.  The natural extension of this 
research is to discover if traders are skilled or lucky when earning profits (e.g. Houthakker 1957; 
Rockwell 1967; Hartzmark 1987, 1991; Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu 1994; Fishe and Smith 2010).  
The results are mixed but generally no risk premium is found and only a small portion of traders 
exhibit any consistent type of forecasting skill.  The following three essays will continue this 
important research and help resolve some current and long standing debates. 
The first dissertation essay is entitled, “The Price Impact of Index Funds in 
Agricultural Futures Markets: Evidence from the CFTC’s Daily Large Trader Reporting 
System.”  This essay analyzes agricultural commodity index traders to determine if their trading 
activity has impacted either returns or volatility in 12 different agricultural futures markets.1  The 
data covers January 2000 to September 2009 detailing end of day positions for all traders.  
Granger Causality tests are used to assess casual relationships in conjunction with seemingly 
unrelated regression estimation.  The analysis tests three different scenarios: (i) changes in 
returns or volatility cause aggregate commodity index trader positions (ii) commodity index 
trader aggregate positions cause changes in returns or volatility, and (iii) commodity index trader 
positions in individual maturities cause changes in returns or volatility during the roll period.  
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The motivation from this work stems from concerns about the influx of these index traders who 
passively buy agricultural futures and are non-responsive to the underlying market fundamentals.  
A Commissioner from the CFTC commonly calls these traders “massive passives”, indicating 
their large size in the marketplace and their inactive trading style. 
 The second dissertation essay is entitled, “Returns to Traders and Existence of a Risk 
Premium in Agricultural Futures Markets.”  The purpose of the essay is to determine if a risk 
premium exists in futures markets where hedgers pay speculators for protection against adverse 
price movements.  Hartzmark (1987) addressed this same question but his time period of study 
from 1977 to 1981 is limited and outdated.  The current state of the futures markets is quite 
different today than in was in the late 1970s.  The data for this study extends from January 2000 
to September 2009 and covers 12 commodity markets.  The profitability of aggregate trader 
groups is calculated using end of day positions and prices for individual commodities; these 
commodities are then grouped according to price patterns over the sample period into three 
groups including grains (corn, soybeans, soybean oil, and wheat contracts), livestock (feeder 
cattle, lean hogs, and live cattle) in addition to cotton, and soft commodities (cocoa, coffee, and 
sugar) except cotton.  More importantly, long passive traders, called commodity index traders 
(CITs) emerged into the futures markets during 2004 and 2005 and provide a natural experiment 
to determine if naïvely holding positions opposite of hedgers results in positive profits and 
thereby evidence of a risk premium. 
 The third dissertation essay is “Returns to Individual Traders: Skill or Luck?”  The 
purpose of this essay is to determine if noncommercial traders persist in making profits or if 
profits are randomly generated.  This essay builds upon the work of the second essay, which 
identified noncommercial traders as the profitable category of traders.  The data for this study 
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extend from January 2000 to September 2009 and covers three important and representative 
commodities: corn for field crops, live cattle for livestock, and coffee for soft commodities.  Two 
methods are used to analyze trader skill or persistence.  The first is the Fisher Exact test, a 
nonparametric two-way winner and loser rank contingency table analysis.  The second is the 
testing of trader by magnitude of profits using the rank of trader profits in the first period to 
identify top and bottom deciles.  In this third essay, the analysis performs a stringent test with 
data spanning 10 years and across 3 main commodities to determine if past performance is 
predictive of future performance.  Previous shortcomings are rectified by testing multiple 
investment horizons using both binary variables and magnitude of profit measures.   
The dissertation contributes to the agricultural marketing literature by providing a unique 
insight into the trading activity of new commodity index trader entrants and a comprehensive 
assessment of trader profitability and skills.  The results are interesting to regulators who have 
proposed restrictions on commodity index trading due to accusations of inflated price levels and 
increased volatility.  Researchers who study the behavior of commodity traders and motivations 
of speculators find the profits and losses results contribute significantly to further understanding 
of the marketplace.  The theoretical framework, data, methods to be employed, and results for 
each of the three dissertation essays follow.   
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2.  THE PRICE IMPACT OF INDEX FUNDS IN AGRICULTURAL FUTURES 




The idea of a long-only investment that tracks an index of commodity futures prices is 
not new (Greer 1978; Bodie and Rosansky 1980); however, monetary investment in such 
instruments was small until the early 2000’s.  The Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) estimates that index fund investment was only $12 billion in 2002 but increased to over 
$200 billion by 2008.2  Index fund investors are attracted to commodity futures markets in 
search of risk premiums and portfolio diversification benefits (e.g., Gorton and Rouwenhorst 
2006).   
A world-wide debate has erupted about the price impact of these new ‘index fund’ 
speculators in commodity futures markets.3  A number of observers (e.g., Masters and White 
2008) assert that buying pressure from index funds created a bubble in commodity prices during 
2007-2008, which resulted in market prices far exceeding fundamental values.  Petzel (2009) 
argues that unleveraged futures positions of index funds are effectively synthetic long positions 
in physical commodities and represents new demand.  If the magnitude of index fund demand is 
large enough relative to physically-constrained supplies in the short-run, prices and price 
volatility can increase sharply.  The bottom-line of this argument is that the size of index fund 
investment is “too big” for the current size of commodity futures markets. 
Based on these concerns, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations 
probed index trading and their findings state that “…there is significant and persuasive evidence 
to conclude that these commodity index traders, in the aggregate, were one of the major causes 
of “unwarranted changes”—here, increases—in the price of wheat futures contracts relative to 
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the price of wheat in the cash market…Accordingly, the Report finds that the activities of 
commodity index traders, in the aggregate, constituted “excessive speculation” in the wheat 
market under the Commodity Exchange Act.” (USS/PSI 2009, p. 2)  This and other research (e.g. 
Robles, Torero, and von Braun 2009, p.7) are used as justification for the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protect Act that provides the CFTC with broad 
authority to set on and off exchange spot month, single maturity, and aggregate contract position 
limits in commodity markets in an attempt to prevent, “Excessive speculation in any commodity 
under contracts of sale of such commodity for future delivery…..causing sudden or unreasonable 
fluctuation or unwarranted changes in the price of such commodity, is an undue and unnecessary 
burden on interstate commerce in such commodity. …” (Dodd-Frank  2010).  The concerns over 
speculation and manipulation facilitated the passage of unprecedented regulations on commodity 
derivate trading.  
 In response to concerns about speculative behavior, several studies provide empirical 
evidence on the relationship between index traders and subsequent commodity futures prices. 
Gilbert (2009, 2010), Irwin and Sanders (2010b), and Stoll and Whaley (2010) analyze the 
impact of commodity index traders (CITs) on agricultural prices.  These studies generally find 
that CITs do not have a significant impact on returns.  Similarly, Brunetti and Reiffen (2010) and 
Irwin et al. (2011) study index trader position impact on spreads between the nearby and first 
deferred agricultural futures contracts during the “roll period” of index traders.  The roll period is 
the interval of time when index traders must “roll” or change their futures positions from the 
expiring nearby contract to the first deferred contract; the roll involves exiting long positions in 
the nearby contract and entering long positions in the first deferred.  Brunetti and Reiffen 
determine CITs contribute to decreased hedging costs with a modestly increasing affect on 
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spreads whereas Irwin et al. determine that CITs have no affect on spreads during the roll period.  
Additional studies apply other methods that do not specifically rely on index fund positions.   
Tiang and Xiong (2009) conclude that index fund investing has an impact on commodity prices 
based on a trend towards increasing co-movement of futures prices for commodities included in 
popular investment indexes, such as the S&P GSCI Index™.  Mou (2010) also studies the roll 
period and concludes the increased activity of index traders has caused a significant widening of 
spreads during this time.   
 Irwin and Sanders (2011) recently surveyed the literature surrounding the role of CITs in 
the commodity markets, weighing the evidence that CITs cause a price impact against the 
evidence that CITs do not artificially inflate prices.  The authors call into question the data and 
methods used in the empirical studies finding evidence that commodity index investment impacts 
futures prices.  Rather, they determine the evidence provided by the group of studies arguing 
against an impact is more robust and the CITs have no systematic influence on commodity 
futures prices. 
 While the weight of existing evidence tilts towards limited or no price impact of index 
funds, previous research is nonetheless subject to important data limitations.  First, public data 
on CIT positions are only available weekly which limits the sample size and camouflages any 
impacts that may occur in periods less than a week.  Second, public index trader data are not 
available prior to 2006 which does not include the most rapid position increases of CITs during 
2004 and 2005 that is more probable to show the impact of index traders (Sanders, Irwin, and 
Merrin 2008).4  Third, previous data are aggregated across all maturities which limit the ability 
to evaluate the market impact during the crucial index trader roll period.  Thus far, matching 
prices with both the exiting of index trader position in the nearby maturity and entering of 
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position into the first deferred contract has not been possible.  Stoll and Whaley (2010) argue the 
roll period is more likely to exhibit an impact because the size of CIT position changes in roll 
periods is substantially larger than the size of position changes in non-roll periods. 
 Two important methodological issues have not been investigated in previous studies of 
CITs in agricultural futures markets. The first issue is due to uncertainty about how to categorize 
CIT positions.  Specifically, CITs do not fit neatly into the hedger or speculative category which 
is the reason why the CFTC created a separate category for the reporting of index traders 
(2008b).  Stoll and Whaley (2010) argue CITs cannot be classified as speculators because of the 
diversification motive of index investors.  However, the actual motivation of investors in index 
funds is not precisely known, particularly in the case of exchange traded funds (ETFs).  
The second issue is the roll period definitions used in previous studies. For example, Stoll 
and Whaley (2010) and Irwin et al. (2011) assume that the roll window is the fifth through ninth 
business days in the month before expiration, consistent with the traditional “Goldman Roll” 
definition.  This definition of the roll window may exclude substantial amounts of rolling 
activity, particularly in light of CIT efforts to alter rolling strategies in order to lessen the 
liquidity costs (trade execution) of moving such large positions from the expiring nearby contract 
to the first deferred maturity. 
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze the price impact of long-only index funds in 
agricultural futures markets from January 2004 through September 2009, using disaggregated 
data from the CFTC’s Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS).  The data used in this study are 
not subject to previous limitations; the non-public CFTC database reports index trader positions 
on a daily basis and disaggregates positions by contract maturity.  Furthermore, the data can 
reliably estimate CIT positions starting in 2004 to capture the period of their most rapid position 
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growth.  The commodity futures markets in this data set include corn, soybeans, soybean oil, 
CBOT wheat, KCBOT wheat, feeder cattle, lean hogs, live cattle, cocoa, cotton, coffee, and 
sugar.  The previous methodological limitations are also addressed in this study including a test 
to determine if CIT positions changes react to past price movements and the definition of a data-
dependent roll period. 
This essay has three main parts.  First, the hypothesis that aggregate CIT positions do not 
cause changes in price returns or volatility is tested.  This tests if demand for long only 
commodity index portfolios impacts futures prices.  Second, aggregate CIT positions are 
regressed on lagged returns and volatility measures to determine if CIT position changes are 
impacted by prices.  Third, the analysis examines non-aggregated index trader positions in the 
nearby and first deferred contract maturities during the roll period.  Limiting the specification to 
the roll period focuses the estimation on extreme changes in CIT open interest during a 
concentrated period of time.  In all three parts, Granger causality tests are used to investigate 
whether a significant relationship exists between index trader position changes and commodity 
futures returns and volatility.  Seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) estimation is used to 
improve the power of statistical tests, and equality constraints are placed on the parameters not 
significantly different across equations.  Additional cotemporaneous correlation tests are added 
to the roll period analysis to support the Granger causality tests.  Overall, using both aggregated 
and non-aggregated positions in addition to the SUR estimation and daily data should provide the 
most powerful tests of CIT impact to date in agricultural futures markets. 
2.2 Literature Review 
A number of empirical studies test the impact of traders on prices and volatility in the 
futures markets, with a small portion directly assessing commodity index traders.  In this 
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literature review the focus is strictly on those empirical studies directly addressing commodity 
index traders and their potential impact on agricultural commodity market prices.  The discussion 
of literature is in chronological order to demonstrate the progression of research through time. 
Brunetti and Buyuksahin (2009) investigate speculators using the CFTC Large Trader 
Reporting System to test the hypothesis that speculative trading is destabilizing to the futures 
market.  The five commodities studied include, NYMEX crude oil and natural gas, CME 
Eurodollar and mini-Dow, and CBOT corn.  The sample period is January 2005 to March 2009 
for all commodities except corn, which starts in August 2006.  Swap dealer positions are used as 
a proxy for index fund investment.  A vector autoregression (VAR) is estimated for each 
commodity to jointly test across trading groups to discover the direct effect of each group on 
returns or volatility, as well as the interaction of positions among groups.  They provide evidence 
that speculative trading, including index investment, in futures markets is not destabilizing, and 
speculative trading activity reduces volatility levels.   
Tiang and Xiong (2009) analyze the correlation of commodity futures returns with stock, 
bond, and dollar returns to determine if the financialization of commodities has increased 
correlation among commodities within the popular commodity indices, GSCI and DJ-AIG.  The 
paper studies 28 commodities, four are energy, nine are grains, six are softs, four are livestock, 
and five are metals, from January 2, 1998 to March 2, 2009.  They find that that correlation of 
commodity returns within indices increased starting in 2004; they attribute this increase to the 
existence of index investment.  They find that along with the growth in investment, commodity 
prices have been increasingly exposed to market-wide shocks.   The study highlights the 
increasingly important interactions between commodities markets and financial markets after 
than financialization of commodity markets. 
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Gilbert (2009) attempts to explain speculative influences on commodity futures prices by 
examining the price behavior in crude oil futures, three metals, and three agricultural futures 
from 2006 through 2008.  He uses a test for bubbles created by Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2009) and 
finds evidence of bubbles in seven out of nine markets; the “bubble” days are concentrated in the 
summer of 2008.  He also constructs a quantum index of commodity index investment using 
reported positions of index traders in 12 agricultural markets to approximate index investment in 
crude oil and metal commodities.  This quantum index is used in Granger causality tests to 
determine if the index forecasts price changes.  Results show index activity may impact prices in 
crude oil, aluminum, and copper but none of the agricultural commodities indicate index trader 
activity impacts prices.  
Gilbert (2010) continues his investigation using monthly data from March 2006 to June 
2009.  He employs a CAPM type model and Granger causality analysis to establish the role of 
demand growth, monetary expansion, and exchange rate movements in explaining price 
movements over the period.  He concludes there is modest evidence that the impact of index-
based investment may have caused “bubble-like” commodity prices but acknowledges macro 
economic factors likely had a major impact on the food price increase in 2008. 
Irwin and Sanders (2010a) calculate Workings T-index for speculation and employ 
bivariate Granger causality tests using lead-lag dynamics between index fund positions and 
futures returns (prices changes) or price volatility.  Results show no convincing evidence that 
positions held by index traders impact market returns.  For volatility, they do find larger long 
positions by index traders lead to lower market volatility but excessive speculation, as measured 
by Working’s T-Index, is associated with greater subsequent variability in a few markets.  
Overall, these results do not support an argument that index funds cause inflation in commodity 
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futures prices but does provide evidence that increases in index fund positions can lead to 
declining volatility.   
Stoll and Whaley (2010) investigate commodity index positions and commodity futures 
prices to determine if commodity index investing is a disruptive force to markets.  The study 
uses the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) public Commitment of Traders 
Report (COT) from 2006 to 2009 for the cocoa, coffee, corn, cotton, KC wheat, soybean oil, 
CBOT wheat, crude oil, heating oil, natural gas, RBOB oil5, feeder cattle, lean hogs, live cattle, 
gold, and silver.  A linear regression is used to test if the number of nearby futures contracts 
rolled from one maturity to the next affects commodity returns; the roll effect is measured in the 
month before contract expiration from the fourth through ninth business days.  Granger causality 
tests are used to determine the lead lag relationship between commodity index flows and returns.  
The authors argue that commodity index investment is not speculative, that commodity index 
rolls have little futures price impact, and that commodity index position changes do not cause 
futures price changes. 
Mou (2010) specifically studies the roll activity of commodity index investors and the 
impact on commodity prices.  The paper analyzes the change in spreads during the roll period 
over time and by comparing commodities that are both in and outside a commodity index.  The 
paper studies 19 commodities involved in index investment from the agriculture, livestock, 
energy, and metal sectors and 18 commodities from similar categories that are not involved in 
index investment.  Panel regressions are conducted to determine if the change in spreads during 
the roll period can be explained by an indicator variable if a commodity is in an index 
commodity, an indicator variable if a commodity is included in the Goldman Sachs Commodity 
Index on day t, and control variables for GDP and inflation.  A second regression is computed 
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including size of index investment relative to size of the market.  Results find that spreads are 
widened by the increased participation of commodity index traders.  Next, two simple trading 
strategies are devised to exploit this market anomaly; the strategies to “front run” the rolling 
activity proves to yield excess returns with positive skewness.  The profitability decreases as the 
amount of arbitrage capital increases, measured as spread activity.  Mou estimates that due to the 
price impact, index investor forwent on average 3.6% annual return and a 48% higher Sharpe 
ratio of the return. 
Brunetti and Reiffen (2010) analyzed commodity index traders and hedgers in corn, 
soybeans, and CBOT wheat markets from July 2003 through December 2008 using the CFTC 
Large Trader Reporting System.  They developed an equilibrium model of trader behavior for 
CITs and traditional short hedgers to determine if the cost of hedging has decreased in the 
presence of index traders.   The empirical estimation employs a GARCH (1,1) model that 
regresses spreads between nearby and deferred contracts on index trader levels, a model derived 
measure of hedging activity in the cash market, and various dummy variables accounting for pre 
and post harvest contracts.  They determine that hedging costs have decreased in the presence of 
index traders, consistent with the explanation that CITS are willing to take the opposite position 
from hedgers at lower prices than are traditional speculators.  Within the same model, they also 
conclude that absolute levels of index trader’s positions are positively related to spread levels. 
Irwin, Garcia, Good, and Kunda (2011) analyze if index funds are to blame for an 
increase in spreads and non-convergence in CBOT corn, soybean, and wheat futures contracts 
using data spanning from 1994 to 2010.  First, the analysis tests if spreads in futures prices 
contributed to the lack of convergence.  Second, the analysis investigates if index trading leads to 
expanded spreads and therefore caused convergence problems; the analysis uses weekly CFTC 
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index trader positions data from 2004-2010.  Results find that increases in spreads did contribute 
to the lack of convergence but fail to find that index traders significantly contributed to the 
increase in spreads.   
Overall, previous research is mixed on the impact of index fund investment on 
commodity price returns and volatility but the majority of studies fail to determine that index 
traders significantly increase agricultural futures prices.  Researchers widely agree that 
commodity index trader investment corresponds to the price increases in certain commodities 
during 2008 but actual causality is not established.  The evidence regarding index traders impact 
on spreads is also mixed with Stoll and Whaley (2010) and Irwin et al. (2011) concluding index 
traders have no effect and Mou (2010) and Brunetti and Reiffen (2010) arguing index traders 
expand spreads.  The study will join the debate using data from the detailed CFTC Large Trading 
Reporting System database. 
2.3  CFTC Large Trader Reporting System 
The CFTC Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS) is designed for surveillance purposes 
to detect and deter futures and options market manipulation (Fenton and Martinaitas 2005).  
Positions must be reported to the CFTC on a daily basis if they meet or exceed reporting levels. 
For example, the current reporting level in the corn futures contract is 250 contracts, or 1.25 
million bushels.  The LTRS database contains end- of-day reportable positions for long futures, 
short futures, long delta-adjusted options, and short delta-adjusted options for each trader ID and 
contract maturity.6,7  In recent years about 70% to 90% of open interest in commodity futures 
markets has been reported to the CFTC and included in the LTRS (CFTC 2010). 
A weekly snapshot of the LTRS data is compiled in aggregate form and released to the 
general public as the Commitment of Traders report (COT).  The COT pools traders into two 
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broad categories (commercial and non-commercial), all contract maturities are aggregated into 
one open interest figure, and the report is released each Friday with the data as of the end-of-day 
on the preceding Tuesday.  The COT report covers over 90 U.S. commodity markets and two 
versions are published: i) the Futures-Only Commitments of Traders report that includes futures 
market open interest only; and ii) the Futures-and-Options-Combined Commitments of Traders 
report that includes futures market open interest and delta-weighted options market open interest. 
In response to industry concerns regarding commodity index fund positions, the CFTC 
changed the reporting system in 2007 by creating the Supplemental Commodity Index Trader 
(CIT) report that separates commodity index traders from the original commercial and 
noncommercial COT categories.  CFTC staff engaged in a detailed process to identify index 
traders in the LTRS for inclusion in the new category.  The process included screening all traders 
with large long positions in commodity futures contracts, analyzing futures positions to 
determine a pattern consistent with index trading, reviewing line of business forms (Form 40) to 
obtain more detailed information on their use of the market, and conducting an expansive series 
of phone and in-person interviews with traders.  The CFTC acknowledges that the classification 
procedure was imperfect and that “…some traders assigned to the Index Traders category are 
engaged in other futures activity that could not be disaggregated….Likewise, the Index Traders 
category will not include some traders who are engaged in index trading, but for whom it does 
not represent a substantial part of their overall trading activity” (CFTC 2008a).  While 
recognizing these potential problems, the CIT data are nevertheless widely regarded as providing 
valuable information about index trader activity in commodity futures markets. 
The first weekly Supplemental report was published in January 2007 and provided 
aggregate futures and delta-adjusted options positions of CITs in 12 commodity futures markets: 
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corn, soybeans, soybean oil, CBOT wheat, KCBOT wheat, feeder cattle, lean hogs, live cattle, 
cocoa, cotton, coffee, and sugar.  The CIT category was computed retroactively for 2006 to 
provide context for the initial release of the data in 2007.   
As noted above, CITs are drawn from the original commercial and noncommercial 
categories in the LTRS.  CITs from the commercial category are traders whose positions 
predominately reflect hedging of OTC transactions associated with commodity index investors 
seeking exposure to commodity prices following a standardized commodity index. CITs from the 
noncommercial category are mostly managed funds, pension funds and other institutional 
investors also seeking exposure to commodity price movements.  Sanders, Irwin and Merrin 
(2008) show that approximately 85% of index trader positions are drawn from the long 
commercial category with the other 15% from the long non-commercial category.  This implies 
that the bulk of CIT positions are initially established in the OTC market and the underlying 
position is then transmitted to the futures market by swap dealers (including both commercial 
and investment banks) hedging OTC exposure.  
2.4  Commodity Index Trader Positions 
Data on the positions of CITs are collected from the LTRS for the same 12 markets 
included in the weekly Supplemental report over January 2000 through September 2009.  In 
contrast to the weekly data on CIT positions made public in the Supplemental report, CIT 
positions collected directly from the LTRS are reported on a daily basis, disaggregated by 
contract maturity month, and indicate if the position is in futures or options.  The CIT 
classifications are applied retroactively from 2000 through 2005 to approximate CIT positions 
before the official CFTC index trader classifications began in 2006.  This assumes that traders 
classified as CITs over 2006-2009 also were CITs previously in this period.  Discussions with 
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CFTC staff indicate that CIT designations have changed little since the classification scheme was 
first constructed in 2006, which provides support for its retroactive application.8 
The growth in CIT positions in commodity futures markets is pronounced during the 
2000 to 2009 period.  Table 2.1 provides a breakdown by year of the average daily net long open 
interest (long minus short contracts) held by CITs in the 12 markets.  Note that these CIT futures 
positions are aggregated across all contract maturities and options positions are excluded.  The 
general pattern is a small base of positions in 2000-2003, rapid growth during 2004-2005, and 
then a leveling off or more modest growth during 2006-2009.  For example, the net long position 
of CITs in CBOT wheat increased from an average of 25,702 contracts in 2003 to 134,408 
contracts in 2005, over a fivefold increase.  The rapid growth in CIT positions is also apparent in 
CBOT wheat as a percentage of total open interest (long), which increased from 25% to 55% 
over the same time frame.  There were some exceptions to this pattern.  Growth in CIT positions 
in feeder cattle, live cattle, coffee, and cocoa was more linear from 2000-2009.   
While there is some variation in the pattern across markets, the averages in table 2.1 
clearly reveal that CITs became large participants in commodity futures markets during a 
relatively short period of time.  By 2009, the lowest CIT percentage of total market open interest 
was 14% in cocoa and the highest was 52% in cotton.  The average across all 12 markets in 2009 
was 34%.  Concerns about the price impact of index funds are understandable in light of the 
historic magnitude of this structural change in market participation.  Some have termed this 
process the ‘financialisation’ of commodity futures markets (Domanski and Heath 2007). 
Figure 2.1 provides daily detail on the growth of CIT positions for one of the most 
actively traded markets, the corn futures market.9  Panel A displays the daily net long open 
interest in terms of number of contracts held by CIT traders for two categories: i) nearby and first 
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deferred corn contracts combined, and ii) all other deferred corn contracts combined.  Panel B 
displays the percent of total CIT open interest in all other corn deferred contracts.  Separating 
positions into these two categories highlights any changes in the maturity of futures contracts 
held by CITs.   
Total CIT open interest in corn was at a moderate level, between 25,000 and 50,000 
contracts through the end of 2003, and then increased rapidly starting in early 2004, with a peak 
of more than 425,000 contracts in July 2006.  CIT open interest leveled off and then declined 
thereafter in early 2009 with a subsequent rebound in late 2009.  There is an increase in the 
importance of other deferred contracts in 2007, as reflected by the dark portion of panel A and 
the line in panel B.  For example, about a quarter of CIT positions were held in longer maturity 
corn futures contracts in 2008.  This is consistent with the much discussed trend of CITs 
spreading positions across more contracts in an effort to reduce trade execution costs (e.g., 
Meyer and Cui 2009).  However, the magnitude of the increase in CIT activity for more distant 
contracts was less pronounced in several markets (soybean oil, feeder cattle, cocoa, coffee, and 
sugar).   
Based on inspection of the data, other characteristics of CIT positions were identified.  
CIT traders bypass certain cotton, lean hogs, soybeans, and soybean oil contract maturities, 
presumably due to trading or liquidity costs considerations.  These contracts are excluded in the 
later statistical analysis of price impacts.10  It was also determined that CITs do not trade actively 
in options markets.  The proportion of combined futures and delta-adjusted options positions 
represented by options has increased modestly over time, but it is unusual for options to make up 
more than 5% of the total.  As a result only futures positions are used in the later statistical 
analysis.  CIT traders are also interconnected across commodity markets; specifically, this data 
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set contains 42 unique index traders with 33 traders in 10 or more markets and no traders in less 
than 5.  Not only do they trade in similar commodities, but also trade in a similar long-only 
passive style. 
A defining characteristic of CIT trading patterns is the “roll.”  Since commodity futures 
contracts have a limited life, CITs develop strategies to transfer (roll) long positions from an 
expiring contract to a later contract.  The S&P GSCI Index™ is one of the most widely tracked 
indexes and the roll process for this index is described as follows: 
“The rolling forward of the underlying futures contracts in the excess return index 
portfolio occurs once each month, on the fifth through ninth business days (the roll 
period).  As explained above, some of the underlying commodity contracts expire in the 
next month and thus need to be rolled forward.  The simplest way to think of the process 
is as rolling from one basket of nearby futures (the first nearby basket) to a basket of 
futures contracts that are further from expiration (the second nearby basket).  The S&P 
GSCI™ is calculated as though these rolls occur at the end of each day during the roll 
period at the daily settlement prices.”11 
 
The implication is that CIT trading ebbs and flows in specific contracts, as positions shift from 
one maturity to another.  The nearby contract carries the majority of the open interest and the 
deferred contracts constitute the remaining positions.   
Figure 2.2 presents an example of this “ebbing and flowing” for the 2007 calendar year in 
the March, May, July, September, and December corn futures contracts.  Each contract expires 
roughly in the third week of the expiration month.  The top solid black line in panel A represents 
the net long open interest aggregated across all contracts each business day.  Total position size 
of CITs in corn was about 400,000 contracts at the start of the year, quickly declined to about 
350,000 contracts, and then varied little from that level over the remainder of 2007.  The “hills” 
below the total line show the composition of CIT positions on each day and clearly illustrate the 
pattern of rolling positions from contract-to-contract.  Positions build up rapidly during the 
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period when a contract is the nearest-to-maturity (nearby) and decline equally rapidly as the 
contract approaches expiration and positions are moved the next contract (first deferred) as 
shown in Panel B.  Note that the pattern is somewhat different for the December 2007 “new 
crop” contract, with positions being held at some level in this contract for almost the entire year.  
Panel C shows the changes in the nearby and first deferred series are nearly mirror images12.  
Changes in the nearby are negative as traders rollout/exit their positions and changes in the 
deferred are positive as traders roll into/enter their new positions.  Figure 2.2 highlights the 
importance of considering CIT positions in terms of both the rolling of existing positions from 
one contract to another and the change in aggregate new net flows into the investment category.  
This follows Stoll and Whaley’s (2010) argument that analyzing index investment in aggregate 
and by maturities is an important distinction. 
2.5 Aggregate Index Positions Impacting Returns or Volatility 
The directional relationship between CIT positions and prices can be tested two ways.  
The first, more controversial relationship is the influence of index positions on changes in prices.  
The second, less debated, directional relationship is the influence of changes in prices on index 
positions.  The former is investigated first to determine if net flows of CITs and their demand for 
commodity investment have overwhelmed the market and systematically precede changes in 
returns or volatility.  This directly tests the arguments of Masters and White (2008) and Petzel 
(2009) asserting that the “wave” index traders impacts prices and volatility in agricultural 
commodity markets.  Aggregate CIT investment flows are used to test these relationships 
because aggregate positions represent the new investment decisions of index traders, not a simple 





Hamilton (1994) recommends Granger tests to assess causal relationships between two 
time series using lead-lag variables.  Granger causality tests reflect the basic idea that if event X 
causes event Y then event X should precede event Y in time.  The independent variable is lagged 
CIT positions, the “X”, and the dependent variable is returns or volatility, the “Y”.  Previous 
studies of large trader impacts in commodity futures markets (e.g., Buyuksahin and Harris 2009; 
Irwin and Sanders 2010b) use similar methods and specify returns as a function of lagged returns 
and lagged measures of trader participation.  As is well-known, these tests require careful 
interpretation if the null hypothesis of no causality is rejected.  A statistical correlation may be 
observed between X and Y when in reality an omitted variable Z is the true cause of both X and Y.  
Hamilton (1994, p. 308) suggest it is better to describe “Granger causality” tests between X and Y 
as tests of whether X helps forecast Y rather than whether X causes Y. 
Equations 1 and 2 display the specification for testing CITs impact on returns and CITs 
impact on volatility as,  
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where Rt is the daily return , 1[ (ln ln )*100]t t tR P P−= − tX is a measure of CIT participation in the 
market, measures as both the change in position level and also percent change in position level, 
and is volatility measured as both Parkinson estimate of volatility and implied volatility.  
Volatility is measured first by the Parkinson high-low estimator of daily nearby price volatility 




(Parkinson 1980).  Implied volatility is also measured using option quotes on futures contracts 
and is supplied by CRB/Barchart.  The method is described as,  
"This volatility is measured by entering the prices of options premiums into an options 
pricing model, then solving for volatility. The implied volatility value is based on the 
mean of the two nearest-the-money calls and the two nearest-the-money puts using the 
Black options pricing model. This value is the market's estimate of how volatile the 
underlying futures will be from the present until the option's expiration. " (Barchart/CRB, 
2010). 
 
Implied volatility is a widely accepted method of calculating forward looking volatility (e.g. 
Irwin 2010b, Hull, 2000, p. 255).  Monthly Effects is a set of monthly dummy variables to allow 
for changing seasonal volatility (Egelkraut, Garcia, and Sherrick 2007); these dummy variables 
are only used if significant.   
Following the convention in numerous studies, the nearby series for most futures markets 
is computed by rolling from the nearby contract to the first deferred contract on the last day of 
the month prior to the expiration month of the nearby contract.  For instance, in February the 
nearest contract for corn is March.  On the last business day in February the price series is rolled 
to May, the next nearest contract.  Price and position changes are not calculated across contracts, 
so changes on a switching date correspond to the contract entering the series.  Due to the nature 
of their contract expiration rules, cocoa, coffee, cotton, and sugar are rolled on the day following 
the 15th day of the month prior to the delivery month.  For all variables, an augmented Dickey-
Fuller test is used to determine stationarity.  In every case, the test including a constant and trend 
rejects the null hypothesis of non-stationarity.13    
Following Irwin and Sanders (2010b), the lag structure determined in the individual 
commodity regressions are used in a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system for 12 
markets to increase statistical power.  Using equations 1 and 2, the lag structure of the 
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independent variables for individual markets is determine by minimizing BIC using an OLS 
search procedure with a maximum lag of m=5 and n=5.  The SUR procedure incorporates cross-
equation correlation of errors using a GLS estimator within Zellner’s SUR framework (see 
Harvey, 1991, p 66).  For example, corn and soybeans compete for the same acres to be planted, 
and grains are a major component to raising livestock.  In addition to the efficiency gains from 
exploiting the correlation between residuals, Harvey also indicates constraints can be placed on 
parameters across contracts if those parameters are not statistically different from one another.  
First, all the commodities are tested in the general unrestricted SUR model.  Second, a Wald test 
evaluates the null hypothesis that each parameter is equal across the markets, including α , each 
lag of ,γ and each lag of .β  If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then cross equation parameter 
restrictions are enacted.  After the SUR system is estimated, the overall causality testing of 
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2.5.2 Results 
The first set of Granger causality results using equation 1 test the null hypothesis that CIT 
positions do not cause returns.  Aggregate CIT positions are either measured as a change in net 
positions or percent change in net positions of CITs.  If the assertion that CITs drive up prices is 
true and CIT positions cause returns, then a necessary condition is for the estimated coefficients 
on CIT positions to be greater than zero and positive.  
In table 2.2 the explanatory variable, change in CIT net positions, is used in a SUR 
system to test the null hypothesis that CITs do not impact returns.  The minimum BIC lag 
structure (m,n) is (1,1) for all commodities except for live cattle and lean hogs which are (1,2) 
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and (2,1), respectively.  In this SUR system the cross-market restrictions are set for the intercept, 
,α  which imposes the same intercept across all equations.  The remaining unrestricted variables 
are allowed to vary across commodity markets.  The third column test the null hypothesis that 
positions do not lead returns, , 0j k j.β = ∀   Feeder cattle, lean hogs, and KCBOT wheat reject the 







∑ and the fifth column 
calculates the p-value testing the null cumulative coefficient hypothesis for each 
commodity k.  If only one lag is modeled, n=1, then no cumulative test is necessary; this is the 
case for all commodities in table 2.2 except for live cattle.  Column six displays a one standard 
deviation impact of the explanatory variable which is calculated by multiplying a one standard 
deviation change in the positions by the cumulative coefficient from the fourth column.  A one 
standard deviation change in positions, on average, is 1,000 contracts, with the largest being corn 
(2,760) and the smallest being feeder cattle (109).  For example in lean hogs, a one standard 
deviation change in net positions is 747 contracts and the cumulative impact of a one standard 










The negative relationship between positions and returns holds for the other two 
significant commodities; in feeder cattle a one standard deviation increase in CIT positions 
decreases returns by -0.032% and in KCBOT wheat, a one standard deviation increase in 
positions decreases returns by -0.042%.  The system wide tests at the bottom of the table show 








=∑ to be significant at the 5% level with a 
negative cumulative coefficient overall (-0.0005).  
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Table 2.3 contains parallel results to table 2.2 but percent change in CIT positions is used 
as the explanatory variable instead of change in CIT positions.  Using this measure, the null 
hypothesis is rejected for all commodities and the cumulative coefficients are negative and 
similar in magnitude to table 2.2.  The average one standard deviation change in the explanatory 
variable is 1.6% across all commodities.  For feeder cattle in table 2.3, a one standard deviation 
percent change in CIT positions (1.8%) would decrease returns by -0.035% compared to -
0.032% in table 2.8.  Not surprisingly, the system wide results for table 2.3 are significant and 
negative.  Overall, table 2.2 and table 2.3 provide consistent evidence that an increase (decrease) 
in CIT positions is associated with subsequent decrease (increase) in commodity returns.  
Although this negative relationship between CIT positions and returns is small in magnitude, the 
results are in direct opposition to those proposed by individuals claiming CITs increased 
presence in commodity markets causes an increase in commodity prices. 
The second set of Granger causality results use equation 2 to test the null hypothesis that 
CIT positions do not impact volatility in futures markets.  CIT positions will again be measured 
as both change in open interest and percent change and volatility will be measured as both 
Parkinson’s high-low estimator and implied volatility to represent realized and forward looking 
volatility.  Overall four sets of results are provided.  If CIT positions are followed by an increase 
in volatility and destabilize the market, than the impact coefficient will be positive; conversely if 
CIT positions are followed by a decrease in volatility because they  provide liquidity and 
stabilization, then the impact coefficient will be negative. 
In table 2.4 the explanatory variable, change in CIT net positions, is used in a SUR 
system to test the null hypothesis that CIT net positions do not impact realized volatility.  The lag 
structure is (5,1) or (4,1) for all commodities.  The CIT positions are all lagged once for each 
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commodity and this lag is restricted to be equal across equations; therefore, all p-values are 
equivalent and no market rejects the null hypothesis.  Predictably, the system wide test is also not 
significant.  Despite the lack of significance, all cumulative impacts are negative indicating the 
CITs may have a small dampening effect on realized volatility. 
The parallel results in table 2.5 use the explanatory variable, percent change in CIT net 
positions, in a SUR system to test the null hypothesis that percent change in CIT net positions do 
not impact realized volatility.  The only significant test is the cumulative corn result indicating 
that a one standard deviation increase in percent of CIT positions would decrease annualized 
volatility by -0.7%.  Based on this single significant commodity, the system wide SUR results 
are significant and negative. 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 directly relate to tables 2.4 and 2.5 but use implied volatility instead of 
realized volatility.  Table 2.6 tests the null hypothesis that a change in aggregate CIT positions 
impacts implied volatility.  None of the test results are significant and the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected.  Despite the lack of significance, all cumulative impacts are negative indicating the 
CITs may dampen implied volatility, corresponding with results in table 2.4.  Table 2.7 tests the 
null hypothesis that percent change in CIT positions impacts implied volatility.  Similar to the 
previous results, none of the coefficients are significant but all are consistently negative. 
Overall tables 2.4-2.7 provide consistent evidence that aggregate CIT positions do not 
impact volatility.  Furthermore, the negative coefficients indicate that if anything, CIT positions 
dampen volatility providing stabilization and liquidity to the markets.  The conclusion is 
consistent with previous results by Irwin and Sanders (2010) and Brunetti and Buyuksahin 
(2009).  Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide some evidence that an increase in CIT positions my cause 
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returns to decrease, in direct opposition of any argument that index traders cause increases in 
commodity prices due to increased investment. 
2.6  Returns or Volatility Impacting Aggregate Index Positions 
The previous section analyzes the influence of index positions on prices; this section will 
test the opposite directional relationship, the influences of prices on index positions.  Similar to 
the previous section, tests are conducted on aggregate commodity index positions to determine if 
net flows of CITs are influenced by changes in returns or volatility.  In this section, aggregate 
CIT positions are regressed on lagged returns and volatility to determine how positions react to 
changes in prices.  The testing of index position reactions to prices provides insights into the 
motivation of the investors behind index funds. 
 2.6.1 Methods 
Granger causality is employed in a similar, but opposite manner as in the method section 
2.5.1.  Granger causality tests if event X, returns or volatility, cause event Y, changes in CIT 
positions.  Irwin and Sanders (2010b) use a similar methodology by specifying positions as a 
function of lagged positions and lagged returns.   
Equations 3 and 4 display the specification for testing the impact of returns and volatility 
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where variable definitions are identical to previous section 2.5.  Rt is the daily return
, is a measure of CIT participation in the market represented as both 1[ (ln ln )*100]t t tR P P−= − tX
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the change in position level and also percent change in position level, and is volatility 
measured as both realized volatility and implied volatility.  Monthly Effects is a set of monthly 
dummy variables to allow for changing seasonal volatility; these dummy variables are only used 
if significant.    The lag structure is determined by minimizing BIC using an OLS search 
procedure with a maximum lag of m=5 and n=5. 
tV
To increase statistical power, the 12 markets studied will be modeled together using a 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) consistent with section 2.5.2 and following Irwin and 
Sanders (2010b).  In addition, constraints can be placed on parameters across contracts if those 
parameters are not statistically different to further promote efficiency.  After the SUR system is 










can be determined using a F-test for each 
market separately (if all 'sγ are not restricted) and for the entire system across all 12 









The first set of Granger causality results using equation 3 tests the null hypothesis that 








=∑   If the null hypothesis is rejected and returns 
impact CIT positions, then a relationship exists between returns and positions.  The sign of the 
cumulative coefficient is potentially influenced by two competing forces.  First is the rebalancing 
effect, this would create a negative relationship between prices and positions.  When the price of 
a commodity within a portfolio increase, the number of contracts held in that commodity must 
decrease to maintain proper portfolio target weights.  The second competing force is the trend 
following effect; this would create a positive relationship between prices and positions.  When 
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prices increase and the value of the commodity index increases, additional investors are attracted 
to the investment and CIT positions increase.     
In table 2.8 the explanatory variable, change in CIT net positions, is used in a SUR 
system to test the null hypothesis that returns do not impact index positions.  The minimum BIC 
lag structure (m,n) ranges from 1 to 5 for m and from 1 to 4 for n.  In this SUR system the cross 
market coefficient restrictions are restricted for the intercept, ,α and lag three of CIT positions, 
3,k kβ ∀ .  The remaining unrestricted variables are allowed to vary across commodity markets.  
The third column tests the null hypothesis that returns do not lead positions, , 0i k i.γ = ∀   Eight 
out of the twelve commodities reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level and ten commodities 









∑ and the fifth column calculates the p-value testing the null for each 
commodity k.   If m =1, then the tests in column 3 and 5 are identical and are not repeated in 
column 5; this is the case for all commodities except for cocoa and soybeans.  Column six is the 
one standard deviation impact calculated as a one standard deviation change in the explanatory 
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deviation change in returns is 1.8% on average over the 12 commodities.  All cumulative impacts 
are positive; for example in lean hogs, a one standard deviation increase in returns of 1.5% will 
increase CIT positions by approximately 36 contracts, a relatively small increase in positions.  
The system wide tests at the bottom of the table show , ,i k k0 iγ = ∀  and cumulative coefficient 
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 Table 2.9 contains parallel results using percent change in CIT positions as the 
independent variable.  Using this measure, the null hypothesis is rejected for 6 out of 12 
commodities at the 5% level and all cumulative impacts are positive.  For example in soybeans, a 
1.9% increase in returns will increase CIT positions by 0.19%.  Across all commodities the 
increase in CIT positions from a one standard increase in returns would be 0.10%; although half 
of the coefficients are statistically significant, the overall effects are small.  The system wide 
tests at the bottom of the table are significant and positive.  Based on the small but positive 
impacts in table 2.8 and 2.9, trend following outweighs the rebalancing effect and provides 
evidence that index traders are not only passive, buy-and-hold traders, but are price-sensitive 
investors to some degree.  
 The previous results show that CITs positions have a positive relationship to past price 
movements; the same type of SUR test is employed to determine if CITs change positions in 
response to volatility.  Prior to testing the expected relationship, if any, between CITs and 
volatility is negative.  As volatility increases in a commodity, CITs may tend to decrease 
positions due to greater uncertainly brought on by the volatility that makes investment less 
desirable.  
Equation 4 is tested using two measures of CIT positions, change in CIT positions and 
percent change in CIT positions, and two measures of volatility, realized volatility and implied 
volatility.  Table 2.10 tests the null hypothesis that Parkinson’s high-low estimate of realized 
volatility does not impact changes in aggregate CIT net positions.  The lag structure (m,n) is 
highly varied across commodities and four coefficients are restricted during the SUR estimation 
including, intercept α , lag three of CIT positions 3, 3k kβ β= ∀ , and lags three 3, 3k kγ γ= ∀  and 
five 5, 5k kγ γ= ∀  of volatility.  None of the coefficients are significant although 11 out of 12 are 
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negative indicating that as volatility increases (decreases) CIT positions decrease (increase).  Not 
surprisingly, the overall system results are also insignificant with a negative cumulative 
coefficient.  In parallel results, table 2.11 tests the null hypothesis that Parkinson’s high-low 
estimate of realized volatility does not impact the percent change in aggregate CIT net positions.  
Consistent with previous results, the null hypothesis is not rejected in any situation and all 
cumulative coefficients are negative.  No significant evidence exists that CITs change their 
positions in response to changes in realized volatility. 
 Next, both tables 2.10 and 2.11 are repeated in tables 2.12 and 2.13 using implied 
volatility instead of realized volatility.  Table 2.12 tests the null hypothesis that implied volatility 
does not impact changes in CIT net positions.  Five out of the twelve commodities are significant 
at the 5% level and all significant coefficients are negative.  For example in cocoa, a one 
standard deviation increase in implied volatility of 8.2% causes a decrease in CIT positions of 19 
contracts.  The overall system coefficient is significant and also negative.  Table 2.13’s parallel 
results test the null hypothesis that implied volatility does not impact percent changes in 
aggregate CIT net positions.  Only one commodity, cocoa, shows significance at the 5% level but 
this is only for the joint test and not the cumulative impact.  For the system wide results, the joint 
test rejects the null hypothesis but the cumulative impact is not significant.  Therefore, the 
system estimation does not reject the null hypothesis.  
Overall, index positions have a small but positive relationship to past price movements 
indicating limited trend following behavior.  Furthermore, index positions have a weak but 
inverse relationship to price volatility that is stronger for the measure of implied volatility than 




2.7  The Roll Period 
In section 2.5, aggregate CIT position flows were used to test whether CITs impacted 
market prices, with limited evidence of significant results found.  This is not entirely surprising 
since the average standard deviation of changes in aggregate CIT positions is only approximately 
1,000 contracts and the average standard deviation of the percent change in positions is only 
1.6%.  The use of aggregate CIT positions measures the new net flows of CITs but does not 
capture the change in existing positions that occurs during the roll period (Stoll and Whaley 
2010).  The “roll” of the vast portion of existing index positions from one futures contract 
maturity to another before expiration represents the largest changes in CIT positions.  During the 
conventional roll period, known as the Goldman Roll, the average standard deviation of positions 
changes is 3,300 contracts and average standard deviation of percent change in positions is 15%.   
Index traders concentrate their positions in the nearby contract because it closely replicates the 
cash market for the particular commodity in which they want long financial exposure.  Every 
futures contract eventually approaches expiration and all traders either must close out their 
positions or make/take delivery; since index traders are not commercial traders and generally do 
not trade in the underlying cash market, they close out positions prior to expiration and invest in 
the next nearest to delivery contract.  The impact of index funds on prices may be more evident 
during the roll period when large portions of existing CITs migrate to the next maturity than was 
otherwise evident from the much smaller changes in aggregate net flows of CITs.  
Revisiting figure 2.2 panels A and B, the roll period is evident as CIT open interest in the 
nearest to maturity contract decreases and simultaneously the open interest in the first deferred 
contract increases.  Panel C illustrates this further by displaying the change in CIT open interest 
in the nearby and first deferred contracts that peak during the rolling period; the two series are 
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nearly mirror images of each other.  Nearby open interest changes are negative as CITs exit their 
positions, and the first deferred open interest changes are positive as CITs enter new long 
positions.  The aggregate positions in the top line of panel A mask this rolling behavior, 
providing the motivation for the second disaggregate test of specific CIT price impact. 
Before proceeding with roll period tests, the question of how to precisely define the roll 
period has to be considered.  The basic nature of the task is illustrated by figure 2.2, panel C, 
where the sizeable spikes in the changes in open interest associated with rolling activity is 
obvious.  The main consideration is then what length of time should the roll period encompass or 
how wide of a spike should be considered?  Most previous studies have identified the “width” as 
the Goldman Roll period spanning the fifth through ninth business day in the month before 
expiration (e.g. Stoll and Whaley 2010; Mou 2010; Irwin et. al 2011).  The spike in the change in 
open interest definitely includes the conventional roll period, but there are numerous accounts in 
the financial press of index traders expanding the time frame in which they roll to mask trades, 
seek liquidity, or capture advantageous spreads.  As Kemp (2010) reported in an article on the 
next generation of commodity investment strategies, “The most basic strategy enhancement, 
used by providers…….has been to offer index investors a more dynamic roll procedure.” 
The data available for this study are the first to be of sufficient detail to formally 
investigate the amount of position rolls both in and outside of the conventional Goldman Roll 
period.  Figure 2.3 displays two different roll periods for the December 2004 and December 
2008 corn futures contract maturities.  The shaded box indicates the Goldman Roll period, the 
fifth through ninth business day in the month before expiration.  The 25 business days before the 
Goldman Roll period and the 10 business days after are also displayed.  The 2008 period shows a 
larger amount of the change in open interest occurring outside of the traditional Goldman Roll 
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period than the 2004 maturity, this pattern also holds for the other commodities and maturities in 
this study. Based on this knowledge, a data dependent time roll time frame is formed which 
differs from previous studies using a preset roll period. 
To determine a roll period that encompasses the bulk of CIT rolling activity, four 
different time frames are compared in figure 2.4; section 1 spans the entire 2nd month before the 
expiration month through business day 10 of the month before expiration, section 2 spans the 
10th business day in the 2nd month before the expiration through business day 10 of the month 
before expiration, section 3 spans business days 1 to 10 of the month before expiration, and 
section 4 is the Goldman Roll period spanning business days 5-9 in the month before expiration.     
Figure 2.5 displays the percentage of total roll activity over all commodities in each of 
the defined sections; for the purposes of this analysis, total roll activity is defined as the entire 
two months prior to the expiration month.  Section 4 (Goldman roll) has approximately 65% of 
roll activity in 2004 but this has decreased over time to a little over 50% as CITs have 
increasingly distributed trading through time.  Section 1 and section 2 both contain about 90% of 
the roll activity and section 3 averages about 75% of the total roll activity.  Based on this 
analysis, the traditional Goldman roll period will not be used to define the period of roll days for 
this study; rather, section 2 will define the CIT roll period as it encompasses the majority of roll 
activity within the shortest time period.  The second set of tests using specific maturities employs 
this definition of a roll period to test trader impact during the transfer period of positions from 
one maturity to the next. 
2.8  Roll Impact Tests 
In this section, tests are conducted to determine if the rolling of existing CIT positions 
from the nearby maturity to the first deferred contract impacts returns or volatility.  Two 
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different types of tests are conducted; first prices are regressed on CIT positions using Granger 
causality in a SUR system and second, a simple, straightforward contemporaneous correlation 
between positions and prices is tested. 
2.8.1 Granger Causality Methods 
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In equation 5 the nearby futures returns, are regressed on lagged returns and a measure of 
CIT positions in the nearby futures contract, 
,tNR
.t jNX −   This will capture the activity of CIT’s 
exiting the nearby contract.  Likewise, equation 6 captures the activity of CIT’s entering the first 
deferred contract.  The first deferred return, ,tDR is regressed on lagged returns and measure of 
CIT positions in the first deferred futures contract, .t jDX −   Equations 5 and 6 are then estimated 
as an SUR system to leverage the relationship between residuals using the same procedure 
described in the previous sections except that instead of a system across commodities, this 
system is run for each individual commodity.14  Finally, this specification is flexible in that price 
impacts can differ between the nearby and first deferred contracts. 
 In addition to testing returns, SUR systems are also formed to test if CIT positions affect 
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In equation 7 the nearby volatility measure, is regressed on lagged volatility and a measure 
of CIT positions in the nearby futures contract, 
,tNV
NX .t j−   This will capture the activity of CIT’s 
exiting the nearby contract.  Likewise, equation 8 captures the activity of CIT’s entering the first 
deferred contract.  The first deferred volatility, is regressed on lagged volatility and a 
measure of CIT positions in the first deferred futures contract, 
,tDV
.t jDX −   Volatility is first tested as 
Parkinson estimator and then as implied volatility.    
CIT positions in equations in equations 5 to 8 are defined as the change in open interest 
and as percent change in positions.  The entire testing procedure will be 6 different equation 
systems, (i) returns regressed on changes in positions, (ii) returns regressed on percent change in 
position, (iii) Parkinson volatility regressed on changes in positions, (iv) Parkinson volatility 
regressed on percent change in positions, (v) implied volatility regressed on change in positions, 
and (vi) implied volatility regressed on percent change in positions.  For each of these variables, 
an augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to determine stationarity.  In all cases, the test including 
a constant and trend rejects the null hypothesis of non-stationarity.  
Data on CIT positions in nearby contracts and first deferred contracts are needed in order 
to estimate equations 5-8.  As discussed above, the roll period, section 2, spans business day 10 
or greater in 2 months before expiration to business day 10 in the month before the expiration 
month.  For example, the March 2008 contract maturity roll period will span from mid January 
2008 to mid February 2008.  Similarly, the next maturity, May 2008 will span from mid March 
2008 to mid April 2008.  Any days between the roll periods are not included in the analysis, 
although, lags that occur prior to the defined roll period may be included as explanatory 
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variables.  The nearby and first deferred prices and positions that occur in the roll period 
windows are pooled together to construct a data series, but no data is lagged across roll period 
maturity windows.15 
2.8.2  Granger Causality Results 
 Table 2.14 employs the SUR procedure on the roll period data to test the null hypothesis 
that CIT positions do not impact returns.  Panel A defines the explanatory variable as change in 
CIT positions whereas panel B defines the explanatory variable as percent change in CIT 
positions.  Column 2 is the minimum BIC lag structure (m,n) where m ranges from 1 to 2 and n 
ranges from 1 to 5.  Column 3 is the joint coefficient test p-value for the SUR system.  Column 4 
is the system cumulative coefficient that is the sum of beta coefficients on lagged CIT positions, 
and column 5 tests if the cumulative coefficient is significantly different than zero.  Columns 6 
and 7 multiply the cumulative coefficient by a one standard deviation change in the nearby 
(column 6) and deferred (column 7) explanatory variable.    
 If CITs rolling activity impacts returns in the nearby contract as CITs “roll out”, this 
would be in the form of decreasing returns due to the selling pressure.  Conversely, the impact in 
the first deferred contract would be in the form of increasing returns due to buying pressure.  In 
both situations the relationship between CIT positions and returns would be shown in the results 
as a positive cumulative coefficient (column 4).  The results can also be interpreted as CIT 
impact on the spread between the nearby and first deferred contract.  If spreads widen, then 
nearby prices would decrease and/or deferred prices would increase.  If spreads narrow, then 
nearby prices would increase and/or deferred prices would decrease.  Spreads widening 
(narrowing) due to CIT positions is consistent with positive (negative) cumulative coefficient. 
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In table 2.14, the significant cumulative coefficients are grouped in the livestock markets, 
cocoa, cotton, and the wheat markets.  All of the cumulative coefficients are negative, the exact 
opposite of the expected outcome if CITs widen spreads.  For example in panel A for cotton, a 
one standard deviation decrease in nearby CIT positions would increase returns by 0.10%; 
likewise, a one standard deviation increase in deferred CIT positions would decrease deferred 
returns by -0.10%.  The impacts are computed by multiplying the cumulative coefficient of -
.000044 by the one standard deviation change in positions of 2,372 contracts in the nearby and 
2,273 contracts in the deferred.  The results are relatively consistent irrespective of modeling the 
explanatory variable as change in positions or percent change in positions.16   
Why are CITs positions and returns moving in the opposite direction and contributing to 
narrower spreads?  One possibility is that since CIT rolling patterns are so blatantly apparent, 
commonly called “sunshine trading”  (Admati 1991; Brunnermeier 2005), where a large number 
of traders try to extract naïve rents from the CITs as they predictably change positions.  These 
traders that anticipate CIT positions may, themselves, be influencing market prices.  For the 
nearby contract, traders attempting to take positions opposite CITs aggressively place buy orders 
to attract CIT sell orders and thereby increase prices.  For the deferred contract, traders 
attempting to take positions opposite CITs aggressively place sell orders to attract CIT buy 
orders and thereby decrease prices.  Second, the common assumption that CITs would 
theoretically move the market because of their roll strategy often neglects that future markets are 
a zero sum game.  Since CITs do roll prior to the expiration month, other traders on the short 
side are also rolling their hedges.  This rolling strategy was not invented by index traders.  Long 
before index traders were ever participants in the marketplace, hedgers rolled their position from 
one contract maturity to the next to maintain hedge positions.  Therefore, position rolling 
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strategies have long been common place in futures markets and by themselves unlikely to cause 
disruptions.17 
Next the hypothesis that CITs rolling activity impacts volatility is examined for both 
realized volatility and implied volatility.  If CITs impact realized volatility during the roll period, 
then both the nearby and deferred contracts would experience increases in volatility as index 
traders roll out of the nearby and into the deferred thereby causing rapid fluctuations in prices 
due to their trading activity.18  In this scenario the cumulative coefficient would be negative for 
the nearby contract19 and positive for the deferred contract.  The direction of CIT impact on 
implied volatility is less clear as implied volatility is a forward looking measure. 
The null hypothesis that CIT positions do not impact volatility during the roll period is 
tested using equations 7 and 8 in a SUR procedure; results are present in table 2.15 using realized 
volatility and in table 2.16 using implied volatility.  In table 2.15, the null hypothesis that CIT 
positions do not impact realized volatility is consistently rejected for live cattle and lean hogs 
(column 5).  The cumulative impacts for both the nearby and deferred series are positive for live 
cattle and lean hogs, and the impact tends to be larger when the percent change in CIT positions 
is the explanatory variable; this indicates that a one standard deviation percent change in 
positions may influence volatility more than a one standard deviation change in positions.  For 
example, in table 2.15 panel A for live cattle a one standard deviation decrease (increase) in 
nearby (deferred) positions decreases (increases) annualized volatility by -0.14% (0.13%) where 
as in panel B for live cattle the corresponding estimate decreases (increases) annualized volatility 
-0.32% (1.32%) in the nearby (deferred) contract.  During the roll period for live cattle and lean 
hogs, CIT positions precede movement in realized volatility by consistently decreasing volatility 
in the nearby contract and increasing volatility in the deferred contract in live cattle and lean 
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hogs.  As a whole the evidence is mixed and inconsistent across commodities and provides 
limited evidence that CITs impact realized volatility. 
 In table 2.16 the parallel null hypothesis that CIT positions do not impact implied 
volatility is tested.  The commodities rejecting the null hypothesis include cocoa, cotton, feeder 
cattle, sugar, and wheat; the significant commodities are not consistent with table 2.15.  Of the 
significant commodities both the nearby and the deferred cumulative impacts are the same sign, 
where five commodities have positive coefficients and one has negative.  Therefore the majority 
of significant commodities indicate that as CITs exit nearby contracts they lead to decreased 
volatility and as CITs enter the first deferred contracts they lead to increased volatility.  Across 
commodities, the potential impact (columns 6 and 7) appears to be larger for realized volatility in 
tables 2.15 (Parkinson’s measure) and smaller for implied volatility in tables 2.16.  This 
difference in magnitudes between volatility measures may occur because realized volatility is 
directly impacted by the roll trading behavior; conversely, the implied volatility is forward 
looking and the impact of roll period positions changes on future volatility of a contract is 
unclear.   
Overall, the evidence is fleeting and insufficient to reject the null hypothesis that CIT 
positions do not impact volatility during the roll period, but if an effect exists it is more likely to 
be positively related to position movements and between 0.03 - 0.33% for a one standard 
deviation change in CIT positions and between 0.02 – 1.57% for a one standard deviation 
percent change in CIT positions.  The surprising result of tables 2.15 and 2.16 is the positive 
coefficient for the nearby contract; this indicates that as CITs exit the nearby contract they are 
decreasing volatility.  Less surprising is the positive coefficient in the deferred contract which 
indicates that as CITs enter the contract the volatility increases.  
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2.8.3 Contemporaneous Correlation Results 
The Granger causality test results of the roll period provided little evidence that index 
traders materially influenced returns, spreads, or volatility during the roll period.  An additional 
test is conducted that simply measures how two variables co-vary in a linear manner.  A 
straightforward test of contemporaneous correlation between changes in CIT positions and prices 
is conducted for the data-defined, section 2 roll period and the traditional Goldman roll period.  
The Goldman roll period is added to the analysis because it represents the most concentrated 
period of roll activity.  While this specification does not test causality, we argue this test provides 
additional useful information.  In particular, a finding of no price or volatility impact using this 
basic analysis provides strong evidence against the hypothesis that index funds impact 
agricultural futures prices.   
If CIT position changes are impacting returns, then the necessary (although not 
sufficient) contemporaneous correlation must be positive.  A positive correlation coefficient 
would indicate that as index traders exit the nearby contract they decrease prices, and as index 
traders enter the first deferred they increase prices.   By extension, the results can also be 
interpreted as CIT impact on the spread between the nearby and first deferred contract.20  
Spreads widening due to CIT roll behavior is consistent with positive correlation coefficient. 
 Table 2.17 displays the correlation between changes in CIT positions and returns and 
table 2.18 displays the correlation between percent change in CIT positions and returns for both 
section 2 and the concentrated Goldman roll period.  Out of the 96 correlation coefficients across 
the two tables only 7 were significant at a 5% level, with 4 positive coefficients and 3 negative 
coefficients.  Furthermore, the average correlation coefficients at the bottom of tables 2.17 and 
2.18 only ranges between -0.01 and 0.04.  The lack of evidence disproves the notion that index 
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traders impact returns and does not provide evidence that index traders impact the spread 
between the nearby and first deferred contract during the roll period. 
The next set of results test the correlation between change in index trader positions and 
volatility in four different ways.  Tables 2.19 and 2.20 test the correlation between positions and 
Parkinson volatility measuring positions as both change in positions in table 2.19 and percent 
change in positions in table 2.20.  Tables 2.21 and 2.22 test the correlation between positions and 
implied volatility measuring positions as both change in positions in table 2.21 and percent 
change in positions in table 2.22.  If index traders are influencing volatility, then the expected 
correlation in the nearby contract is negative since as index traders exit the contract, volatility 
increases.  The expected correlation in the deferred contract is positive since as index traders 
enter the contract, volatility increase.   
For tables 2.19 and 2.20, 21 out of 96 correlation coefficients are significant.  In the 
nearby, 8 out of 10 significant are negative.  In the deferred, 1 out of the 11 significant are 
positive.  Over all there is no widespread significant correlation between the commodities and 
realized (Parkinson) volatility.  The average coefficients at the bottom of tables 2.19 and 2.20 
range from -0.02 to 0.01 for the nearby and -0.01 to -0.09 for the deferred, further indicating the 
small correlation between realized volatility of prices and index trader returns.  For tables 2.21 
and 2.22 using implied volatility, 46 out of the 96 correlation coefficients are significant with a 
concentration in table 2.21 using change in positions.  In the nearby, 1 of the 16 significant 
coefficients are negative.  In the deferred, 1 of the 29 coefficients are positive.  The evidence 
appears stronger that volatility decreased when index trader positions change; as CITs exit the 
nearby contract they decrease volatility (positive coefficient) and as CITs enter the deferred they 
decrease volatility (negative coefficient).  The average coefficients at the bottom of table 2.21 
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and 2.22 range from 0.04 to 0.20 for the nearby and -0.07 to -0.31 for the deferred, providing 
further evidence that the change in CIT positions during the roll period dampens volatility. 
Overall, the contemporaneous correlation results show no relationship between index 
trader positions and returns indicating the index traders are not causing an increase in spreads.    
The results agree with the Granger causality tests in table 2.14 that index trader positions are not 
increasing spreads during the roll period.  The results differ in that the Granger causality tests 
find more significant negative relationship between prices and positions than do the 
contemporaneous correlation results.  
The contemporaneous correlation between Parkinson volatility and index trader positions 
agree with the Granger causality tests in table 2.15, both find mixed signs across commodities 
with no broad based significance.  The relationship between implied volatility and CIT positions 
is stronger for the contemporaneous correlation tests than for the Granger causality tests in table 
2.16.  The contemporaneous correlation between index trader positions and volatility is positive 
in the nearby contract and negative in the first deferred contract, indicating that index traders are 
dampening volatility in both the nearby and first deferred contracts. The implied volatility 
Granger results in table 2.16 find the same positive relationship in the nearby contract between 
positions and volatility for two commodities (sugar and feeder cattle) as tables 2.21 and 2.22.  
The analysis differs in that Granger causality results find a positive relationship in the deferred 
contracts in four commodities when the contemporaneous correlations results find a negative 
relationship.  Despite these differences in the details, the weight of the evidence provided by the 
results dispels the notion that index traders are widening spreads, impacting prices, or increasing 




2.9  Summary and Conclusions 
A world-wide debate has erupted about the price impact of long-only ‘index fund’ 
speculators in commodity futures markets.  A number of observers assert that buying pressure 
from index funds impacted commodity prices during 2007-2008, which resulted in market prices 
far exceeding fundamental values.  The purpose of this paper is to analyze the price impact of 
long-only index funds in commodity futures markets from January 2004 through September 
2009.  Daily positions of index traders in 12 markets are drawn from the internal Large Trader 
Reporting System used by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).  The 
commodity futures markets include corn, soybeans, soybean oil, CBOT wheat, KCBOT wheat, 
feeder cattle, lean hogs, live cattle, cocoa, cotton, coffee, and sugar.  Since index positions are 
available on a daily basis and disaggregated by contract the analysis is not subject to data 
limitations of previous studies.   
Granger causality tests are used to investigate whether a significant relationship exists 
between index trader position changes and commodity futures returns and volatility.  Seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) estimation is used to increase the power of statistical tests and 
equality constraints are placed on those parameters that are not statistically different across 
equations.  The analysis is performed on both aggregate daily positions overall all maturities and 
on disaggregated nearby and first deferred contracts during the roll window of index traders.  
The use of aggregate positions attempts to determine if new net flows of index traders have an 
effect on futures prices;  conversely, limiting the period of study to roll days using specific 
contract maturities focuses the estimation on extreme changes in existing open interest during a 
concentrated period of time. 
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As index driven financial products evolve they increasingly diversify their roll trading 
behavior; this may be driven by a desire to limit impact on the futures markets, camouflage 
trading activity, or ensure adequate liquidity for trades.  For example, CIT roll activity has 
decreased in concentration over the sample period, and the percent of open interest change 
occurring during the Goldman roll period decreased from 65% to 50%.  For this reason, the roll 
period used in this research is expanded beyond the traditional “Goldman roll” period to be 
defined as the 10th business day of the month two months before expiration through the 10th 
business day in the month before expiration.  This expanded roll period captures approximately 
90% of roll activity versus the 55% captured in the Goldman period. 
The findings from this research on the impact of index funds indicate that an increase in 
aggregate CIT positions may decrease returns and may dampen volatility.  This does not support 
the assertion that index traders contributed to price spikes in agricultural commodities due to 
increased investment.  Second, an increase in returns tends to be followed by a small increase in 
aggregate CIT positions, and an increase in volatility tends to be followed by a decrease or no 
change in aggregate CIT positions.  The results make clear that index traders may have limited 
reactions to changes in returns and volatility.  Finally, tests analyzing the “roll period”, where 
CITs change the majority of their open interest, use both Granger causality methods and simple 
contemporaneous correlation coefficients.  The contemporaneous tests find no relationship 
between returns and index positions.  The Granger causality methods also find that index traders 
are not increasing spreads during the roll period although results show an opposite effect.  
Granger causality tests show returns in the nearby contract may increase as CIT positions 
decrease and returns in the deferred contract decrease as CIT positions increase into the contract 





methods and commodities.  The contemporaneous correlation tests between changes in index 
positions and implied volatility had the greatest concentration of significant coefficients 
providing evidence that volatility decreases in the nearby contract as traders exit and volatility 
also decreases in the deferred contract as trader enter.  Despite the differences in the details 
between the contemporaneous and Granger causality tests, the weight of the evidence provided 
by the results dispels the notion that index traders are widening spreads, impacting prices, or 
increasing volatility during the roll period.   
Across all three testing methods using both aggregated and disaggregated index trader 
positions, it appears that CITs are not causing a major disruption to the futures market and in 
some cases actually decreasing volatility.   In essence, the trader category is just another 
participant in the futures market that has changed the trader composition in the marketplace but 
has not undermined the fundamental price discovery function. 
These conclusions from this essay are consistent with other research that use less frequent 
observations and a higher level of aggregation for index trader positions (e.g., Stoll and Whaley 
2010) and most research on the effects of large trader positions on commodity market returns 
(e.g., Sanders and Irwin 2010b).  The results of this study provide the strongest evidence to date 
that ‘long-only’ index funds have a minimal impact on commodity futures price movements.  
This has important implications for the ongoing policy debate surrounding index fund 
participation in commodity futures markets.  In particular, the results provide no justification for 
limiting the participation of index fund investors.  Since there is some evidence that index funds 
provide liquidity and dampen price volatility, limiting index fund positions may be harmful in 
that an important source of liquidity and risk-bearing capacity may be removed at a time when 
both are in high demand.  
2.10 Tables and Figures
Market 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Panel A: Number of Contracts
Cocoa 2,208 1,447 1,892 2,612 11,549 7,483 13,272 17,534 23,612 16,195
Coffee 2,728 1,475 2,867 6,916 21,735 23,114 33,862 42,716 54,434 38,165
Cotton 4,967 4,009 5,579 7,863 16,132 38,696 71,430 87,229 95,249 65,637
Sugar 12,898 10,059 17,659 23,497 61,931 98,672 136,135 230,434 309,598 180,138
Feeder Cattle 1 101 1,557 1,933 2,838 4,362 6,562 8,315 8,265 6,210
Lean Hogs 7,858 6,479 8,654 10,546 26,801 43,871 76,923 80,275 100,138 56,472
Live Cattle 22,360 12,779 12,067 13,941 33,118 52,931 86,152 112,310 128,549 90,465
Corn 28,732 30,217 48,209 53,656 117,364 233,142 393,954 357,482 358,979 289,860
Soybeans 6,509 4,920 9,563 28,279 36,692 76,884 114,591 147,449 143,982 122,437
Soybean Oil -122 1 949 1,402 10,773 38,030 65,801 72,351 68,371 54,855
Wheat CBOT 20,178 18,704 21,439 25,702 56,682 134,408 195,194 185,341 165,968 151,227
Wheat KCBOT 5,591 5,777 7,921 9,543 14,971 18,210 25,480 31,372 26,156 26,178
Panel B: Percent of Total Open Interest
Cocoa 2 1 2 3 11 6 10 12 16 14
Coffee 6 3 4 9 23 24 31 28 37 31
Cotton 8 6 8 10 20 37 45 41 43 52
Sugar 7 7 9 12 21 24 28 33 37 25
Table 2.1  Average Daily Net Futures Positions of Commodity Index Traders (CITs) in 12 
Commodity Futures Markets, All Contracts, 2000-2009
Year
Feeder Cattle 0 1 12 11 17 17 22 29 27 27
Lean Hogs 16 15 26 25 34 43 48 44 47 42
Live Cattle 18 11 12 13 29 35 38 45 48 42
Corn 7 7 10 13 19 33 32 28 29 34
Soybeans 4 3 5 12 16 28 31 29 33 32
Soybean Oil 0 0 1 1 7 24 28 25 26 25
Wheat CBOT 15 14 19 25 37 55 45 46 48 49
Wheat KCBOT 8 8 11 16 22 20 18 24 26 29
Notes: Data for 2009 end on September 29, 2009.  Positions of commodity index traders (CITs) are aggregated across 
all contract maturity months on a given day and exclude options positions.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n
Impact
Cocoa 1,1 0.51 0.00009 0.034
Coffee 1,1 0.68 0.00005 0.021
Cotton 1,1 0.56 -0.00004 -0.024
Sugar 1,1 0.80 -0.00001 -0.023
Feeder Cattle 1,1 0.04 -0.00029 -0.032
Lean Hogs 2,1 0.00 -0.00017 -0.127
Live Cattle 1,2 0.89 0.00000 0.92 -0.002
Corn 1,1 0.26 -0.00001 -0.027
Soybeans 1,1 0.29 0.00003 0.032
Soybean Oil 1,1 0.26 -0.00004 -0.029
Wheat CBOT 1,1 0.05 -0.00003 -0.042
Table 2.2  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Change in Aggregate CIT 
Net Positions Do Not Cause Returns, January 2004 through September 2009
0,j jβ = ∀
jβ∑ 0jβ =∑
, 0, ,j k j kβ = ∀ ,j kβ∑∑ , 0j kβ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
R R X k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
Chg in CIT PositionstX =
Wheat KCBOT 1,1 0.02 -0.00011 -0.042
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.00 -0.0005 0.036
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  The cross market 
coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test are the intercepts.  All intercepts are 
estimated as a single pooled parameter across all markets.  Observations per commodity 1,447.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n
Impact
Cocoa 1,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.052
Coffee 1,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.029
Cotton 1,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.020
Sugar 1,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.025
Feeder Cattle 1,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.035
Lean Hogs 2,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.029
Live Cattle 1,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.025
Corn 1,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.023
Soybeans 1,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.025
Soybean Oil 1,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.057
Wheat CBOT 1,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.024
Table 2.3  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Percent Change in 
Aggregate CIT Net Positions Do Not Cause Returns, January 2004 through September 
2009
0,j jβ = ∀ 0jβ =∑
, 0, ,j k j kβ = ∀ ,j kβ∑∑ , 0j kβ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
R R X k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
Pct Chg in CIT PositionstX =
jβ∑
Wheat KCBOT 1,1 0.00 -1.97 -0.033
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.00 -1.9712 0.000
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  The cross market 
coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test include the intercepts and first lag of CIT 
position measure.  The coefficients are estimated as a single pooled parameter across all 
markets.  Observations per commodity 1,447.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n
Impact
Cocoa 5,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.008
Coffee 5,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.009
Cotton 5,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.012
Sugar 5,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.046
Feeder Cattle 4,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.002
Lean Hogs 4,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.015
Live Cattle 4,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.014
Corn 5,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.053
Soybeans 5,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.021
Soybean Oil 5,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.015
Wheat CBOT 5,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.028
Table 2.4  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Change in Aggregate CIT 
Net Positions Do Not Cause Parkinson Volatility, January 2004 through September 2009
0,j jβ = ∀ 0jβ =∑
, 0, ,j k j kβ = ∀ ,j kβ∑∑ , 0j kβ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
V V X Dum k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑
Chg in CIT PositionstX =Parkinson High-Low EstimatetV =
jβ∑
Wheat KCBOT 5,1 0.76 -0.00002 -0.008
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.76 -0.00002 0.765
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  The cross market 
coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test include the  first lag of CIT position 
measure and fifth lag of the volatility measure.  The coefficients are estimated as a single 
pooled parameter across all markets.  Observations per commodity 1,447.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n
Impact
Cocoa 5,1 0.82 0.90 0.024
Coffee 5,1 0.82 0.90 0.013
Cotton 5,1 0.82 0.90 0.009
Sugar 5,1 0.82 0.90 0.012
Feeder Cattle 4,1 0.82 0.90 0.016
Lean Hogs 4,1 0.82 0.90 0.013
Live Cattle 4,1 0.82 0.90 0.011
Corn 5,2 0.08 -59.29 0.03 -0.699
Soybeans 5,1 0.82 0.90 0.011
Soybean Oil 5,1 0.82 0.90 0.026
Wheat CBOT 5 1 0 82 0 90 0 011
Table 2.5  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Percent Change in 
Aggregate CIT Net Positions Do Not Cause Parkinson Volatility, January 2004 through 
September 2009
0,j jβ = ∀ 0jβ =∑
, 0, ,j k j kβ = ∀ ,j kβ∑∑ , 0j kβ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
V V X Dum k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑
Pct Chg in CIT PositionstX =Parkinson High-Low EstimatetV =
jβ∑
 , . . .
Wheat KCBOT 5,1 0.82 0.90 0.015
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.08 -59.29353 0.03
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  The cross market 
coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test include the  first lag of CIT position 
measure and fifth lag of the volatility measure.  The coefficients are estimated as a single 
pooled parameter across all markets.  Observations per commodity 1,447.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n
Impact
Cocoa 5,1 0.75 -0.000003 -0.001
Coffee 2,1 0.75 -0.000003 -0.001
Cotton 5,1 0.75 -0.000003 -0.002
Sugar 4,1 0.75 -0.000003 -0.008
Feeder Cattle 5,1 0.75 -0.000003 -0.0004
Lean Hogs 2,1 0.75 -0.000003 -0.003
Live Cattle 4,1 0.75 -0.000003 -0.002
Corn 1,1 0.75 -0.000003 -0.009
Soybeans 1,1 0.75 -0.000003 -0.004
Soybean Oil 3,1 0.75 -0.000003 -0.002
Wh t CBOT 3 1 0 75 0 000003 0 005
Table 2.6  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Change in Aggregate CIT 
Net Positions Do Not Cause Implied Volatility, January 2004 through September 2009
0,j jβ = ∀ 0jβ =∑
, 0, ,j k j kβ = ∀ ,j kβ∑∑ , 0j kβ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
V V X Dum k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑
Chg in CIT PositionstX =Implied VolatilitytV =
jβ∑
ea  , . - . - .
Wheat KCBOT 4,1 0.75 -0.000003 -0.001
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.75 -0.000003 0.750
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  Dummy variables 
for months are used.  The cross market coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test 
include the  first lag of CIT position measure and may through October dummy variables.  The 
coefficients are estimated as a single pooled parameter across all markets.  Observations per 
commodity 1,447.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n
Impact
Cocoa 5,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.002
Coffee 2,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.001
Cotton 5,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.001
Sugar 4,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.001
Feeder Cattle 5,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.001
Lean Hogs 2,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.001
Live Cattle 4,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.001
Corn 1,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.001
Soybeans 1,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.001
Soybean Oil 3,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.002
Table 2.7  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Percent Change in 
Aggregate CIT Net Positions Do Not Cause Implied Volatility, January 2004 through 
September 2009
0,j jβ = ∀ 0jβ =∑
, 0, ,j k j kβ = ∀ ,j kβ∑∑ , 0j kβ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
V V X Dum k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑
Pct Chg in CIT PositionstX =Implied VolatilitytV =
jβ∑
Wheat CBOT 3,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.001
Wheat KCBOT 4,1 0.94 -0.06 -0.001
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.94 -0.063170 .
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  Dummy variables 
for months are used.  The cross market coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test 
include the  first lag of CIT position measure, January dummy variable, and may through 
October dummy variables.  The coefficients are estimated as a single pooled parameter across 
all markets.  Observations per commodity 1,447.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n Impact
Cocoa 5,2 0.05 18.1 0.08 36.7
Coffee 1,2 0.05 9.8 19.5
Cotton 1,4 0.03 16.5 30.9
Sugar 1,2 0.22 33.3 68.1
Feeder Cattle 1,2 0.42 2.3 2.2
Lean Hogs 1,3 0.02 24.3 35.6
Live Cattle 1,3 0.02 30.9 30.9
Corn 1,3 0.00 132.1 266.0
Soybeans 2,2 0.00 117.7 0.00 220.1
Soybean Oil 1,3 0.02 21.4 39.7
Wheat CBOT 1,3 0.00 62.7 138.4
Table 2.8  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Change in Returns do not 
cause Change in Aggregate CIT Net Positions, January 2004 through September 2009
0,i iγ = ∀ iγ∑ 0iγ =∑
, 0, ,i k i kγ = ∀ ,i kγ∑∑ , 0i kγ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
X R X k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
Chg in CIT PositionstX =
Wheat KCBOT 1,1 0.00 14.3 28.6
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.00 483.61 0.0001
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  The cross market 
coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test are the intercepts and lag three of CIT 
positions.  All intercepts are estimated as a single pooled parameter across all markets.  
Observations per commodity 1,447.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n Impact
Cocoa 5,2 0.13 0.0013 0.06 0.2695
Coffee 3,1 0.24 0.0006 0.06 0.1191
Cotton 5,3 0.07 0.0001 0.83 0.0112
Sugar 1,2 0.70 0.0001 0.0123
Feeder Cattle 1,2 0.45 0.0003 0.0322
Lean Hogs 1,4 0.03 0.0003 0.0469
Live Cattle 1,4 0.04 0.0004 0.0350
Corn 1,3 0.00 0.0004 0.0785
Soybeans 2,2 0.00 0.0010 0.00 0.1926
Soybean Oil 1,4 0.15 0.0004 0.0723
Wheat CBOT 1,4 0.00 0.0004 0.0884
Table 2.9  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Change in Returns do not 
cause Percent Change in Aggregate CIT Net Positions, January 2004 through September 
2009
0,i iγ = ∀ iγ∑ 0iγ =∑
, 0, ,i k i kγ = ∀ ,i kγ∑∑ , 0i kγ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
X R X k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
Pct Chg in CIT PositionstX =
Wheat KCBOT 2,1 0.00 0.0012 0.00 0.2449
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.00 0.007 0.00
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  The cross market 
coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test are the intercepts and lag three of CIT 
positions.  All intercepts are estimated as a single pooled parameter across all markets.  
Observations per commodity 1,447.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n Impact
Cocoa 5,2 0.28 -0.56 0.23 -7.6
Coffee 3,3 0.05 -0.58 0.20 -7.4
Cotton 1,4 0.17 -0.80 -10.3
Sugar 3,2 0.49 -0.65 0.74 -9.3
Feeder Cattle 5,2 0.11 -1.11 0.08 -6.0
Lean Hogs 2,3 0.61 -0.92 0.33 -6.7
Live Cattle 1,3 0.25 -1.46 -7.9
Corn 1,3 0.91 -0.24 -3.4
Soybeans 2,2 0.95 -0.11 0.91 -1.5
Soybean Oil 1,3 0.37 -0.62 -8.0
Wheat CBOT 2 1 0 13 -0 24 0 82 -3 8
Table 2.10  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Parkinson Volatility does 
not cause Change in Aggregate CIT Net Positions, January 2004 through September 
2009
0,i iγ = ∀ iγ∑ 0iγ =∑
, 0, ,i k i kγ = ∀ ,i kγ∑∑ , 0i kγ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
X V X Dum k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑
Chg in CIT PositionstX =Parkinson High-Low EstimatetV =
 , . . . .
Wheat KCBOT 1,1 0.84 0.10 1.1
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.53 -9.034 0.23
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  The cross market 
coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test are the intercepts, lag three of CIT 
positions, and lag three and five of the volatility measure.  All intercepts are estimated as a 
single pooled parameter across all markets.  Observations per commodity 1,447.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n Impact
Cocoa 1,3 0.08 -0.00001 -0.0136
Coffee 3,1 0.08 -0.00001 0.46 -0.0127
Cotton 5,1 0.26 -0.00001 0.54 -0.0128
Sugar 2,2 0.20 -0.00001 0.33 -0.0143
Feeder Cattle 1,2 0.08 -0.00001 -0.0054
Lean Hogs 1,3 0.08 -0.00001 -0.0073
Live Cattle 1,4 0.08 -0.00001 -0.0054
Corn 1,3 0.08 -0.00001 -0.0141
Soybeans 1,2 0.08 -0.00001 -0.0133
Soybean Oil 1,4 0.08 -0.00001 -0.0130
Wheat CBOT 1 4 0 08 0 00001 0 0156
Table 2.11  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Parkinson Volatility does 
not cause Percent Change in Aggregate CIT Net Positions, January 2004 through 
September 2009
0,i iγ = ∀ iγ∑ 0iγ =∑
, 0, ,i k i kγ = ∀ ,i kγ∑∑ , 0i kγ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
X V X Dum k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑
Pct Chg in CIT PositionstX =Parkinson High-Low EstimatetV =
 , . - . - .
Wheat KCBOT 1,1 0.08 -0.00001 -0.0116
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.24 -0.000010 0.08
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  The cross market 
coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test are the intercepts, lag tow and three of 
CIT positions, and lag one of the volatility measure.  All intercepts are estimated as a single 
pooled parameter across all markets.  Observations per commodity 1,447.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n Impact
Cocoa 5,2 0.00 -2.28 0.05 -18.84
Coffee 3,3 0.31 -1.87 0.25 -11.99
Cotton 1,4 0.04 -3.79 -29.88
Sugar 1,2 0.00 -21.08 -160.79
Feeder Cattle 1,2 0.13 1.19 6.06
Lean Hogs 1,2 0.82 0.20 3.28
Live Cattle 1,3 0.13 -4.71 -20.78
Corn 5,3 0.00 -4.86 0.48 -42.19
Soybeans 1,1 0.14 -4.46 -35.88
Soybean Oil 1,3 0.18 -4.03 -23.63
Wheat CBOT 2 1 0 00 -9 52 0 01 -86 04
Table 2.12  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Implied Volatility does not 
cause Change in Aggregate CIT Net Positions, January 2004 through September 2009
0,i iγ = ∀ iγ∑ 0iγ =∑
, 0, ,i k i kγ = ∀ ,i kγ∑∑ , 0i kγ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
X V X Dum k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑
Chg in CIT PositionstX =Implied VolatilitytV =
 , . . . .
Wheat KCBOT 1,1 0.68 0.50 4.07
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.00 -48.94 0.00
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  The cross market 
coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test are lag three of CIT positions, and lag five 
of the volatility measure.  All intercepts are estimated as a single pooled parameter across all 
markets.  Observations per commodity 1,447.
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p-value p-value One StDev
Market, k m,n Impact
Cocoa 5,2 0.00 -0.00001 0.73 -0.0082
Coffee 3,1 0.57 0.00000 0.68 0.0000
Cotton 5,1 0.69 -0.00001 0.39 -0.0079
Sugar 1,2 0.28 -0.00001 -0.0076
Feeder Cattle 1,2 0.28 -0.00001 -0.0051
Lean Hogs 1,3 0.28 -0.00001 -0.0167
Live Cattle 1,4 0.28 -0.00001 -0.0044
Corn 1,3 0.28 -0.00001 -0.0087
Soybeans 1,2 0.28 -0.00001 -0.0081
Soybean Oil 1,3 0.28 -0.00001 -0.0059
Table 2.13  Granger Causality Test Results.  Null Hypothesis: Implied Volatility does not 
cause Change in Aggregate CIT Net Positions, January 2004 through September 2009
0,i iγ = ∀ iγ∑ 0iγ =∑
, 0, ,i k i kγ = ∀ ,i kγ∑∑ , 0i kγ =∑∑
, , , , , , ,
1 1
for each market, , and time, 
m n
t k t k i k t i k j k t j k t k
i j
X V X Dum k tα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑
Pct Chg in CIT PositionstX =Implied VolatilitytV =
Wheat CBOT 2,4 0.47 -0.00001 0.26 -0.0090
Wheat KCBOT 1,1 0.28 -0.00001 -0.0082
p-value Estimate p-value
System 0.02 -0.000018 0.27
Notes:  The models are estimated across the K markets as an SUR system.  The cross market 
coefficient restrictions not rejected by the Wald test are the intercepts, lag two and three of 
CIT positions, and lag one of the volatility measure.  All intercepts are estimated as a single 
pooled parameter across all markets.  Observations per commodity 1,447.
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p-value Estimate p-value One StDev One StDev





Cocoa 1,5 0.0001 -2.6E-05 0.14 -0.022 -0.019
Coffee 1,5 0.86 -4.6E-06 0.20 -0.006 -0.006
Cotton 1,1 0.0001 -4.4E-05 0.0001 -0.104 -0.099
Sugar 1,4 0.49 -3.4E-06 0.16 -0.024 -0.021
Feeder Cattle 1,1 0.07 -2.2E-05 0.07 -0.007 -0.007
Lean Hogs 1,1 0.002 -1.3E-05 0.002 -0.039 -0.037
Live Cattle 1,1 0.001 -6.8E-06 0.001 -0.025 -0.022
Corn 1,5 0.63 -1.8E-06 0.09 -0.016 -0.015
Soybeans 2,1 0.70 -5.7E-07 0.70 -0.002 -0.002
Soybean Oil 1,1 0.56 -1.3E-06 0.56 -0.003 -0.003
Wheat CBOT 1,5 0.09 -4.1E-06 0.04 -0.021 -0.020
Wheat KCBOT 1,4 0.001 -3.5E-05 0.02 -0.034 -0.032
Panel B
SUR System (lag)
Cocoa 1,5 0.0001 -1.0E-02 0.0001 -0.234 -1.981
Coffee 1,3 0.85 2.1E-04 0.37 0.003 0.009
Cotton 1,3 0.0001 -1.2E-02 0.0001 -0.169 -0.297
Sugar 1,3 0.90 -3.8E-04 0.53 -0.005 -0.019
Feeder Cattle 1,1 0.02 -1.9E-03 0.01 -0.032 -0.094
Table 2.14  Granger Causality Test Results for Roll Period Days.  Null Hypothesis Change in 
Lagged CIT Positions do not Cause Returns, January 2004 through September 2009
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
NP NP NXα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
0,j jβ = ∀ jβ∑ 0jβ =∑
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
NP NP PNXα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
DP DP DXα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
DP DP PDXα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
Lean Hogs 1,1 0.0001 -1.0E-02 0.0001 -0.132 -0.356
Live Cattle 1,1 0.0001 -5.9E-03 0.0001 -0.074 -0.311
Corn 1,4 0.36 9.3E-04 0.15 0.011 0.011
Soybeans 2,4 0.89 1.3E-05 0.82 0.000 0.008
Soybean Oil 1,1 0.17 -3.8E-04 0.17 -0.010 -0.011
Wheat CBOT 1,5 0.06 -3.5E-03 0.01 -0.041 -0.045
Wheat KCBOT 1,3 0.001 -5.2E-03 0.00 -0.059 -0.270
Note:   The results are presented for the system results only.  Bold indicates significance at the 5% level.  NP is nearby price 
return, DP is first deferred price return, NX is nearby change in CIT positions, DX is first deferred change in CIT positions, 
PNX is nearby percent change in CIT positions, and PDX is first deferred change in CIT positions.  Observations vary by 
commodity due to differences in the number of maturing contracts, but each commodity has approximately 630 observations. 
63
p-value Estimate p-value One StDev One StDev





Cocoa 1,5 0.0001 -1.4E-04 0.54 -0.115 -0.099
Coffee 1,5 0.03 1.2E-04 0.40 0.161 0.145
Cotton 1,1 0.61 2.0E-05 0.61 0.048 0.046
Sugar 1,2 0.08 2.7E-05 0.10 0.192 0.169
Feeder Cattle 1,1 0.51 7.8E-05 0.51 0.026 0.024
Lean Hogs 1,1 0.01 7.5E-05 0.01 0.221 0.211
Live Cattle 1,1 0.002 3.8E-05 0.002 0.138 0.126
Corn 1,1 0.39 6.0E-06 0.39 0.055 0.051
Soybeans 1,1 0.06 -3.0E-05 0.06 -0.130 -0.121
Soybean Oil 1,1 0.02 1.0E-04 0.21 0.225 0.216
Wheat CBOT 1,2 0.20 6.1E-06 0.66 0.032 0.030
Wheat KCBOT 2,4 0.07 1.3E-04 0.23 0.128 0.122
Panel B
SUR System (lag)
Cocoa 1,4 0.0004 -8.5E-03 0.51 -0.194 -1.642
Coffee 1,5 0.09 -1.3E-03 0.82 -0.018 -0.058
Cotton 1,1 0.58 -3.3E-03 0.58 -0.045 -0.080
Sugar 1,1 0.11 3.0E-02 0.06 0.430 1.510
Table 2.15  Granger Causality Test Results for Roll Period Days.  Null Hypothesis Change 
in Lagged CIT Positions do not Cause Parkinson Volatility, January 2004 through 
September 2009
0,j jβ = ∀ jβ∑ 0jβ =∑
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
NV NV NXα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
NV NV PNXα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
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DV DV DXα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
DV DV PDXα γ β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
Feeder Cattle 1,1 0.10 2.3E-03 0.10 0.040 0.115
Lean Hogs 1,1 0.0003 4.6E-02 0.0003 0.583 1.572
Live Cattle 1,1 0.002 2.5E-02 0.0004 0.316 1.321
Corn 1,5 0.90 -9.6E-03 0.46 -0.110 -0.108
Soybeans 1,1 0.63 1.3E-04 0.63 0.002 0.078
Soybean Oil 1,1 0.33 4.4E-03 0.33 0.115 0.125
Wheat CBOT 1,5 0.54 -1.6E-03 0.86 -0.019 -0.021
Wheat KCBOT 1,5 0.35 6.5E-03 0.17 0.074 0.339
Note:   The results are presented for the system results only.  Bold indicates significance at the 5% level.  NV is nearby 
Parkinson volatility, DV is first deferred Parkinson volatility, NX is nearby change in CIT positions, DX is first deferred 
change in CIT positions, PNX is nearby percent change in CIT positions, and PDX is first deferred change in CIT 
positions.  Observations vary by commodity due to differences in the number of maturing contracts, but each commodity 
has approximately 630 observations.
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p-value Estimate p-value One StDev One StDev





Cocoa 1,1 0.002 3.9E-04 0.0005 0.333 0.286
Coffee 1,1 0.75 -8.0E-06 0.75 -0.011 -0.010
Cotton 1,1 0.79 -3.1E-06 0.79 -0.007 -0.007
Sugar 1,1 0.42 4.2E-06 0.42 0.030 0.026
Feeder Cattle 1,1 0.01 9.3E-05 0.01 0.031 0.029
Lean Hogs 1,1 0.39 1.4E-05 0.39 0.042 0.040
Live Cattle 1,1 0.22 5.6E-06 0.22 0.020 0.018
Corn 1,1 0.96 1.3E-07 0.96 0.001 0.001
Soybeans 2,1 0.72 1.7E-06 0.72 0.007 0.007
Soybean Oil 1,1 0.76 -4.8E-06 0.76 -0.011 -0.010
Wheat CBOT 2,1 0.93 -3.0E-07 0.93 -0.002 -0.001
Wheat KCBOT 1,1 0.08 4.8E-05 0.08 0.046 0.044
Panel B
SUR System (lag)
Cocoa 1,1 0.54 -1.2E-04 0.54 -0.003 -0.023
Coffee 1,1 0.75 3.3E-04 0.75 0.004 0.014
Cotton 1,1 0.01 -3.6E-03 0.01 -0.050 -0.087
Sugar 1,1 0.04 1.8E-03 0.04 0.025 0.089
Feeder Cattle 1,1 0.01 5.9E-03 0.005 0.104 0.302
Lean Hogs 1,1 0.71 6.6E-04 0.71 0.008 0.023
Table 2.16  Granger Causality Test Results for Roll Period Days.  Null Hypothesis Change in 
Lagged CIT Positions do not Cause Implied Volatility, January 2004 through September 2009
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= =
= + + +∑ ∑
Live Cattle 1,1 0.34 3.7E-04 0.34 0.005 0.020
Corn 1,1 0.87 3.7E-04 0.87 0.004 0.004
Soybeans 2,1 0.69 2.1E-05 0.69 0.000 0.013
Soybean Oil 1,1 0.11 -2.5E-03 0.11 -0.064 -0.069
Wheat CBOT 2,1 0.47 -7.0E-04 0.47 -0.008 -0.009
Wheat KCBOT 1,1 0.0001 2.0E-03 0.0001 0.022 0.102
Note:   The results are presented for the system results only.  Bold indicates significance at the 5% level.  NI is nearby implied 
volatility, DI is first deferred implied volatility, NX is nearby change in CIT positions, DX is first deferred change in CIT 
positions, PNX is nearby percent change in CIT positions, and PDX is first deferred change in CIT positions.  Observations vary 
by commodity due to differences in the number of maturing contracts, but each commodity has approximately 630 observations.
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Nearby Deferred Nearby Deferred
Cocoa -0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.02
(0.78) (0.33) (0.52) (0.85)
Coffee -0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.08
(0.76) (0.67) (0.2) (0.34)
Cotton 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.87) (0.89) (0.89) (0.97)
Sugar -0.04 0.05 -0.16 0.10
(0.32) (0.28) (0.07) (0.31)
Feeder Cattle 0.08 -0.07 0.11 -0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.29)
Lean Hogs 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.04
(0.64) (0.22) (0.09) (0.61)
Live Cattle 0.06 -0.04 0.19 -0.16
(0.11) (0.23) (0.01) (0.04)
Corn 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.04
(0.93) (0.73) (0.81) (0.68)
Soybeans -0.04 0.05 -0.16 0.10
Table 2.17  Correlation between Change in Index Traders Positions and Returns, 
January 2004 through September 2009
Roll Period: Section 2 Roll Period: Goldman Roll
Contract Contract
(0.32) (0.28) (0.07) (0.31)
Soybean Oil -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.03
(0.56) (0.22) (0.85) (0.77)
Wheat 0.04 0.00 0.09 -0.04
(0.37) (1) (0.28) (0.66)
Wheat KS 0.02 0.01 0.16 -0.05
(0.63) (0.74) (0.05) (0.58)
Average Coefficient 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01
Note:  The results display the Pearson Correlation coefficient and a p-value below each 
coefficient.  P-values less than 0.05 are bold.
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Nearby Deferred Nearby Deferred
Cocoa 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.16
(0.93) (0.62) (0.62) (0.05)
Coffee 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.11
(0.12) (0.03) (0.64) (0.19)
Cotton -0.07 0.03 -0.12 0.01
(0.1) (0.51) (0.22) (0.93)
Sugar -0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.02
(0.27) (0.42) (0.77) (0.85)
Feeder Cattle 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.09
(0.1) (0.19) (0.71) (0.17)
Lean Hogs -0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.58) (0.27) (0.46) (0.54)
Live Cattle 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.13
(0.7) (0.29) (0.47) (0.09)
Corn 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.01
(0.8) (0.19) (0.4) (0.95)
Soybeans -0 05 0 04 -0 03 -0 02
Table 2.18  Correlation between Percent Change in Index Trader Positions and Returns, 
January 2004 through September 2009
Roll Period: Section 2 Roll Period: Goldman Roll
Contract Contract
. . . .
(0.27) (0.42) (0.77) (0.85)
Soybean Oil -0.05 0.02 -0.19 -0.03
(0.29) (0.7) (0.03) (0.71)
Wheat 0.01 0.06 0.12 -0.07
(0.78) (0.15) (0.16) (0.4)
Wheat KS 0.03 0.05 0.19 -0.05
(0.42) (0.18) (0.02) (0.59)
Average Coefficient 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00
Note:  The results display the Pearson Correlation coefficient and a p-value below each 
coefficient.  P-values less than 0.05 are bold.
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Nearby Deferred Nearby Deferred
Cocoa -0.03 -0.01 -0.20 0.15
(0.46) (0.77) (0.02) (0.07)
Coffee 0.04 -0.06 0.12 -0.15
(0.32) (0.11) (0.15) (0.07)
Cotton 0.06 -0.09 0.37 -0.39
(0.19) (0.06) (0) (0)
Sugar -0.11 0.08 -0.19 0.17
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Feeder Cattle 0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0.02
(0.18) (0.33) (0.21) (0.72)
Lean Hogs 0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.10
(0.33) (0.81) (0.25) (0.17)
Live Cattle 0.03 0.01 0.11 -0.13
(0.36) (0.79) (0.13) (0.08)
Corn -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.10
(0.19) (0.66) (0.67) (0.22)
Soybeans -0 11 0 08 -0 19 0 17
Table 2.19  Correlation between Change in Index Trader Positions and Parkinson 
Volatility, January 2004 through September 2009
Roll Period: Section 2 Roll Period: Goldman Roll
Contract Contract
. . . .
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Soybean Oil 0.05 -0.08 0.19 -0.26
(0.29) (0.05) (0.03) (0)
Wheat -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.15
(0.12) (0.64) (0.71) (0.08)
Wheat KS -0.11 0.09 -0.17 0.15
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08)
Average Coefficient -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.05
Note:  The results display the Pearson Correlation coefficient and a p-value below each 
coefficient.  P-values less than 0.05 are bold.
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Nearby Deferred Nearby Deferred
Cocoa 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.16
(0.91) (0.26) (0.6) (0.06)
Coffee 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.16
(0.28) (0.2) (0.96) (0.05)
Cotton -0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.21
(0.52) (0.48) (0.39) (0.02)
Sugar 0.00 -0.03 0.03 -0.15
(0.94) (0.54) (0.72) (0.11)
Feeder Cattle 0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.04
(0.3) (0.56) (0.27) (0.55)
Lean Hogs 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.11
(0.48) (0.1) (0.55) (0.11)
Live Cattle -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.12
(0.85) (0.6) (0.66) (0.11)
Corn -0.07 -0.17 -0.09 -0.29
(0.07) (0) (0.26) (0)
Soybeans 0 00 -0 03 0 03 -0 15
Table 2.20  Correlation between Percent Change in Index Trader Positions and 
Parkinson Volatility, January 2004 through September 2009
Roll Period: Section 2 Roll Period: Goldman Roll
Contract Contract
. . . .
(0.94) (0.54) (0.72) (0.11)
Soybean Oil 0.03 -0.11 0.16 -0.17
(0.53) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05)
Wheat -0.04 -0.08 0.00 -0.30
(0.28) (0.05) (0.98) (0)
Wheat KS -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.09
(0.02) (0.99) (0.18) (0.28)
Average Coefficient -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.09
Note:  The results display the Pearson Correlation coefficient and a p-value below each 
coefficient.  P-values less than 0.05 are bold.
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Nearby Deferred Nearby Deferred
Cocoa -0.01 -0.13 -0.16 -0.03
(0.86) (0) (0.05) (0.69)
Coffee 0.14 -0.20 0.53 -0.56
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Cotton 0.13 -0.19 0.53 -0.54
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Sugar 0.09 -0.15 0.10 -0.28
(0.04) (0) (0.26) (0)
Feeder Cattle 0.14 -0.14 0.01 -0.04
(0) (0) (0.89) (0.52)
Lean Hogs 0.00 -0.08 0.09 -0.33
(0.92) (0.03) (0.22) (0)
Live Cattle 0.14 -0.16 0.55 -0.52
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Corn 0.00 -0.05 0.08 -0.19
(0.98) (0.17) (0.37) (0.02)
Soybeans 0 09 -0 15 0 10 -0 28
Table 2.21  Correlation between Change in Index Trader Positions and Implied 
Volatility, January 2004 through September 2009
Roll Period: Section 2 Roll Period: Goldman Roll
Contract Contract
. . . .
(0.04) (0) (0.26) (0)
Soybean Oil 0.12 -0.18 0.35 -0.41
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Wheat 0.06 -0.16 0.21 -0.38
(0.16) (0) (0.01) (0)
Wheat KS 0.00 -0.06 0.07 -0.12
(0.98) (0.12) (0.42) (0.14)
Average Coefficient 0.07 -0.14 0.20 -0.31
Note:  The results display the Pearson Correlation coefficient and a p-value below each 
coefficient.  P-values less than 0.05 are bold.
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Nearby Deferred Nearby Deferred
Cocoa 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 0.12
(0.3) (0.71) (0.4) (0.16)
Coffee -0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.06
(0.69) (0.32) (0.67) (0.48)
Cotton 0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.31
(0.77) (0.13) (0.72) (0)
Sugar 0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.15
(0.06) (0.24) (0.92) (0.11)
Feeder Cattle 0.14 -0.01 -0.12 0.04
(0) (0.74) (0.06) (0.5)
Lean Hogs 0.02 -0.08 0.12 -0.22
(0.67) (0.04) (0.09) (0)
Live Cattle 0.04 -0.01 0.10 0.18
(0.26) (0.77) (0.21) (0.02)
Corn 0.00 -0.14 0.05 -0.27
(0.99) (0) (0.52) (0)
Soybeans 0 08 -0 05 -0 01 -0 15
Table 2.22  Correlation between Percent Change in Index Trader Positions and Implied 
Volatility, January 2004 through September 2009
Roll Period: Section 2 Roll Period: Goldman Roll
Contract Contract
. . . .
(0.06) (0.24) (0.92) (0.11)
Soybean Oil 0.09 -0.11 0.32 -0.13
(0.03) (0.01) (0) (0.13)
Wheat 0.04 -0.28 0.15 -0.52
(0.35) (0) (0.07) (0)
Wheat KS -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.17
(0.84) (0.03) (0.8) (0.04)
Average Coefficient 0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.14
Note:  The results display the Pearson Correlation coefficient and a p-value below each 
coefficient.  P-values less than 0.05 are bold.
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Panel A: Number of Contracts
Panel B: Percent of Position in All Other Deferred Contracts
Figure 2.1 Composition of Daily Net Long Open Interest of Commodity Index 
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Panel A: Total and Contract-by-Contract Net Long Open Interest 
Panel B: Nearby and First Deferred Contract Net Long Open Interest 
Figure 2.2  Level and Change in Daily Net Long Open Interest of Comm
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Figure 2.3  Commodity Index Trader Change in Open Interest Roll Pattern during the 
Goldman Roll, 25 Days Before and 10 Days After for Corn Futures Contract Maturities, 





























Figure 2.4  Defining the Commodity Index Trader Roll Periods
10th business day 10th business day 10th business day
Month of ExpirationFirst Month before 
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Figure 2.5  Percent of Roll Activity in Respective Periods, Average Over All 
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3.  RETURNS TO TRADERS AND EXISTENCE OF A RISK PREMIUM IN 
AGRICULTURAL FUTURES MARKETS 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Important research in futures markets has been performed to assess the distribution and 
sources of trader returns.  The Keynesian theory of normal backwardation was motivated by a 
desire to determine whether hedgers paid speculators for protection against adverse price 
movements.  If the theory is true, speculators earn a positive return over time and hedgers earn a 
negative return as they pay speculators to reduce business risk.  The risk premium is in the form 
of a bias in futures prices, whereby, “The quoted forward price, though above the present spot 
price, must fall below the anticipated future spot price by at least the amount of normal 
backwardation.” (Keynes 1930, pp.144) 
Because of its central importance to understanding how futures markets function, the 
theory has raised considerable debate in the literature but has never been convincingly resolved 
(Telser, 2000).  When testing for normal backwardation by calculating trader profitability, most 
early papers were hampered by infrequent observations and aggregation problems.  This forced 
authors to make highly simplified assumptions about trading behavior.  Nevertheless, 
Houthakker (1957) and Rockwell (1967) conclude that speculators can earn returns if they 
possess the skill to forecast price movements. 
Hartzmark (1987, 1991) made significant contributions to the debate with daily data from 
1977 to 1981 in nine markets by calculating the profitability of trader types.  He finds no support 
for the presence of risk premium as commercial traders often obtained positive returns and later 
concluded that profits were primarily generated by luck.  Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu (1994) 
followed Hartzmark’s work using more recent data from 1982-1990 from the frozen pork belly 
futures market.  Leuthold et al. also find little evidence of risk premiums, but observed that the 
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distribution of returns is not random.  Large reporting traders generate significant profits, 
speculators are able to forecast profitably, and spreaders have less forecasting ability but are able 
to consistently identify the direction of market changes.  Phillips and Weiner (1994) used a 
unique data set of forward market participants in the North Sea oil market in which participants 
face higher barriers to entry in the forward market than in the future markets.  If a risk premium 
is to be uncovered, it would most likely exist in harder to enter markets rather than in more liquid 
futures markets where a risk premium could be eliminated by a large supply of willing 
speculators.  Results of the study show no evidence of a risk premium, further supporting 
Hartzmark and Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu’s findings.  Dewally, Ederington, and Fernando (2009) 
investigated energy futures markets and find evidence that persistent profits among traders do 
exist, and that speculator profits are largely due to risk absorption services they provide.  The 
debate continues.  Recently, Fishe and Smith (2010) waded into the debate and argue against the 
theory that commercial hedgers pay a risk premium to speculators.  Their results contradict the 
theory of normal backwardation finding liquidity demanders tend to be noncommercial traders 
and liquidity suppliers tend to be commercial firms.  Brunetti and Reiffen (2010) find that 
hedging costs have decreased in the presence of index traders but do not calculate if index traders 
or speculators successfully profit from absorbing hedge trades. 
The purpose of this essay is to contribute to the understanding of the distribution and 
sources of trader returns in futures markets, focusing on agricultural commodities in a time of 
changing market participants and price levels.  During the sample period, agricultural commodity 
futures markets have experienced extreme changes in price levels and increased volatility which 
should enable us to effectively identify how returns to market participants change in risky 
situations.  More importantly, the emergence of commodity index traders (CITs) into the futures 
78 
 
markets during 2004 and 2005 provides a natural experiment to determine if holding positions 
opposite of hedgers results in positive profits.  The emergence of CITs was encouraged by an 
influential study by Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) that finds futures prices rise over the life of 
a contract and passive long investors can earn a risk premium.  Past studies using actual trader 
positions to test for the existence of a risk premium calculate profits of all noncommercial traders 
to determine if speculators actually earn a premium for absorbing risk.  Testing all 
noncommercial traders mixes both an active trading strategy designed to leverage perceived skill 
and a passive trading strategy attempting to earn a risk premium opposite hedgers.  The existence 
of CITs allows the disentanglement of these two strategies since CITs positions are opposite 
hedgers and passive in nature.  
Although index funds maintain a passive strategy by using preset weights of commodities 
in portfolios, the motivation of the investors behind the funds is less clear.  Aulerich (2011a) 
analyzes the positions of CITs to determine if they exhibit trend following behavior that differs 
from the assumption of passivity.  The research finds that CITs do exhibit some limited 
tendencies to trend follow, where a one standard deviation increase in returns of 2% would 
encourage a maximum of 0.25% additional contract investment (and vice versa).  This effect is 
minimal but does indicate that investors in index funds are not solely interested in earning a risk 
premium.  In another caveat, CITs motivation for diversification would also cloud the strategy of 
strictly earning a risk premium.  Following Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006), commodities 
provide a hedge against inflation and are negatively correlated with equity and bond returns.  
Despite these imperfections, commodity index trader profits provide the clearest real time proxy 
to date for testing the strategy imbedded in the original normal backwardation theory. 
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This research uses daily disaggregated data from the non-public CFTC large trader 
reporting system from January 2000 through September 2009 for 12 agricultural commodity 
futures markets (cocoa, coffee, corn, cotton, feeder cattle, lean hogs, live cattle, soybeans, 
soybean oil, sugar, CBOT wheat, KS wheat).  Daily profit is calculated for commercial, 
noncommercial, commodity index traders, and small traders.  After analyzing aggregate returns 
by trader group, a temporal assessment of trader profits and positions over time is used to clarify 
findings.  Next, a return on investment measure is computed, and profits are separated by days 
outside and inside the index trader roll period; the roll period is the time frame when traders 
move positions for the nearest maturity contract to the next nearest to maturity contract.  The 
results from the additional tests support the conclusions from the aggregate results, which show 
that speculative noncommercial traders are indeed successful, earning approximately $7.9 billion 
whereas the hedging commercial traders experience a net loss of -$698 million.  The small, 
nonreporting traders have net losses of -$366 million, consistent with previous beliefs that small 
traders are unskilled (Hartzmark 1991).  Overall, no evidence of a risk premium is supported as 
CITs do not display evidence of receiving a risk premium by earning consistent positive returns 
but rather experience losses in aggregate of -$6.9 billion. 
3.2 Literature Review 
A number of empirical studies have attempted to study the existence of a risk premium in 
futures markets. The evidence is mixed as researchers use different data sets and techniques 
attempting to prove or disprove hedging pressure, normal backwardation, or a risk premium.  
This section first provides a review of research measuring the risk premium through calculation 
of trader’s profits, the most direct method, and then reviews selected research employing 
alternate methods of risk premium detection that provide either direct or indirect evidence on the 
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theory of normal backwardation.  These include determining if risk premiums are functions of 
non-diversifiable risk and discovering the hypothetical profitability of positions opposite hedgers 
(hedging pressure). 
3.2.1 Profit Calculations on Positions 
Houthakker (1957) set out to determine if speculators could forecast prices by calculating 
the profits of hedgers, speculators, and small non-reporting traders. The analysis uses monthly 
data on trader positions for corn, wheat, and cotton from 1937 to 1947. Profits and losses by 
group are calculated by multiplying the end of month position by the monthly average futures 
price for the respective commodity. Results show long speculative positions to be profitable and 
short hedging positions to generate losses. The disentanglement of skill versus risk premium is 
attempted two ways.  The first is a regression of net positions in each category on changes in 
prices, and the second is analysis of distributive skill. The regression results demonstrate that 
large speculators have skill and small traders do not. The distributive skill results reinforce the 
regression conclusions; large speculators are able to position themselves in shorter maturity 
contracts and incur positive profits by exploiting their knowledge of deliverable stocks. Small 
traders simply take the opposite side of short hedging positions and the opposite side of short 
speculative bets in order to profit from a risk premium.  While both large and small speculators 
profit, the sources of profits differ; large speculators gain through distributive skill, while smaller 
speculators gain through a risk premium. 
Rockwell (1967) considers whether returns by speculators are explained by normal 
backwardation or forecasting ability. Rockwell uses a similar method as Houthakker (1957) but 
covers a much broader sample of 25 markets for 18 years from 1947 to 1965.  He splits the 
semimonthly data into large markets and small markets, large markets being both Chicago wheat 
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and soybeans and New York cotton. He tests for normal backwardation by determining if a naïve 
speculator would earn profits by taking the opposite side of a the net hedger’s positions. The 
evidence rejects the theory of normal backwardation, finding a naïve speculative strategy is not 
profitable. He then tests for basic versus special forecasting skills. Basic forecasting skills is 
tested by calculating a ratio of total value of long positions minus short positions divided by long 
positions plus short positions and the ratio multiplied by that rate of return for a single market.  
Special forecasting skill is a residual of aggregation of overall sets of markets minus basic 
forecasting skill. Results show that small traders exhibit a consistent negative special forecasting 
skill but large speculators consistently show both basic and special forecasting skill. He 
concludes that no significant evidence of normal backwardation exists and forecasting ability is 
the reason for speculative profits. 
Hartzmark (1987) conducted ground-breaking research with daily position and price data 
from the CFTC to test the existence of a risk premium in futures markets.  The study covers nine 
markets: oats, CBOT wheat, MGE wheat, KS wheat, pork bellies, live cattle, feeder cattle, T-
bonds, and 90 day T-bills from July 1977 to December 1981.  Daily profits for each trader for 
each contract held are calculated by multiplying end-of-day positions by the change in the 
settlement price between the current day and the following day.  The results show that 
speculators in futures market do not earn significant positive profits and hedgers do not suffer 
significant losses.  He infers that a risk premium implicit in the futures price is highly unlikely or 
the premium is masked by differences in price expectations. 
Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu (1994) follow up to Hartzmark’s work and examine the returns 
and forecasting ability of large traders in the frozen pork belly futures markets.  The data used 
are from the same database as Hartzmark (1987) which is the CFTC’s Large Trader Reporting 
82 
 
System and extends from 1982 to 1990. They calculate profits and search for skill using Cumby 
and Modest and Henriksson and Merton tests. The results show the distribution of profits over 
time is not random and all large reporting traders earn significant profits and small non-reporting 
traders experience losses. For a small subset of traders, significant profits are positively related to 
the traders’ ability to forecast price behavior.  The discovery of significant skill contradicts the 
notion that a large group of traders can make profits from risk premiums by naively positioning 
themselves opposite hedging traders. 
Phillips and Weiner (1994) used unique data to analyze the existence of normal 
backwardation in the North Sea oil forward market.  The data contain individual transactions 
rather than end of day positions and indicates the type of companies participating from July 1983 
to December 1989.  Profits and losses were computed by trader based on positions and the 
closing futures price.  Results find no significant profits or losses and do not support the theory 
of normal backwardation.  Given that entry into this forward market is far more costly than in 
futures markets, the absence of a risk premium in these results is even stronger evidence against 
the theory of normal backwardation.  The analysis also tests for forecasting ability using HM 
non-parametric tests and is unable to detect forecasting ability among any of the nine trader 
types. 
3.2.2  Non-diversifiable Risk in a Portfolio Context 
Dusak (1973) examined the question of risk premium in a unique fashion using the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model and non-diversifiable risk.  In this framework, the risk premium 
should depend not on the variability of prices but on the extent to which the variations in prices 
are systematically related to variations in the return on total wealth.  She analyzed wheat, corn, 
and soybeans futures from 1952 to 1967 using semi-monthly data.  The results indicate that 
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average returns and portfolio risk are both close to zero during the sample period, providing 
evidence that a risk premium does not exist in the futures market.  
Additional studies have been performed in an agricultural context using the portfolio 
approach; most indicate the absence of a risk premium except for Bjornson and Carter (1997) 
who find some evidence of a time-varying risk premium.  They use a conditional asset pricing 
model on data from 1969 to 1994 to evaluate time-varying expected returns to holding 
commodity stocks under varying economic conditions.  The expected return risk premia range 
from -0.03% to 0.03% of returns and does not support the theory of positive normal 
backwardation. 
3.2.3  Hedging Pressure 
Raynauld and Tessier (1984) approach the question of a risk premium in the futures 
market by using unrestricted regressions including pertinent variables selected from equilibrium 
and hedging models to explain risk premiums.  The authors study corn, wheat, and oats markets 
from the third quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of 1981.  In all three markets, risk premiums 
take on positive and negative values over extended periods.  Therefore, empirical evidence 
provides no support for Keynes’ normal backwardation theory that suggests futures prices are 
downward biased predictors of realized spot prices.  Also, results do not support the hedging 
pressure hypothesis as the percentage of open interest held by reporting speculators and hedgers 
did not vary in conformity with the ex ante risk premium.  For these reasons they were unable to 
empirically verifying the theory of normal backwardation. 
Chang and Stevenson (1985) investigate the value of the risk-bearing function of 
speculators in the futures market in light of increased price volatility in the latter half of their 
sample period. The study scrutinizes the trading performance of small traders for corn, wheat, 
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and soybean futures contracts in three sub-periods from 1951 to 1980 using a Henriksson and 
Merton (HM) methodology to assess small trader’s timing ability.  They find that small traders 
had ability in the last decade and attribute this to the extraction of a risk premium in more 
volatile futures markets. 
Chang (1985) studied the theory of normal backwardation further using Henriksson and 
Merton’s nonparametric procedure to test for market timing. The study uses corn, soybeans, and 
wheat semimonthly price quotes from July 1951 to June 1972 and monthly quotes from 
December 1972 to December 1980. The results show speculators are consistent winners in the 
futures markets and hedgers consistently lose money, providing evidence for normal 
backwardation. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that commodity futures prices 
are unbiased estimates of the future spot prices. 
Wang (2003) studies the behavior and performance of speculators and hedgers in 15 U.S. 
markets to determine if positive feedback or contrarian styles are evident as well as the existence 
of hedging pressure (risk premium). The study analyzes 15 U.S. futures markets from October 
1992 to March 2000, with monthly position data coming from the CFTC’s public Commitment 
of Traders report. The determinants of trading decisions are tested by regressing the change in 
net position of a trader type on lagged Consensus index, futures returns, and set of common 
information variables. Market timing tests regress returns on lagged changes in net positions and 
a set of information variables.  Results indicated that hedgers tend to engage in positive feedback 
trading, whereas speculators are contrarians. Speculators commonly outperform hedgers, but the 
market timing tests do not show that speculative traders have significant ability in predicting the 
market.  In the absence of superior timing ability, the hedging pressure effects, not skill, are 
determined to be the source of speculative profits. 
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Bryant, Bessler, and Haigh (2006) investigate the existence of normal backwardation and 
the possibility that speculators or uniformed trader activity affects price volatility. The 
commodities analyzed are corn, crude oil, Eurodollars, gold, Japanese yen, coffee, live cattle, 
and S&P 500 from March 21, 1995 through January 8, 2003 using the CFTC’s public 
Commitment of Traders (COT) report.  They use the Fast Causal Inference (FCI) algorithm, 
developed in causality literature to infer causal relationships using observational data. Results 
show no evidence of normal backwardation and no evidence that activity by traders affects price 
volatility. 
Dewally, Ederington, and Fernando (2009) study the existence of risk premia and if 
individual traders make profits attributed to information or luck. They use a proprietary data set 
of crude oil, gasoline, and heating oil from the CFTC’s Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS) 
from June 1993 through March 1997. They estimate the analysis of variance (ANOVA) across 
382 traders to test if the number of traders tending to make consistent profits or losses is more 
than one would expect due to chance. Then they test if futures prices tend to fall (rise) over time 
when hedgers on balance are long (short), if true this presents evidence that a risk premium 
exists. Results indicate that speculators earn profits primarily due to the liquidity and risk 
absorption services they provide hedgers. 
Most recently, Fishe and Smith (2010) attempt to identify informed and liquidity traders 
in futures markets from a large group of 8,921 unique traders.  The data used are from the 
CFTC’s Large Trader Reporting System and extends from 2000 to mid-2009 covering the 12 
commodities of crude oil, copper, corn, cotton, gold, heating oil, natural gas, silver, soybean oil, 
soybeans, sugar, and wheat.  Instead of using the CFTC’s classification of traders ex-ante, they 
analyze trader behavior and group them ex-post by trading actions.  Traders are considered 
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liquidity demanders if open interest moves with prices and is consistent with price changes.  
Traders are considered liquidity suppliers if their open interest moves with prices but is 
inconsistent with price changes.  They find no evidence that commercial hedgers pay a risk 
premium to speculators.  In fact, the results contradict hedging pressure theory, in that liquidity 
demanders tend to be managed money/hedge fund traders and liquidity suppliers tend to be 
commercial traders. 
Brunetti and Reiffen (2010) analyzed commodity index traders and hedgers in corn, 
soybeans, and CBOT wheat markets from July 2003 through December 2008 again using the 
CFTC’s disaggregated Large Trader Reporting System.  They developed an equilibrium model 
of trader behavior for CITs and traditional short hedgers to determine if the cost of hedging has 
decreased or increased in the presence of index traders.  The empirical estimation employs a 
GARCH (1,1) model that regresses spreads between nearby and deferred contracts on index 
trader levels, a model derived measure of hedging activity in the cash market, and various 
dummy variables accounting for pre- and post-harvest contracts.  They determine that hedging 
costs have decreased in the presence of index traders, consistent with the explanation that CITs 
are willing to take opposite positions from hedgers at lower prices than are traditional 
speculators.  Although Brunetti and Reiffen determine that hedging costs have decreased, they 
do not calculate if index traders or speculators successfully profit from absorbing hedge trades. 
To conclude, the literature provides inconclusive evidence as to the existence of a risk 
premium. The most powerful evidence comes from profit calculations using daily end of day 
position data from the CFTC’s Large Trader Reporting system.  Previous studies using this type 
of data are dated or suffer from limitations on the number of commodities analyzed or the 
inability to disentangle naïve trading strategies from skill-based trading strategies.  The 
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emergence of CITs, which are basically long-passive traders (with the aforementioned caveats), 
provides the clearest proxy to  develop an assessment of the original normal backwardation 
theory.  
3.3  Data 
The data for this study come from the CFTC Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS), 
which was designed for surveillance purposes to detect and deter futures and options market 
manipulation (Fenton and Martinaitas 2005).  The LTRS database contains end-of-day reportable 
positions for long futures, short futures, long delta-adjusted options, and short delta-adjusted 
options for each trader ID and contract maturity.21,22  Traders who meet or exceed the reporting 
levels set by CFTC must report their positions on a daily basis.  The reporting level can range 
from 25 contracts to over 1,000 contracts. The level for any given market is based on the total 
open positions in that market, the size of positions held by traders in the market, the surveillance 
history of the market, and the size of deliverable supplies for physical delivery markets.  If, at the 
daily market close, a reporting firm has a trader with a position at or above the CFTC’s reporting 
level in any single futures or option expiration month, the firm reports that trader’s entire 
position in all futures and options expiration months in that commodity, regardless of size.23  
The data provided in these reports usually cover 70-90 percent of open interest in any given 
market (CFTC, 2010). 
When a trader surpasses the reporting level threshold, a reporting firm must file a Form 
102 to identify each new reportable account and include the controlling traders of that account.  
The trader himself is then required to file a Form 40.  Since traders frequently carry positions 
through more than one reporting firm and can control or have financial interest through more 
than one account, the CFTC is able to combine these accounts by trader and ownership level 
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using detail from these forms.  For example, a diversified company can have a hedging operation 
and a separate speculative trading operation; these two operations would be assigned different 
trader ID’s but the same owner ID.   
In addition to ownership and trading control, classifications of traders are identified 
through the required filings.  The trader is either determined to be a commercial or 
noncommercial from the information provided on the Form 40 filing.  If a trader indicates they 
are engaged in bona fide hedging transactions, which classifies them as a commercial, then they 
are required to fill out Schedule 1 attached to Form 40 detailing their use of the futures markets 
for hedging.  Upon satisfaction of the reviewing staff, the trader would then be considered a 
commercial trader and given a sub-classification based on his underlying business (e.g. producer, 
manufacturer, merchant, swaps dealer, etc.).  If a trader does not meet the requirements for a 
commercial trader, they are then classified as a noncommercial trader; which is commonly 
referred to as a speculator.  Form 40 provides a section allowing the reporting trader to check a 
box indicating their registration under the Commodity Exchange Act; these noncommercial 
classifications include futures commission merchant (FCM), introducing broker (IB), associate 
person (AP) of an FCM, commodity trading advisor (CTA), commodity pool operator (CPO), 
floor broker (FB), and floor trader (FT).    
Absent from the current From 40 is the sub-classification of Commodity Index Traders 
(CITs).   This category was created in response to industry concerns to separate out the passive 
long index traders from the original commercial and noncommercial categories to form a stand-
alone category.  CFTC staff engaged in a detailed process to identify index traders in the LTRS 
for inclusion in the new category.  The process included screening all traders with large long 
positions in commodity futures contracts, analyzing futures positions to determine a pattern 
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consistent with index trading, reviewing line of business forms (Form 40) to obtain more detailed 
information on their use of the market, and conducting an expansive series of phone and in-
person interviews with traders.  The CFTC acknowledges that the classification procedure was 
imperfect and that “…some traders assigned to the Index Traders category are engaged in other 
futures activity that could not be disaggregated….Likewise, the Index Traders category will not 
include some traders who are engaged in index trading, but for whom it does not represent a 
substantial part of their overall trading activity” (CFTC 2008a).  While recognizing these 
potential problems, the CIT data are nevertheless widely regarded as providing valuable 
information about index trader activity in commodity futures markets. 
This new commodity index trader category was first released publically in January 2007 
as a Supplemental report coinciding with the CFTC’s stalwart Commitment of Traders report 
(COT).  The COT report pools traders into two broad categories (commercial and non-
commercial) covering over 90 U.S. commodity markets, whereas the Supplemental CIT report 
only covers 12 agricultural futures markets: corn, soybeans, soybean oil, CBOT wheat, KCBOT 
wheat, feeder cattle, lean hogs, live cattle, cocoa, cotton, coffee, and sugar.  The Supplemental 
CIT report covers a smaller number of markets because index traders in other markets are 
engaged in substantial amounts of non-index related trading activity which makes identification 
and segregation more difficult.  The CIT category was computed retroactively by the CFTC for 
2006 to provide context for the initial release of the data in 2007.24  In this study, a longer 
retroactive application is applied from 2000 to 2006.  This extended application assumes traders 
classified as CITs in 2007-2009 were also CITs in 2000-2006.  The retroactive application is 
supported by both the fact that CIT’s are passive net longs by definition without constantly 
changing strategies, and by discussions with CFTC staff which indicate that CIT designations 
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have changed little since the classification scheme was first constructed in 2006.25 
For this study, daily futures and delta adjusted positions from the LTRS cover the period 
from January 2000 through September 2009 for all 12 commodities in which CIT classifications 
exists.26  The commodities studied are corn, soybeans, soybean oil, and wheat all traded at the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), cocoa, coffee, cotton, and sugar traded on the Intercontinental 
Exchange (ICE), feeder cattle, lean hogs and, live cattle traded at the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME), and wheat traded on the Kansas City Board of Trade.  The traders are divided 
into the four broad categories established in the LTRS based on trading motivation; these include 
commercial, noncommercial, index, and nonreporting.  Nonreporting traders are small traders 
not required to submit their positions to the LTRS because their holdings are under a pre-
specified threshold; these small traders represent residual open interest not reported to the large 
trader reporting system at the CFTC.  In this sample there are 23.6 million observations and 
14,487 unique traders.  The noncommercial group has the largest number of unique traders at 
10,470, commercial has 3,975 and index has only 42 unique traders.  The number of 
observations is greatest in the commercial group at 12.2 million, next is noncommercial with 
10.6 million observations, and finally the CITs have 855,000 observations. 
3.4 Trader Characteristics 
Trader characteristics are analyzed to identify the position tendencies of traders both 
through time and across categories.  The positions of CITs are shown to be net long opposite 
commercial trader positions where as noncommercial trader positions change between net long 
and net short.  The long/short balance is important since futures markets are a zero sum game 
and for every winner there must be a loser and gains equal total losses.  Furthermore, the CIT 
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position characteristics are shown to provide a desirable real time proxy for testing the strategy 
imbedded in the original normal backwardation theory. 
Traders best suited to test for the existence of a risk premium have two main 
characteristics, (i) positions opposite hedging traders and (ii) a passive strategy.  As shown in 
table 3.1 (panel A) commercial traders are net negative for the vast majority of yearly average 
positions except for feeder cattle; feeder cattle commercial traders may include more long 
hedging feedlot operators who protect against rising input prices.  From 2000 to 2009 the 
commercial position levels in the 12 commodities became increasingly larger negative positions.  
Conversely, CIT positions are net long and have increased long positions through the sample 
period (table 3.1, panel C) mirroring the increasing levels of net short positions by commercial 
traders.  This key relationship between CITs and commercial trader positions satisfies the first 
requirement for testing the risk premium theory, positions opposite hedging traders.  Second, 
following Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006), the motivations for CITs trading are twofold, the 
desire for diversification affects and the ability to earn a risk premium.   CITs attempt to 
accomplish this dual motivation by taking long positions in a basket of commodity futures 
contracts.  As shown in table 3.1 (panel C) CITs are consistently net long unlike traditional 
speculators (panel B) that fluctuated between net long and net short since these noncommercial 
traders are speculative in nature and tend to exhibit considerable trend-following behavior or 
employ algorithmic trading strategies (Sanders, Irwin, and Merrin 2009).  This key difference 
between the CITs and traditional noncommercial traders satisfies the second requirement for 
testing the risk premium theory, passive trading strategy.  Although the index funds themselves 
are passive, the traders behind these funds do show a minimal amount of trend following 
behavior as shown in Aulerich (2011a). 
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To determine the magnitude of positions relative to total open interest, the percentage of 
both long and short open interest for the same groups of traders analyzed in table 3.1 are shown 
in tables 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.  In table 3.2, commercial traders (panel A) have a decreasing 
proportion of long open interest but in 2009 still hold 21 percent of long open interest across 
commodities (down from 41 percent in 2000).  Noncommercial traders (panel B) have a 
fluctuating but relatively steady proportion of long open interest at 31 percent across 
commodities and years.  Commodity index traders (panel C) have an increasing proportion of 
long open interest, consistent with steadily increasing levels of open interest shown in table 3.1.  
The commercial traders have increasingly transferred long open interest to CITs thereby 
decreasing commercial percent of long open interest and increasing CITs proportion. 
Table 3.3 documents the proportion of the market taking the short side opposite of those 
long side positions shown in table 3.2.  Commercial traders (panel A) are a large and steady 
proportion of short open interest; indicating commercial traders position levels increase along 
with open interest.  Noncommercial traders (panel B) percentage of short open interest is similar 
to that in long open interest, both a fluctuating but steady proportion of open interest.  The 
average percent of short open interest held by noncommercial traders over all years and 
commodities is 27 percent, comparable to the 31 percent of long open interest.  CITs in panel C 
hold a small portion of short open interest although this has increased slightly in 2008 and 2009 
possibly due to swap dealers diversifying away from strictly servicing index traders or from the 
emergence of a greater number of actively managed commodity funds (Meyer 2009). 
In total, CITs are well suited with positions opposite hedgers and a largely passive 
strategy to provide a natural experiment testing for the existence of a risk premium.  The 
commercial traders hold a consistent net short position through the time period with a decreasing 
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proportion of long positions.  Opposite commercial traders, CITs increase long position levels 
and account for an increased proportion of long open interest in the market.  The traditional 
speculators, noncommercial traders, hold positions fluctuating between net long and net short 
with relatively stable proportions of both long and short open interest. 
3.5  Price Trend Characteristics 
The movement of commodity prices from January 2000 to September 2009 is relevant to 
the profits and losses methodology due to the nature of trader’s positions.  For example, a 
downward trajectory in prices would favor commercial traders who tend to be net short; 
conversely, an upward movement of prices would favor index traders who are consistently net 
long.  Over the time period of the sample there is no clear visual demarcation between stable 
price periods and unstable periods that apply to all commodities, but commodities can be placed 
into three groupings based on general price patterns. 
The first group includes the grains (corn, soybeans, soybean oil, and wheat contracts).  
Price patterns for this group are relatively stable in the earlier portion of the data until large price 
increases in early 2007 and subsequent decreases in late 2008 and 2009; figure 3.1 demonstrates 
this pattern with corn.  The second group is composed of the livestock commodities (feeder 
cattle, lean hogs, and live cattle) in addition to cotton.  These commodity prices are relatively 
stable and fluctuate in a price channel as demonstrated by lean hogs in figure 3.2.  The third 
group includes the soft commodities (cocoa, coffee, and sugar) except cotton.  These prices had 
substantial and sustained price increases at the end of the sample period without subsequent 
declines, illustrated by cocoa in figure 3.3. 
Within each of the three price groupings differences exist; the appendix includes the 
additional commodity price figures.  In the grain grouping, all commodities began an upward 
94 
 
trend prior to the start of 2007, but unlike the other commodities, corn moves in a “head and 
shoulders” pattern with two smaller price spikes flanking the large spike.  In addition, corn, 
soybean oil, and to a greater extent soybeans had a small price spike in 2004, whereas wheat did 
not have a pronounced price increase.  Within the second grouping, the price channel width is the 
smallest for lean hogs at 35 cents and largest for cotton at 60 cents.  Lean hogs experienced a 20 
cent drop and subsequent rebound in price at the end of 2002 which was not pronounced in the 
other commodities.  The third group is the most volatile and diverse.    From 2000 to 2001, 
coffee trended down, cocoa trended up, and sugar was relatively stable.  Sugar and coffee 
experienced a small rally starting in mid-2005 that reversed in late 2006, whereas cocoa did not 
have such a rally.  All commodities saw prices increases in 2009 without subsequent decreases.  
Despite the differences within the groupings, the different aggregations provide a constructive 
way to analyze the results. 
Out of the 12 commodities analyzed, 8 had major price upswings of greater than 50 
percent and only lean hogs experienced a price decline (table 3.4).  From the analysis of price 
trends and trader positions, expected profits for CITs would be positive since CIT positions are 
typically net long and profits for commercial firms would be negative due to predominately net 
short positions.  Noncommercial traders expected profits are more difficult to forecast due to the 
dynamic nature of their trading.  These profit expectations are based on general price and 
position behavior; to test these generalizations, daily profits are calculated based on actual trader 




3.6  Results 
Daily profits for each trader for each contract are calculated by multiplying the end of 
day positions on day t by the settlement price change for the corresponding contract between the 
current day t and the following day t+1 as shown in equation 127, 
(1) ( ), 1 , 1Trader Profit End Day Position Price - Pricei t i t t t+ += × .  
The calculation assumes positions held at the end of day t are held throughout the trading day 
t+1 and all position adjustments occur at the settlement price on t+1.  Since the data only consist 
of end of day positions, any profits of day-traders or scalpers who mainly trade intra-day are not 
included in the analysis.  The profits do not account for commissions or margin requirements due 
to lack of available data and to maintain consistency with previous work.28  
 3.6.1  Aggregate Profit Assessment 
The profit and losses calculations (table 3.5) first report the results for all 12 commodities 
separately and then summarize the profits into the three groups of commodities specified in the 
Price Trend Characteristics section which include (i) row crops, (ii) livestock and cotton, and 
(iii) softs.  Within each commodity and group, each measure is broken down by commercial, 
index (CITs), and noncommercial traders and the remainder of traders are classified as 
nonreporting.29    
The calculated measures in table 3.5 first include a section of net dollar returns to 
provide overall position profits and losses.  Net dollar returns are calculated in equation 1 by 
defining  as net positions (long- short).  A positive CIT profit would 
support the existence of a risk premium.  The total net dollar returns are tested for each 
commodity and category to determine if the mean returns are statistically different from zero.  
The standard t-test is first used and then the Wilcoxon rank test is employed in the presences of 
,End of Day Position i t
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non-normality.  The Wilcoxon rank test is a nonparametric signed rank test using the sign of 
differences between observations and median to determine statistical significance.  All net profits 
of traders in a specific commodity and category are subtotaled first by day and then by monthly 
returns.30  A star denotes the mean of daily returns is different than zero and an apostrophe 
denotes the mean of monthly returns is different than zero. 
In the theory of normal backwardation, naïve speculators can position themselves 
opposite hedgers to earn profits.  In direct contrast to this theory, CITs appear to transfer wealth 
to noncommercial traders where CIT’s overall net dollar returns are -$6.9 billion and 
noncommercial are $7.9 billion.  On the other hand, commercial traders lose a small -$7 million.  
CITs exhibit losses in 9 out of 12 markets, with a loss of -$752 million in row crops, -$6,433 
million in livestock and cotton, and modest profits of $321 million in the soft commodity 
category.   
Unlike CITs, noncommercial traders report positive profits in 9 out of 12 market with the 
majority of profits in row crops ($6.2 bil) and livestock ($1.8 bil) with small losses in softs.  
Commercial traders, on the other hand, report negative net profits in 5 out of 12 markets with 
losses in row crops (-$4.5 bil) and softs (-$517 mil) but large gains in livestock ($4.3 bil).  The 
commercial results are the least conclusive about the profitability of traders, since unlike CITs 
and noncommercial traders where 9 out of 12 markets correspond in the direction of profitability, 
profits and losses of commercial traders vary across commodities.  This difference may be due to 
hedgers having offsetting cash positions not represented in this data which limits visibility into 
their entire profit picture.  Overall, the total net profit results do not support a risk premium; if a 
risk premium existed we would expect to see CITs earning profits and commercial traders 
experiencing futures market losses as they pay CITs for absorbing hedging risk. 
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In table 3.5, net profits are computed separately for when a trader is net long versus net 
short.  In equation 1, net long (short) net dollar returns are calculated by defining 
 as the level of positions when a trader is net long (short) and zero when a 
trader is net short (long).   These calculations are used to determine if a group is more successful 
as a net long or net short trader.  If CITs are earning a risk premium, net long positions are 
expected to be profitable as these positions are opposite net short commercial hedgers.  The 
results show positive profits when CITs are net short in row crops and livestock and negative 
when net long; counterintuitive to the expected outcome if CITs were earning a risk premium for 
taking long positions opposite hedgers.  Although, consistent with CIT investment style, the 
largest portion of returns are generated when the trader is net long.  Soft commodities on the 
other hand, do have returns consistent with a risk premium where net long positions earn $764 
million and net short positions lose -$443 million.  Soft commodities differ because these prices 
sharply increase at the end of the sample without a subsequent decrease whereby the long 
positions become profitable (appendix figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.4).  
,End of Day Position i t
The next section of table 3.5 calculates gross dollar returns to determine how closely the 
magnitude of gross losses and gains coincide; in equation 1, if is positive then 
that trader’s profit is included in gross gains, if T
, 1Traders Profit i t+
, 1i traders Profit + is negative then the trader’s 
profit is included in the gross losses calculation.  Gross gains minus gross loses equal net profits.  
If gross gains and gross losses are balanced it suggests that random elements may be a more 
important factor in determining the group’s performance (Hartzmark 1987) and would be 
contrary to the theory of normal backwardation.  Results of gross dollar losses and gains in 
columns four and five (table 3.5) are of similar magnitude totaling approximately -$317 billion 
and $310 billion for index traders suggesting that random elements are an important factor in 
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determining profits and supporting the argument against a risk premium.  Skewness and kurtosis 
of CITs profits is also considered; the theory of a risk premium would predict the distribution 
would be skewed to the right indicating the profits earned are more prevalent than predicted by a 
normal distribution.  CIT profits results have a skewness of at -1.21 and kurtosis at 3.46, 
compared to the normal distribution with skewness of 0 and kurtosis of 3.31  The profit 
distribution is slightly peaked with a kurtosis greater than 3 and skewed to the left indicating a 
longer left tail relative to the right.  The departure from normality is contrary to the theory of a 
risk premium and indicates that more CITs earn negative returns than predicted by a normal 
distribution.   
The number of days section in table 3.5 compares the number of days with net long 
positions compared to net short positions to view investment direction preferences of traders.  
Based on trading motivations, commercials are expected to have more net short days, CITs are 
expected to have more net long days, and noncommericals are expected to have roughly the same 
number of net long and short days.  Consistent with expected investment behavior, index traders 
have over 400,000 net long days and only 10,000 net short days.  Commercial traders are about 2 
times more likely to be short than long and noncommercial traders are 1.5 times more likely to 
be long than short.  The “split” between long and short days for commercial traders is less 
pronounced than for index traders (2 times versus 40 times) for a variety of reasons including i) 
commercials can be either long or short hedgers and ii) many commercials make trading 
decisions that are not strictly hedging but are more speculative in nature based on beliefs about 
the future. 
Next, the number of traders section in table 3.5 first details the number of total traders, 
second reports the number of traders making a positive profit, and finally computes the 
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percentage of profitable traders by simply dividing the number of traders with a positive profit 
by the total number of traders.  A figure of approximately 50% would indicate profits are random 
among traders, over 50% would indicate more traders earn profits than losses, and below 50% 
would indicated the majority of traders in a group lose money.  Both a significant portion of 
traders above or below 50% would indicate nonrandom profits.  The theory of normal 
backwardation would predict the proportion of successful traders should be higher for CITs since 
they are earning a risk premium without the need for skill (Hartzmark 1987).  Results in the final 
columns show that, in fact, the CITs have the lowest percentage of traders with positive profits at 
only 40% versus approximately 50% for commercial and noncommercial traders, contradicting 
the theory of normal backwardation.  The majority of CITs experiencing losses may be caused 
by CITs paying commercial traders or noncommercial traders for liquidity. 
3.6.2  Dynamic Profit Assessment 
The aggregate profit results find negative CIT profits, indicating that a passive strategy 
opposite hedgers does not results in earning a risk premium.  Positive profits would be predicted 
for net long CITs because all commodities, except for one, had higher prices at the end of the 
sample period than the beginning (table 3.4).  In the soft commodity group, the positive net 
dollar returns ($321K) for index traders are anticipated as price trends in the latter half of the 
sample period increase without a subsequent decline (figure 3.3).  The losses in the other two 
groupings (row crops, livestock and cotton) are unexpected as commodities had higher prices at 
the end of the sample period, except lean hogs (table 3.4).  The counterintuitive profits of CITs 
spur the question, how did CITs experience such large negative returns?  To answer this question 
two examples will examine detailed activity from the corn and lean hogs markets; these markets 
are chosen because they reflect the behavior of the row crops and livestock groupings.  Softs are 
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not highlighted because profits are positive, as expected based on price patterns, but the appendix 
covers each commodity in turn.  The activity of lean hogs and corn will be examined by 
assessing net positions and cumulative profits of trader classifications over time to provide 
relevant insights into the presence of normal backwardation.  This temporal view of profits 
allows an analysis of profit levels during various price patterns (e.g. increasing, decreasing, and 
stable) and ability to view the existence of a risk premium over time through CIT profits.  
First, the temporal existence of a risk premium for corn is examined where prices 
increase and decrease substantially in 2008 and 2009 (figure 3.4, panel A).32  The positions of 
the trading groups (panel B) increase for CITs rapidly during 2004 and 2005 while at the same 
time commercial traders became increasingly net short and noncommercial traders became more 
net long; the cumulative daily profits for these trading groups are presented in panel C.    From 
2000 to 2006 when corn prices appear to be mean–reverting, the profit patterns are similar to 
Hartzmark (1987) which contrasts with the theory of normal backwardation.  Commercials 
experience gains and speculators experience losses; CITs experience losses to a greater extent 
than noncommercial traders.  The profit distribution indicates commercial traders are paid by 
speculators to hedge risk.  Only when prices spike precipitously (or are non-normal) does any 
evidence of normal backwardation emerge.  CITs show positive profits during the price increase 
but not during the price decrease which indicates the profits have more to do with their long 
positions in an upward trending market than earning a risk premium during a volatile market for 
offsetting hedging risk for commercial traders.  Additional insights may be seen from the 2008 
period based on the peaks and valleys of profits during the period; figure 3.5 focuses solely on 
2008 corn prices, CIT cumulative profits, and CIT net positions.  Positions reached a high of 
450,000 contracts in May 2008, less than two months before the all time high corn price of $7.60 
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per bushel at the beginning of July.    The CIT positions were at their highest levels as prices 
started to decrease; when prices rapidly declined, so did positions but over half of the positions 
rode the prices all the way down to the lows of $3.  The CITs profit decreased by approximately 
$7.5 billion in the five months from July to November 2008.  The pattern of positions and profits 
helps to explain the negative CIT profits in corn; CIT positions decreased more slowly than 
prices (partly due to CITs strategy as long passive traders) during the price spike and during 
periods of stable prices CITs did not earn a risk premium. 
Second, the temporal existence of a risk premium in the lean hog contract is examined 
where prices (figure 3.6, panel A) over the sample period were not characterized by a historic 
price spike, as seen in corn, but CITs still lost -$2.6 billion over the period.  The positions of the 
trading groups (panel B) increased for CITs rapidly from 2004 into 2008 while at the same time 
commercial traders became more net short.  At the end of July 2008 CIT positions peaked at 
123,500 contracts and started a precipitous decline which correlated with an equally as abrupt 
reversion in commercial trader positions.  The cumulative daily profits (panel C) were relatively 
stable until July 2008 where a divergence in trading group profits occurred.  The divergence in 
July 2008 is not due to a historic price move, like in corn, but is more likely due to a change in 
the commodity marketplace.  Since CITs participate across many commodity markets, the rapid 
deterioration of prices in commodities such as corn, wheat, and crude oil that make up a much 
larger portion of a commodity index (Aulerich 2008), triggered a decrease in CIT positions 
across all index commodities.  Subsequently, CITs exited the lean hog contract reducing 
positions by almost 50% in 6 month; this is best shown in figure 3.7 that focuses solely on the 
2007 to 2009 time period.  The evidence of CITs earning a risk premium from absorbing risk is 
mixed prior to 2006 (figure 3.6, panel C) and is nonexistent thereafter as CITs profits continually 
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decreased.  The profitable commercial and noncommercial traders appear to be supplying CITs 
with liquidity as they exited the contract in droves, not the other way around.  The lean hog 
market is relatively small and the rapid decline in CIT positions demanding liquidity resulted in 
CITs paying commercials and noncommercial traders to offset their positions.  The pattern of 
positions and profits helps to explain the negative CIT profits in lean hogs; CITs did not earn a 
large risk premium from 2000-2006 and paid handsomely for the liquidity services provided to 
them by commercial and noncommercial traders from 2007-2009.  
3.6.3  Normalization of CIT Profits 
The net profit by category in table 3.5 can be unduly influenced by an influx of 
commodity index money during a single time period, such as CIT positions reaching maximum 
levels in 2008.   In simple terms, a profit of $1 million produces different returns depending on 
an investment of $1 billion versus an investment of $10 billion.33  For this reason, a return on 
investment measure normalizes profit by notional value to determine if profitability or size of 
invested dollars has changed over time.  The cumulative monthly profit is divided by the month’s 
average daily notional value to provide a return on investment over the sample period.34  
Equation 2 displays the return on investment as, 
tTotal Profit in Month% Profit 100,
Avg Daily Notional Value in Montht t
⎛ ⎞= ×⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
(2)   
where the cumulative CIT profit in month t  is divided the average daily notional value in month 
t.35  Since a similar pattern emerges for individual commodities, results are aggregated over all 
commodities in figure 3.8 to show that CITs do not make consistent positively monthly returns, 
and the average monthly return on investment over the entire time period is -0.00024 percent.   
The average monthly return is of such a small magnitude because average daily notional value is 
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of considerable size.   Regardless, evidence does not support consistent risk premiums earned by 
CITs over the sample period.  
 3.6.4  Roll Period Gains/Losses 
 Another possibility that may undermine the conclusion of no risk premium is the 
concentration of losses during the roll period.  As shown in Aulerich (2011a), CITs change 
positions from nearest to maturity contract to the next nearest to maturity contract during a “roll 
period” which is typically concentrated  at the beginning of the month prior to contract 
expiration.  The transparent rolling trading strategy, called “sunshine trading” (Admati 1991; 
Brunnermeier 2005), may allow other traders in the market to front run or take advantage of the 
CITs predictable position rolling.36  Trader losses during the roll period and gains outside the roll 
period would question the conclusion of the absence of a risk premium in the marketplace and 
may be evidence of front running by other trader types. 
 To address this possibility table 3.6 separates profits experienced during the roll period 
from outside the roll period.37  In the last row, All Markets, the returns to CITs are negative both 
in and outside the roll period.  Although, the losses are higher during the roll period despite the 
shorter time period it represents.  Individual commodities and commodity groupings have mixed 
evidence with only 4 commodities with gains outside the roll period and losses during the roll 
period (coffee, sugar, CBOT wheat, KS wheat).  In light of this evidence, CITs do not appear to 
only incur losses during the roll period and the existence of a risk premium is not supported. 
 Overall, the theory of Keynesian normal backwardation is rejected when commodity 
index traders’ (CITs) profits are examined as a natural experiment for testing the existence of a 
risk premium.  Despite increasing price trends, CITs experience negative profits in 9 out of 12 
commodities with total net loss of -$6.9 billion.  The normalization of profits over time by 
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investment size provides further evidence against the Keynesian theory of normal 
backwardation; CITs do not make consistently positive monthly returns and the average monthly 
return on investment is negative.  Furthermore, CIT losses are not isolated to the roll period but 
rather are experienced both in and outside of the roll. 
 3.7  Summary 
The debate over the existence of a risk premium is a central to understanding the 
functioning of futures markets.  The Keynesian theory of normal backwardation (Keynes 1930) 
predicts that speculators earn a positive return over time and hedgers earn a negative return as 
they pay speculators to reduce business risk.  The purpose of this research is to revisit the risk 
premium debate by employing the profits and losses methodology using Commodity Index 
Traders (CITs) as a natural experiment.  The use CITs is not without shortcomings, since CITs 
show some trend following behavior, but the index traders provide the clearest proxy to test the 
profitability of positions that consistently trade opposite hedgers. 
Unlike past research that tests all noncommercial traders together, entangling both an 
active trading strategy designed to leverage perceived skill and a passive trading strategy 
attempting to earn a risk premium, the CITs offer a natural experiment to actually calculate the 
profits earned for passively holding futures contracts in an effort to earn a risk premium.  The 
dataset for this study is from the proprietary CFTC large trader reporting system database from 
January 2000 to September 2009 for 12 commodity futures markets providing one of the most 
comprehensive and detailed profit calculation studies to date.   
 Our findings reject the theory of Keynesian normal backwardation when commodity 
index traders’ (CITs) profits are used to test for the existence of a risk premium.  Despite 
increasing price trends, CITs experience negative profits in 9 out of 12 commodities with overall 
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net loss of -$6.9 billion over the entire time period of 2000 to 2009.  The normalization of profits 
over time by investment size provides further evidence against the Keynesian theory of normal 
backwardation; CITs do not make consistently positive monthly returns and the average monthly 
return on investment is negative.  Furthermore, CIT losses are not isolated to the roll period but 
rather are experienced both in and outside of the roll time frame. 
 The findings are consistent with the research by Hartzmark (1987), who finds no 
evidence of a risk premium in agricultural markets, and by Phillips and Weiner (1994) which 
disprove the evidence of normal backwardation in the North Sea Oil forward market.  Using 
more recent data, Fishe and Smith (2010) also find no evidence of a risk premium, although they 
apply different methods which use liquidity demand and supply analysis.  In contrast to the 
conclusions in this essay, Dewally et al. (2009) use data from 1993-1997 and find evidence of a 
risk premium in three energy markets due to the absence of trader skill.  Also, the passive 
commodity investment encouraged by the influential paper of Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) is 
not supported.  Gorton and Rouwenhorst reported that a 5% risk premium could be earned by 
passively investing in commodities from 1959 to 2004.  The results from this third essay and 
their study may differ for many reasons including, (i) the use of a different time period, (ii) the 
inclusion of 36 commodities across many sectors, or (iii) the use of simulated positions to 
calculate profitability.  
The failure to find support for the Keynesian theory of normal backwardation in this 
essay may be explained by the speculative supply of services (with respect to expected dollar 
profits) being horizontal at a zero return (Hartzmark 1987).  Thus, the risk premium will be bid 
to zero and the returns for bearing risk disappear.  An alternative theory is that the risk absorbing 





commercial traders are providers of liquidity, which runs contrary to previous beliefs (Working 
1960).  Possibly the emergence of CITs has altered the market structure; the liquidity provided 
by commercials is now more valuable to CITs than any risk absorption services offered by CITs 
to commercial traders.   
This research argues against the theory of a positive risk premium, either constant or time 
varying, but cannot reject the idea of a time varying risk premium that changes between positive 
and negative values which in aggregate would be inconclusive and not inconsistent with this 
research.  Additional questions are raised, specifically, do noncommercial traders really think of 
themselves as earning a varying risk premium?  How do noncommercial traders experience 
substantial profits over the time period?  This study rejects the theory of normal backwardation 
and provides motivation for further research examining the forecasting skill of the 
noncommercial traders.
3.8 Tables and Figures
Commodity 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Panel A: Commercial Trader Number of Contracts
1 Cocoa -15,860 -1,637 2,497 17,552 -9,854 -18,064 -28,450 -61,432 -51,623 -38,068
2 Coffee -5,585 -3,205 -14,439 -9,634 -38,817 -41,820 -41,487 -60,908 -70,411 -48,108
3 Cotton -17,189 12,254 -21,313 -35,039 1,747 -40,011 -56,269 -108,453 -115,766 -72,073
4 Sugar -39,270 -7,321 -55,218 -53,121 -110,363 -186,401 -193,763 -221,994 -417,904 -298,294
5 Feeder Cattle 2,522 2,882 -163 366 874 -1,941 -1,387 -2,298 -505 -1,581
6 Lean Hogs -15,769 -8,710 -5,623 -9,566 -29,610 -29,084 -57,978 -63,597 -80,377 -29,041
7 Live Cattle -20,497 -13,247 -27,331 -32,823 -40,394 -49,390 -65,776 -87,917 -94,598 -58,446
8 Corn -54,692 -19,007 -67,214 -47,888 -127,954 -154,582 -443,079 -480,430 -455,991 -215,864
9 Soybeans -45,680 -18,511 -47,297 -66,436 -39,404 -59,027 -67,703 -222,075 -184,688 -138,025
10 Soybean Oil 768 -9,249 -25,168 -42,642 -42,291 -50,753 -105,163 -142,974 -87,328 -51,000
11 Wheat CBOT -32,454 -28,109 -32,729 -33,465 -45,195 -84,728 -146,862 -139,298 -118,669 -81,735
12 Wheat KCBOT -15,826 -16,520 -15,030 -11,680 -15,806 -27,500 -64,839 -53,954 -29,649 -22,840
Panel B: Noncommercial Trader Number of Contracts
1 Cocoa -3,947 -4,598 -7,150 -20,874 -3,964 6,716 11,198 38,118 23,674 18,408
2 Coffee -397 -4,638 3,234 -5,292 9,883 15,322 3,649 14,316 13,797 8,818
3 Cotton 7,760 -19,265 10,205 23,374 -19,039 -3,145 -19,507 11,005 13,510 2,639
4 Sugar 12,779 -7,598 15,453 11,353 22,166 61,126 42,611 -22,398 82,266 93,847
5 Feeder Cattle 5,054 2,882 -268 2,356 662 5,482 2,622 2,487 -59 -721
6 Lean Hogs 10,797 6,350 -1,087 1,389 8,597 -1,196 -3,311 -7,672 -12,366 -24,428
7 Live Cattle 9,449 10,483 17,757 25,014 13,062 16,161 8,819 4,632 -1,447 -14,664
Table 3.1  Average Daily Net Position by Trader Category in 12 Commodity Futures Markets for all 
Contract Maturities, 2000-2009
 
8 Corn 45,209 8,211 22,533 7,343 50,248 -31,197 141,898 197,906 173,503 1,912
9 Soybeans 20,303 -5,487 27,148 34,897 4,667 2,354 -16,700 100,030 67,529 39,718
10 Soybean Oil -6,884 1,266 10,649 28,146 21,282 5,067 32,494 59,437 11,849 -7,704
11 Wheat CBOT -2,158 -3,683 3,118 6,487 -12,413 -41,772 -25,097 -18,574 -26,604 -52,910
12 Wheat KCBOT 4,305 1,442 1,887 2,088 1,132 11,576 42,041 29,182 11,981 1,846
Panel C: Commodity Index Trader Number of Contracts
1 Cocoa 2,208 1,447 1,892 2,612 11,549 7,483 13,272 17,534 23,612 16,195
2 Coffee 2,728 1,475 2,867 6,916 21,735 23,114 33,862 42,716 54,434 38,165
3 Cotton 4,967 4,009 5,579 7,863 16,132 38,696 71,430 87,229 95,249 65,637
4 Sugar 12,898 10,059 17,659 23,497 61,931 98,672 136,135 230,434 309,598 180,138
5 Feeder Cattle 1 101 1,557 1,933 2,838 4,362 6,562 8,315 8,265 6,210
6 Lean Hogs 7,858 6,479 8,654 10,546 26,801 43,871 76,923 80,275 100,138 56,472
7 Live Cattle 22,360 12,779 12,067 13,941 33,118 52,931 86,152 112,310 128,549 90,465
8 Corn 28,732 30,217 48,209 53,656 117,364 233,142 393,954 357,482 358,979 289,860
9 Soybeans 6,509 4,920 9,563 28,279 36,692 76,884 114,591 147,449 143,982 122,437
10 Soybean Oil -122 1 949 1,402 10,773 38,030 65,801 72,351 68,371 54,855
11 Wheat CBOT 20,178 18,704 21,439 25,702 56,682 134,408 195,194 185,341 165,968 151,227
12 Wheat KCBOT 5,591 5,777 7,921 9,543 14,971 18,210 25,480 31,372 26,156 26,178
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Commodity 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Panel A: Commercial Trader Percent of Long Open Interest
1 Cocoa 62 68 66 71 66 63 54 38 34 39
2 Coffee 48 48 43 39 25 24 23 25 24 26
3 Cotton 47 63 41 33 49 23 18 15 17 11
4 Sugar 53 58 46 45 30 27 31 30 23 30
5 Feeder Cattle 38 37 23 21 28 18 17 13 16 14
6 Lean Hogs 23 24 17 20 10 8 6 9 7 7
7 Live Cattle 31 35 20 19 20 16 13 9 8 14
8 Corn 42 44 39 39 35 27 19 23 23 23
9 Soybeans 24 36 31 28 33 25 22 18 19 20
10 Soybean Oil 50 49 41 43 41 28 22 25 31 30
11 Wheat CBOT 26 26 23 19 18 12 15 11 9 10
12 Wheat KCBOT 47 39 43 45 34 33 17 22 29 26
Panel B: Noncommercial Trader Percent of Long Open Interest
1 Cocoa 17 21 23 18 15 22 28 43 42 39
2 Coffee 21 24 30 31 37 39 36 42 34 35
3 Cotton 27 12 33 42 20 26 26 34 30 25
4 Sugar 20 13 20 22 30 34 28 25 28 29
5 Feeder Cattle 41 40 32 42 31 47 42 39 41 33
6 Lean Hogs 40 36 28 34 35 35 34 35 34 33
7 Live Cattle 29 33 41 45 34 37 37 37 35 34
8 Corn 28 27 28 26 29 22 37 37 36 30
9 S b 38 28 35 36 26 27 31 42 37 35
Table 3.2  Average Daily Percent of Long Open Interest by Trader Category in 12 Commodity Futures 
Markets for all Contract Maturities, 2000-2009
 
oy eans
10 Soybean Oil 32 34 38 38 33 31 37 40 33 32
11 Wheat CBOT 30 32 33 34 28 22 30 33 29 28
12 Wheat KCBOT 18 21 18 18 21 28 46 38 29 26
Panel C: Commodity Index Trader Percent of Long Open Interest
1 Cocoa 2 1 2 3 11 6 10 12 17 15
2 Coffee 7 3 4 10 24 25 31 28 38 34
3 Cotton 8 6 8 10 20 38 46 41 45 54
4 Sugar 7 7 10 12 21 24 29 35 41 31
5 Feeder Cattle 0 1 12 11 18 17 23 30 30 30
6 Lean Hogs 17 16 26 26 35 43 48 45 49 45
7 Live Cattle 18 11 12 13 29 35 39 45 49 42
8 Corn 7 7 10 13 19 33 32 29 30 35
9 Soybeans 4 3 5 13 17 29 32 30 33 34
10 Soybean Oil 0 0 1 1 8 25 29 26 27 27
11 Wheat CBOT 15 14 20 26 38 55 47 48 54 54
12 Wheat KCBOT 8 8 11 16 23 21 19 24 27 31
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Commodity 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Panel A: Commercial Trader Percent of Short Open Interest
1 Cocoa 76 69 63 52 74 78 75 79 68 72
2 Coffee 60 54 64 52 65 67 61 64 70 66
3 Cotton 73 45 71 74 46 61 55 65 67 68
4 Sugar 75 64 75 69 67 70 71 62 72 71
5 Feeder Cattle 26 20 25 19 22 24 22 22 15 20
6 Lean Hogs 53 44 33 41 47 36 42 45 45 29
7 Live Cattle 48 46 47 48 55 49 43 44 43 41
8 Corn 54 49 53 51 56 49 54 60 59 48
9 Soybeans 51 47 55 57 49 47 41 61 59 55
10 Soybean Oil 49 55 58 70 66 62 66 74 63 52
11 Wheat CBOT 50 47 51 50 48 47 49 45 42 36
12 Wheat KCBOT 68 61 63 63 59 61 63 63 57 52
Panel B: Noncommercial Trader Percent of Short Open Interest
1 Cocoa 19 26 31 41 20 17 20 18 27 23
2 Coffee 22 32 26 38 27 25 32 33 27 28
3 Cotton 16 41 19 15 45 30 38 30 26 23
4 Sugar 13 18 13 18 23 20 19 29 18 16
5 Feeder Cattle 18 24 34 31 27 27 34 30 44 37
6 Lean Hogs 21 23 32 32 26 36 37 39 40 51
7 Live Cattle 22 25 24 23 23 27 33 36 36 41
8 Corn 19 25 24 24 21 27 26 22 23 30
Table 3.3  Average Daily Percent of Short Open Interest by Trader Category in 12 Commodity Futures 
Markets for all Contract Maturities, 2000-2009
 
9 Soybeans 26 32 22 21 26 27 36 23 23 26
10 Soybean Oil 37 34 31 20 21 27 25 20 29 36
11 Wheat CBOT 32 35 31 29 35 39 37 38 38 45
12 Wheat KCBOT 13 19 16 15 19 19 16 16 18 24
Panel C: Commodity Index Trader Percent of Short Open Interest
1 Cocoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2 Coffee 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
3 Cotton 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
4 Sugar 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 6
5 Feeder Cattle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2
6 Lean Hogs 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 3
7 Live Cattle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
8 Corn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
9 Soybeans 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
10 Soybean Oil 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 2
11 Wheat CBOT 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 5
12 Wheat KCBOT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
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Commodity Low High StartPrice EndPrice PctChange StDev
Cocoa ($/ton) 694 3275 830 3140 278 565.2
Coffee ($/lb) 43 168 117 128 10 29.2
Cotton ($/lb) 29 89 51 63 23 10.2
Sugar ($/lb) 4.8 25.4 6.1 25.4 316 3.5
Feeder Cattle ($/lb) 71 119 86 97 12 12.3
Live Cattle ($/lb) 59 109 70 86 23 10.2
Lean Hogs ($/lb) 30 81 56 50 -11 9.1
Corn ($/bu) 1.7 7.6 2.0 3.4 72 1.1
Soybeans ($/bu) 4.2 16.3 4.6 9.3 100 2.6
Soybean Oil ($/lb) 14 71 16 34 119 11.7
WheatCBOT ($/bu) 2.3 12.8 2.5 4.6 85 1.9
WheatKCBOT ($/bu) 2.7 13.4 2.7 4.8 74 1.9
Table 3.4  Price Summary for All Commodities, 2000-2009
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Long Days







Large Traders 1 1,820 -1,819 -64,013 64,014 1,457 793 54              
Commercial -82 1,095 -1,177 -41,060 40,978 51,790 67,057 191 106 55              
Index 199 198 1 -3,774 3,973 27,992 945 35 29 83              
Noncommercial -116 526 -643 -19,179 19,063 130,148 82,193 1,231 658 53              
Nonreporting -1 -1,820 1,819 -64,014 64,013
Coffee
Large Traders 340  ' -3,093 3,434 -113,765 114,106 3,264 1402 43              
Commercial 2,587  ' -878 3,464 -57,059 59,645 136,356 183,744 548 298 54              
Index -791 -844 52 -17,802 17,010 36,851 1,716 39 9 23              
Noncommercial -1,455  ' -1,372 -83 -38,905 37,450 289,824 186,025 2,677 1095 41              
Nonreporting -340  ' 3,093 -3,434 -114,106 113,765
Cotton
Large Traders 170  ' -4,409 4,579 -95,439 95,609 2,645 1210 46              
Commercial 2,195 -1,371 3,566 -49,847 52,041 115,922 119,112 465 213 46              
Index -1,925 -2,000 75 -20,583 18,658 37,146 930 38 11 29              
Noncommercial -100 -1,038 938 -25,009 24,910 251,251 166,210 2,142 986 46              
Nonreporting -170  ' 4,409 -4,579 -95,609 95,439
Sugar
Large Traders -553 5,635 -6,188 -163,905 163,353 1,618 824 51              
Commercial -3,022 1,903 -4,925 -94,424 91,403 77,528 114,784 358 156 44              
Index 913 1,409 -496 -32,862 33,776 34,793 709 40 28 70              
Noncommercial 1,556 2,323 -767 -36,619 38,174 163,699 101,948 1,220 640 52              
Nonreporting 553 -5,635 6,188 -163,353 163,905
Feeder Cattle
Large Traders 53 16 37 -11,008 11,061 1,426 753 53              
Commercial 51 91 -40 -3,507 3,558 56,505 87,941 553 296 54              
Index -74 -87 13 -1,931 1,857 25,426 852 30 9 30              
Noncommercial 76 11 64 -5,571 5,646 77,707 59,028 843 448 53              
Nonreporting -53 -16 -37 -11,061 11,008
Lean Hogs
Large Traders -304 -3,537 3,233 -57,752 57,448 1,697 903 53              
Commercial 1,426 -23 1,449 -17,096 18,522 24,026 83,384 243 141 58              
Index -2,569 -2,605 35 -17,186 14,617 36,567 454 35 1 3                
Noncommercial 839 * ' -909 1,748 -23,471 24,310 144,726 134,398 1,419 761 54            
Table 3.5  Performance Measures by Market and Trader Type for Futures and Options 
Positions (returns in million dollars) January 2000 to September 2009
Net Dollar Returns Gross Dollar Returns Number of Traders
Nonreporting 304 3,537 -3,233 -57,448 57,752
Live Cattle
Large Traders -245 -1,762 1,518 -73,466 73,221 2,337 1212 52              
Commercial 664 155 509 -27,580 28,244 63,596 259,290 747 390 52              
Index -1,866 -1,864 -2 -18,047 16,182 37,592 269 39 4 10              
Noncommercial 957 * ' -54 1,011 -27,838 28,796 178,339 132,856 1,551 818 53              
Nonreporting 245 1,762 -1,518 -73,221 73,466
Note: Since futures trading is a zero sum game, the nonreporting category is the residual from the large trader profits.   * denotes if the mean of daily returns is 
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Large Traders 4 -2,438 2,442 -356,521 356,525 4,996 2483 50              
Commercial 100 -1,477 1,576 -183,849 183,949 312,529 602,144 1,401 676 48              
Index -1,622 -1,668 46 -66,426 64,804 40,891 489 39 9 23              
Noncommercial 1,527 707 820 -106,246 107,773 429,969 364,010 3,556 1798 51              
Nonreporting -4 2,438 -2,442 -356,525 356,521
Soybean Oil
Large Traders -160 1,218 -1,378 -93,095 92,935 1,427 723 51              
Commercial -716 506 -1,222 -51,681 50,964 73,402 82,405 278 127 46              
Index -30 -32 2 -11,864 11,835 22,711 1,191 36 15 42              
Noncommercial 586 744 -158 -29,549 30,135 129,328 102,670 1,113 581 52              
Nonreporting 160 -1,218 1,378 -92,935 93,095
Soybeans
Large Traders 665 * 11,155 -10,489 -295,348 296,014 4,505 2201 49              
Commercial -4,782 * 3,059 -7,841 -144,535 139,752 120,971 270,266 860 357 42              
Index 2,514 * 2,546 -31 -53,572 56,086 39,151 511 41 27 66              
Noncommercial 2,933 * 5,550 -2,617 -97,242 100,175 386,324 292,397 3,604 1817 50              
Nonreporting -665 * -11,155 10,489 -296,014 295,348
Wheat
Large Traders 327 -739 1,066 -207,201 207,528 3,104 1539 50              
Commercial 1,430 479 951 -70,140 71,570 64,204 170,492 501 254 51            
Index -1,562 -1,577 15 -63,289 61,726 40,564 1,541 40 9 23              
Noncommercial 460 360 100 -73,772 74,232 242,413 255,840 2,563 1276 50              
Nonreporting -327 739 -1,066 -207,528 207,201
Wheat KS
Large Traders 65 1,156 -1,090 -61,650 61,715 1,332 589 44              
Commercial -547 453 -999 -35,162 34,615 80,340 139,147 427 181 42              
Index -52 -65 13 -9,203 9,150 27,785 523 30 11 37              
Noncommercial 664 768 -104 -17,285 17,949 109,494 63,993 875 397 45              
Nonreporting -65 -1,156 1,090 -61,715 61,650
Row Crops (Corn, Soybean Oil, Soybeans, Wheat, Wheat KS)
Large Traders 902 10,352 -9,450 -1,013,815 1,014,717 15,364 7535 49              
Commercial -4,516 3,019 -7,535 -485,366 480,850 651,446 1,264,454 3,467 1,595 46              
Index -752 -796 44 -204,354 203,602 171,102 4,255 186 71 38            
Table 3.5 (continued):  Performance Measures by Market and Trader Type for Futures 
and Options Positions (returns in million dollars) January 2000 to September 2009
Net Dollar Returns Gross Dollar Returns Number of Traders
Noncommercial 6,170 * 8,129 -1,959 -324,095 330,265 1,297,528 1,078,910 11,711 5,869 50              
Nonreporting -902 -10,352 9,450 -1,014,717 1,013,815
Livestock & Cotton (Feeder Cattle, Lean Hogs, Live Cattle, Cotton)
Large Traders -325 -9,692 9,367 -237,666 237,340 8,105 4078 50              
Commercial 4,336 -1,148 5,483 -98,030 102,365 260,049 549,727 2,008 1,040 52              
Index -6,433 -6,555 121 -57,747 51,314 136,731 2,505 142 25 18              
Noncommercial 1,772 * -1,990 3,762 -81,889 83,661 652,023 492,492 5,955 3,013 51              
Nonreporting 325 9,692 -9,367 -237,340 237,666
Softs (Cocoa, Coffee, Sugar)
Large Traders -211 4,362 -4,573 -341,684 341,473 6,339 3019 48              
Commercial -517 2,121 -2,638 -192,543 192,025 265,674 365,585 1,097 560 51              
Index 321 764 -443 -54,438 54,760 99,636 3,370 114 66 58              
Noncommercial -15 1,477 -1,493 -94,703 94,688 583,671 370,166 5,128 2,393 47              
Nonreporting 211 -4,362 4,573 -341,473 341,684
All Markets
Large Traders 366 5,022 -4,656 -1,593,165 1,593,530 29,808 14,632 49              
Commercial -698 3,992 -4,690 -775,938 775,241 1,177,169 2,179,766 6,572 3,195 49              
Index -6,864 -6,587 -277 -316,539 309,675 407,469 10,130 442 162 37              
Noncommercial 7,927 * 7,616 311 -500,687 508,614 2,533,222 1,941,568 22,794 11,275 49              
Nonreporting -366 -5,022 4,656 -1,593,530 1,593,165
Note: Since futures trading is a zero sum game, the nonreporting category is the residual from the large trader profits.   * denotes if the mean of daily returns is 
different than zero and  ' denotes if the mean of monthly returns is different than zero  Significance is measured at the 5% level using the signed rank test due to non-
normality.
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Market and Trader Type
Cocoa
Large Traders 1 -59 60
Commercial -82 -123 41
Index 199 171 28
Noncommercial -116 -107 -10
Nonreporting -1 59 -60
Coffee
Large Traders 340 7 334
Commercial 2,587 315 2,272
Index -791 4 -795
Noncommercial -1,455 -312 -1,143
Nonreporting -340 -7 -334
Cotton
Large Traders 170 -54 224 *
Commercial 2,195 257 1,938
Index -1,925 -670 -1,255 *
Noncommercial -100 359 -459
Nonreporting -170 54 -224 *
Sugar
Large Traders -553 -395 -157
Commercial -3,022 -2,753 -269
Index 913 1,233 -319
Noncommercial 1,556 1,125 431
Nonreporting 553 395 157
Feeder Cattle
Large Traders 53 -24 77
Commercial 51 51 0
Index -74 -107 34
Noncommercial 76 32 44
Nonreporting -53 24 -77
Table 3.6  Performance Measures by Market and Trader Type for Futures 
and Options Positions.  Net Returns calculated by in/out of Commodity 
Index Roll period (returns in million dollars).  January 2000 to September 
2009
Net Dollar Return (Roll)Net Dollar Returns (All)
Net Dollar Returns (Not 
Roll)
Lean Hogs
Large Traders -304 -199 -105
Commercial 1,426 718 708
Index -2,569 -1,231 -1,338
Noncommercial 839 * 313 * 526 *
Nonreporting 304 199 105
Live Cattle
Large Traders -245 -243 -1
Commercial 664 593 71
Index -1,866 -1,285 -580
Noncommercial 957 * 449 * 508 *
Nonreporting 245 243 1
Note: Since futures trading is a zero sum game, the nonreporting category is the residual from the large trader profits.  A * 
denotes if the mean of daily returns is different than zero.  Significance is measured at the 5% level using the signed rank test 
due to non-normality.  Monthly significance is not measured since roll periods do not correspond to monthly time horizons.  
Net profits for inside and outside the roll period are not calculated for row crops, livestock, softs, and all markets since roll 
periods differ depending on commodities.
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Market and Trader Type
Net Dollar Returns 
(All)
Net Dollar Return 
(Roll)
Corn
Large Traders 4 -151 155
Commercial 100 1,689 -1,589
Index -1,622 -2,218 595
Noncommercial 1,527 378 1,149
Nonreporting -4 151 -155
Soybean Oil
Large Traders -160 -29 -131
Commercial -716 327 -1,044
Index -30 -697 668
Noncommercial 586 341 245
Nonreporting 160 29 131
Soybeans
Large Traders 665 * 161 504
Commercial -4,782 * -1,192 * -3,590
Index 2,514 * 426 2,088
Noncommercial 2,933 * 927 * 2,006
Nonreporting -665 * -161 -504
Wheat
Large Traders 327 326 2
Commercial 1,430 -660 2,090
Index -1,562 799 -2,361
Noncommercial 460 187 273
Nonreporting -327 -326 -2
Wheat KS
Large Traders 65 31 34
Commercial -547 -996 449
Index -52 210 -263
Noncommercial 664 817 -153
Nonreporting -65 -31 -34
Row Crops (Corn, Soybean Oil, Soybeans, Wheat, Wheat KS)
Table 3.6 (continued):  Performance Measures by Market and Trader Type 
for Futures and Options Positions.  Net Returns calculated by in/out of 
Commodity Index Roll period (returns in million dollars).  January 2000 to 
September 2009
Net Dollar Returns (Not 
Roll)
Large Traders 902 338 564
Commercial -4,516 -832 -3,684
Index -752 -1,479 727
Noncommercial 6,170 * 2,649 3,520
Nonreporting -902 -338 -564
Livestock & Cotton (Feeder Cattle, Lean Hogs, Live Cattle, Cotton)
Large Traders -325 -520 195
Commercial 4,336 1,619 2,717
Index -6,433 -3,293 -3,140
Noncommercial 1,772 * 1,154 619
Nonreporting 325 520 -195
Softs (Cocoa, Coffee, Sugar)
Large Traders -211 -448 237
Commercial -517 -2,562 2,044
Index 321 1,407 -1,086
Noncommercial -15 706 -722
Nonreporting 211 448 -237
All Markets
Large Traders 366 -630 996
Commercial -698 -1,775 1,077
Index -6,864 -3,365 -3,499
Noncommercial 7,927 * 4,509 3,418
Nonreporting -366 630 -996
Note: Since futures trading is a zero sum game, the nonreporting category is the residual from the large trader profits.  A * 
denotes if the mean of daily returns is different than zero.  Significance is measured at the 5% level using the signed rank test 
due to non-normality.  Monthly significance is not measured since roll periods do not correspond to monthly time horizons.  
Net profits for inside and outside the roll period are not calculated for row crops, livestock, softs, and all markets since roll 
periods differ depending on commodities.
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Figure 3.1  Nearby Prices for Corn Futures Contract, January 2000 - September 2009


















































Figure 3.3  Nearby Prices for Cocoa Futures Contract, 




















Panel A: Nearby Prices
Panel B: Net Positions





































































Figure 3.5  Commodity Index Trader Case Study of Corn Prices, Profits, and 
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Figure 3.7  Commodity Index Trader Case Study of Lean Hog Prices, Profits, and 




























































































4.  RETURNS TO INDIVIDUAL TRADERS: SKILL OR LUCK? 
4.1 Introduction 
 The persistent performance of financial market participants is important to both investors 
and observers of futures markets who want to know the basic question, can past performance 
predict future performance?  The best example in recent history is the investing ability of 
Warrant Buffett, affectionately called the Oracle of Omaha for his persistent ability to earn 
money for his investors and subsequent ability to attract a large influx of investable dollars.  This 
question of persistence can be examined in the context of portfolios and in the context of single 
market trader performance.  Mahani and Bernhardt (2007) provide a model of individual trader 
behavior which provides an explanation for previous empirical regularities which are consistent 
with the notion that experienced speculators perform consistently well.  Not all empirical 
research supports Mahani and Bernhardt’s assertion and conclusions are mixed (e.g. Hartzmark 
1991, Leuthold et al. 1994, Fishe and Smith 2010) calling into question the empirical 
regularities.  The purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of whether past trader 
performance is correlated with future performance.  The findings should provide evidence 
relevant for the Mahani and Bernhardt model and permit a more comprehensive understanding of 
the market behavior and motivations of speculative traders. 
The competing theories of why traders earn profits include existence of a risk premium, 
skill, or just plain luck (Keynes 1930, Hartzmark 1991).  The risk premium or normal 
backwardation argument purports that speculators receive positive returns as compensation for 
risk while hedgers lose in the futures market by the amount of the risk premium.  Numerous 
studies have tested this notion in the past (Hartzmark 1987, Leuthold et al. 1994, Aulerich 
2011b) and with few exceptions previous evidence provides no support for the existence of a risk 
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premium.  Thereby, individual profits from trading stem from significant skill or possibly just 
luck.  In this essay, trading profits are examined over multiple time horizons to determine if 
trading profits are systematically earned through skill or if they are randomly realized through 
luck. 
The three most relevant research studies addressing the existence of individual trader skill 
in futures markets are Hartzmark (1991), Leuthold et al. (1994), and Fishe and Smith (2010).38  
Similar to this essay each of these studies use data from the CFTC Large Trader Reporting 
System database, focus on futures trader performance, and address agricultural futures markets.  
Hartzmark (1991) finds returns for large traders are generated randomly, Leuthold et al. (1994) 
find the distribution of returns over time is not random and the elite subset of traders examined 
have significantly positive profits from forecast skill, and Fishe and Smith (2010) find a small 
subset of traders has skill in determining the next day’s price and a mostly non-overlapping 
subset of traders are skilled intra-day. 
These three main studies attempt to evaluate individual futures trader performance but 
fall short of a comprehensive analysis.  Hartzmark (1991) has a limited time horizon of 5 years 
and uses historical data from 1977-1981.  Leuthold et al. (1994) attempt to follow up to 
Hartzmark but suffer from the use of only one commodity and restrict the analysis to the 50 
largest traders and 20 largest spreaders.  Fishe and Smith (2010) have sufficient time and scope 
using 10 years and 12 commodities but suffers from a (i) limited investment horizon of one day, 
(ii) no analysis of traders excluded from the study, and (iii) no analysis on the magnitude of 
profits.  Finally, procedures used in previous studies have not asked a fundamental question 
regarding skill:  do previous trader profits provide an indication of future profits?   In a realistic 
context, this persistence criterion might be viewed as a more stringent test, and is similar to the 
124 
 
standard applied to mutual funds and other institutions that seek to allocate funds for investors 
based on past performance records. 
In this third essay, the analysis performs stringent tests with data spanning 10 years and 
across 3 representative commodities from row crop, livestock, and soft categories.39  Previous 
shortcomings are rectified by testing multiple investment horizons using both binary variables 
and magnitude of profit measures.  Since most traders included in the database are not day 
traders or high frequency traders their strategies may extend beyond the daily horizon used in 
most previous studies including Leuthold et al.(1994) and Fishe and Smith (2010).  Therefore, 
we test for persistence using monthly, quarterly, and yearly horizons.  Since not every trader is 
continuously active in the market, some traders are excluded in parts of the analysis.  The 
systematic exclusion of traders can bias the results which makes analysis of excluded trader 
properties important.  For this reason, summary statistics and discussion of the excluded traders 
are examined for the first time in the literature. 
This essay builds on the work of Aulerich (2011b), which provides evidence against the 
theory of normal backwardation and identifies noncommercial traders as a profitable category of 
traders.  In the absence of normal backwardation, the question then becomes how 
noncommercial traders earn profits.  Are they just lucky or do they have significant skill?  The 
study addresses this question and determines if noncommercial traders persist in making profits 
or if profits are randomly generated.  Narrowing the study to noncommercial traders also 
removes potential noise caused by commercial traders, generally regarded as hedgers, who may 
have both hedging and speculative motives for trading and makes interpreting trading profits 
problematic.  The noncommercial category from the same dataset used in Aulerich (2011a, 
2011b) will be studied for corn traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), live cattle traded 
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on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and coffee traded on Intercontinental Exchange 
(ICE) from 2000 to mid-2009.  These three commodities are chosen to represent field crops, 
livestock, and soft commodities.40  The source of the dataset is the CFTC Large Trader 
Reporting System database which consists of detailed non-aggregated end of day data.  In the 
database, the number of unique traders in the noncommercial category for corn is 3,556, live 
cattle is 1,551, and coffee is 2,677.   
Two methods are used to analyze trader skill or persistence.  The first is the Fisher Exact 
test, a nonparametric two-way winner and loser rank contingency table analysis.  The second is 
the testing of trader by magnitude of profits using the rank of trader profits in the first period to 
identify top and bottom deciles.  A standard t-test or in the case of nonnormality, Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is used to determine whether profits from the traders in these deciles differ in the 
next period.  The tests have been widely applied in studies of investment performance (e.g., 
Malkiel 1995), and are viewed as an out-of-sample assessment of trader ability to consistently 
generate profits.  Traders in the commodities are tested based on each trader’s profitability level 
over monthly, quarterly, and yearly time horizons.  Arguably the yearly horizon is the most 
important from a standpoint of reporting and compensation, e.g. annual investment performance 
reports and year-end bonuses.  The monthly and quarterly horizons are studied to include a larger 
percentage of traders and determine if traders not only show yearly persistence but also 
demonstrate skill in the shorter time horizons within a year.  Large trading houses may be more 
focused on yearly results, but small traders need to survive through short-run adversity.  The 




The Fisher Exact test results provide substantive evidence of persistence in rankings 
across the commodities and time horizons studied; the only period without statistically 
significant results is the monthly horizon for coffee.  For the second method that determines the 
difference in profitability levels across deciles, the findings show the top 10% of traders have 
persistent skill.  The results for shorter time horizons are stronger for corn than for live cattle and 
coffee. The shorter time periods are likely influenced by a high degree of volatility over shorter 
time periods where trader’s fortunes are expected to fluctuate.   
Overall, results indicate that noncommercial traders rank persistently through time and 
the top 10% of traders persistently make profits on a yearly time horizon.  The evidence of 
persistence coincides with Mahani and Bernhardt’s (2007) theoretical model that trader 
performance shows persistence.  Additional empirical results find that traders excluded from the 
analysis are smaller and less active compared to included traders.  In the case of corn and live 
cattle the excluded traders experience losses while included traders are profitable.  These 
comparisons also coincide with Mahani and Bernhardt’s model explaining that large, more active 
speculators outperform small, less active speculators.  
 4.2 Literature Review 
 The literature review addresses three different strains of the research: the performance of 
individual traders, mutual fund managers and hedge fund managers.  Most relevant to this essay, 
individual trader research focuses on the actual trades of investors in stock or futures market 
investments.  Conversely, mutual fund research focuses on the performance of the overall risk 
and return of a portfolio. Similar to mutual funds, hedge funds are evaluated on total portfolio 
performance, but unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are lightly regulated with higher barriers to 
entry and freedom to participate in less traditional investments.  The various testing 
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methodologies used in the mutual and hedge fund literature are more relevant to this essay than 
the actual results because this essay focuses on individual trader performance and not overall 
portfolio performance. 
4.2.1  Individual Traders 
 The three most relevant research studies addressing individual trader performance in 
futures markets are Hartzmark (1991), Leuthold et al. (1994), and Fishe and Smith (2010).  
Similar to this essay each of these studies use data from the CFTC Large Trader Reporting 
System database, focus on futures trader performance, and address agricultural futures markets. 
Hartzmark (1991) investigates the hypothesis that futures traders possess the ability or 
skill to consistently earn positive profits.  Daily data on individual traders are used from the 
CFTC’s Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS) from 1977 to 1981 for oats, wheat, pork bellies, 
live cattle, feeder cattle, t-bonds, and t-bills.  Traders are divided into commercial and 
noncommercial categories.  This was the first study to use the highly detailed daily transaction 
data on individual traders to investigate ex ante predictions and ex post realizations.  He employs 
the nonparametric statistical procedure developed by Henriksson and Merton (1981) and 
modified by Cumby and Modest (1987) to determine individual trader forecast ability.   
Two different types of forecast ability or market timing are examined.  The first tests if a 
trader consistently predicts the correct direction of price movements.  This skill is establishing a 
long position prior to an increase in futures prices and a short position prior to a decrease in 
futures prices.  Two binary variables are defined, the first is equal to one if the price goes up and 
zero otherwise, and the second is equal to one if trader is long and zero otherwise.  A logit 
equation is specified regressing the price movement binary variable on the position binary 
variable.  The null hypothesis of no skill is rejected if the position coefficient is significant.  The 
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second test is called “big hit” ability.   The test determines if a trader consistently predicts both 
the magnitude and direction of price changes.  The skill establishes a long (short) position prior 
to an increase (decrease) in futures prices and adjusts the size of the position relative to the 
magnitude of the price move and thereby establishing larger positions when larger price moves 
are anticipated.  To test for big hit ability, the price change is regressed on a trader’s net position; 
a coefficient significantly greater than zero indicates a trader with superior ability.  Next, 
Hartzmark tests if a trader who displays superior (or inferior) forecast ability in an early period 
continues to demonstrate it in a later period.  Hartzmark focuses this analysis solely on 
noncommercial traders from 1977 through September 1979 and tests if correlations between 
dollar returns earned in the two periods are significant.  Deciles are then formed comparing 
coefficients across the first half and second half of the time period studied to determine if 
performance persists across time periods. 
The study concludes that even though a large number of traders appear to exhibit 
significantly superior forecast ability he concludes that traders do not have skill.  The entire 
investigation supports three conclusions, (i) there are fewer participants with significantly 
superior skill than expected if participants trade randomly, (ii) there are more traders exhibiting 
no skill than expected if participants trade randomly, and (iii) forecast ability is not correlated 
over time – superior forecasters in the early period are only average forecasters in the later 
period. 
Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu (1994) follow up to Hartzmark’s work and examine the returns 
and forecasting ability of large traders in the frozen pork belly futures markets for a 9 year 
period.  The data are from the CFTC’s Large Trader Reporting System and extends from 1982 to 
1990.  They calculate profits and use similar statistical methods as Hartzmark (1991), searching 
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for consistent forecasting ability by first using Cumby and Modest and Henriksson and Merton 
type tests and second, by using a linear regression of returns on net positions to test for Big Hit 
ability.  Compared to Hartzmark’s 9 commodities and 5 years of data, Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu 
study one market but extends the analysis to 9 years.  The analysis is restricted to the 50 largest 
traders and 20 largest spreaders; Hartzmark does not filter by these standards.  This could be 
partially responsible for the difference in conclusions; Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu conclude that a 
small subset of traders have forecasting skill and Hartzmark concludes that profits are mostly 
earned randomly by traders.  Furthermore, Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu only focus on frozen pork 
bellies, and Hartzmark’s results isolated on frozen pork bellies do demonstrate significant, 
positive, consistent forecasting ability.  The frozen pork belly market, in itself, is traditionally 
viewed as a small mature market trading a unique, semi perishable product.  The market has been 
described as having a relatively higher level of “excess” speculation (Peck 1980).  Based on 
these factors Leuthold’s conclusion may not be broadly extended to other agricultural futures 
contracts. 
Most recently, Fishe and Smith (2010) attempt to identify informed and liquidity traders 
in futures markets from a large group of 8,921 unique traders.  The study does not specify how 
they define unique traders but does remove traders with less than 30 observations.  The data used 
are from the CFTC’s Large Trader Reporting System and extends from 2000 to mid-2009 
covering the 12 commodities of crude oil, copper, corn, cotton, gold, heating oil, natural gas, 
silver, soybean oil, soybeans, sugar, and wheat.  Instead of using the CFTC’s classification of 
traders ex-ante, the authors analyze trader behavior and group them ex-post by trading actions.  
They use a daily binary measure of success to tests if traders are informed.  First, the 
unconditional method is used to determine if the null hypothesis that a trader is successful half 
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the time can be rejected and second, the Henriksson and Merton (1981) test is used, similar to 
both Hartzmark (1991) and Leuthold et al. (1994).  They do not, however, take magnitude of 
profits into account in any testing procedures.  The analysis differentiates between overnight 
informed traders using end of day positions with next day’s prices and intraday informed traders 
using a ‘triple test’ procedure relating how position changes are compared to intraday price 
changes using close to close daily data.  Fishe and Smith also differentiate between position 
profits and trading profits; position profits based on the level of open interest and trading profits 
based on the change in open interest.  Results find that between 94 and 333 traders are informed 
about the next day’s prices (depending on method) and 91 are informed intra-day.  Both results 
are out of 8,921 observed traders, concluding 1% to 3.5% of traders are informed.  They find no 
evidence that commercial hedgers pay a risk premium to speculators and find that liquidity 
demanders tend to be managed money/hedge fund traders and liquidity suppliers tend to be 
commercial traders.  Using an inverse regression, trader characteristics are shown to offer strong 
predictive power identifying informed traders.  These include, experience defined as average 
number of days with open interest, activity defined as days with change in open interest, size 
defined as number of contracts, average expirations held at one time, average net long positions, 
and average net short positions. 
Overall, these three main studies attempt to evaluate individual futures trader 
performance but fall short of a comprehensive analysis.  Hartzmark (1991) has a limited time 
horizon of 5 years and uses historical data from 1977 to 1981.  Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu (1994) 
suffer from the use of only one commodity and restrict the analysis to the 50 largest traders and 
20 largest spreaders.  Fishe and Smith (2010) have sufficient time and scope using 10 years and 
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12 commodities but suffers from a (i) limited investment horizon of one day, (ii) no analysis of 
traders excluded from the study, and (iii) no analysis on the magnitude of profits.  
Two addition relevant studies analyze individual traders, although they do not use CFTC 
position data, these include Coval (2005) and Mahani and Bernhardt (2007).  Coval, Hirshleifer, 
and Shumway (2005) study the central question of whether all individual investors who earn 
profits on their trades are merely lucky or are indeed skillful.  They use a dataset provided by a 
large discount brokerage firm on equity market trades placed by 115,856 accounts from January 
1990 through November 1996.  They use long term and short term risk adjusted measures to 
analyze profits.  Results provide evidence that some individual investors are persistently able to 
beat the market and other individual investors systematically underperform.  The difference in 
performance between the top and bottom deciles (10%) is tested and show persistent skill in 
these comparisons.   The findings suggest investors’ persistent abnormal performance is not 
derived primarily from trading on inside information and implies a potential violation of semi-
strong form market efficiency. 
Mahani and Bernhardt (2007) develop a theoretical model that helps explain trader 
performance in a dynamic context.  This model shows how learning by rational traders 
reconciles several empirical regularities including, (i) cross sectionally, most individual 
speculators lose money, (ii) large speculators outperform small speculators, and (iii) performance 
shows persistence.  They propose a rational, learning-based explanation allowing the authors to 
derive the effects of changes in parameters on the entry, exit, and performance of financial 
speculators.  The model provides insight into the interaction between learning-from-trading and 
other elements of the financial markets.  Their results show inexperienced traders initiate 
speculation on a small scale, trading off expected losses against the value of information 
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generated by greater trading.  Most inexperienced traders realize losses, conclude that they are 
unlikely to be skilled, and leave the markets; survivors expand their trades and make more 
profits. 
4.2.2  Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds 
The mutual and hedge fund literature is relevant to this analysis because similar methods 
can be used in the analysis of futures traders.  The results themselves are less relevant because 
they pertain to an overall portfolio and compare to market benchmarks, unlike that of individual 
trader positions in a futures contract that lack an easy comparison.  Therefore, the review of this 
literature will focus on the studies that highlight particular methods and will not be a 
comprehensive review of the mutual and hedge fund performance evaluation literature. 
A common approach in analyzing the performance of fund managers is to test for 
persistence in fund returns, that is, whether past winners continue to produce high returns and 
past loser continue to underperform.  Two widely-cited studies using this approach are Grinblatt 
and Titman (1992) and Carhart (1997). 
Grinblatt and Titman (1992) analyzed the persistence of mutual fund performance using a 
dataset from 1974 to 1984.  They develop a three-step procedure; first split the ten-year sample 
of fund returns into two five-year sub-periods.  Second, compute the abnormal returns of each 
fund for each five year sub-period.  Finally, estimate the slope coefficient in a cross-sectional 
regression of abnormal returns from the last five years of data on abnormal returns computed 
from the first five years of data.  A significant positive t-statistic for the slope coefficient in this 
regression would reject the null hypothesis that past performance in unrelated to future 
performance and support the alternative hypothesis that past performance is positively related to 
future performance.  They overcome the bias created by the highly correlated residuals resulting 
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from funds with similar portfolios by developing a “time-series t-statistic”.   The results of the 
tests show the differences in performance between funds persist over time and the persistence is 
consistent with the ability of fund managers to earn abnormal returns. 
Carhart (1997) also developed a testing procedure to measure persistence in one year 
returns of mutual fund portfolios.  Mutual funds are sorted on January 1 each year from 1963 to 
1993 into decile portfolios based on their previous calendar year’s return.  The portfolios are 
equally weighted monthly so the weights are readjusted whenever a fund disappears.  Funds 
disappear primarily because of poor performance over several years; the average annual fund 
attrition rate is 3.6%.  On average 2.2% per year disappear due to merger, 1% disappear because 
of liquidation, 0.1% because of self-selected means, and the remainder is unknown (Carhart 
2002).  Funds with the highest past one-year return comprise decile 1 and funds with the lowest 
comprise decile 10.  The difference between top and bottom deciles is tested for significance to 
determine if traders’ performance persists from year to year.   Results show that while the ranks 
of a few top and bottom funds persist, the year to year rankings on most funds appear largely 
random.  
The other common approach is measuring “alpha” or the quantifiable amount a particular 
fund performs differently from a market portfolio.  There are three common ways of modeling 
the alpha: CAPM is the Capital Asset Pricing Model described by both Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965), the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) 4-factor 
model.41  The alpha approaches, although effective for mutual fund and hedge fund portfolio 
analysis, are not applicable to single market individual trader analysis.  Rather in this third essay 
the analysis uses nonparametric ranking methods and comparison of profits across deciles similar 
to Hartzmark (1991) and Carhart (1997).  These methods are appropriate to single market 
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individual trader analysis because they do not relate to a market portfolio and can apply to both 
rankings of traders by profits and differences in profit magnitudes between top and bottom 
performing traders. 
4.3 Data 
The data for this study come from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS), which was designed for surveillance purposes to detect 
and deter futures and options market manipulation (Fenton and Martinaitas, 2005).  The LTRS 
database contains end-of-day reportable positions for long futures, short futures, long delta-
adjusted options, and short delta-adjusted options for each trader ID and contract maturity.42,43 
Traders who meet or exceed the reporting levels set by CFTC must report their positions on a 
daily basis.  The reporting level can range from 25 contracts to over 1,000 contracts. The level 
for any given market is based on the total open positions in that market, the size of positions held 
by traders in the market, the surveillance history of the market, and the size of deliverable 
supplies for physical delivery markets.  If, at the daily market close, a reporting firm has a trader 
with a position at or above the CFTC’s reporting level in any single futures or option expiration 
month, the firm reports that trader’s entire position in all futures and options expiration months 
in that commodity, regardless of size.44  The data provided in these reports usually cover 70-90% 
of open interest in any given market (CFTC, 2010). 
When a trader surpasses the reporting level threshold, a reporting firm must file a Form 
102 to identify each new reportable account and include the controlling traders of that account.  
The trader himself is then required to file a Form 40.  Since traders frequently carry positions 
through more than one reporting firm and can control or have financial interest through more 
than one account, the CFTC is able to combine these accounts by trader and ownership level 
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using detail from these forms.  For example, a diversified company can have a hedging operation 
and a separate speculative trading operation; these two operations would be assigned different 
trader ID’s but the same owner ID.   
In the case of an omnibus account, the process works in a similar fashion.  An omnibus 
account is defined as an account between two brokerage firms where a number of individual 
customer accounts of one firm are grouped into a single account at the second firm.  The account 
at the second firm is called an omnibus account and usually does not have individual details of 
each client.  The second firm is required to report positions that are above large trader thresholds, 
which means that individual positions in the omnibus account are aggregated together and 
reported in the name of the first firm, but the first firm is than required to report any large 
positions held by individual customer accounts and thereby relating the position back to the 
controlling trader.  The LTRS system is designed to identify any double counting from omnibus 
accounts and removes any repetitive reporting. 
In addition to ownership and trading control, classifications of traders are identified 
through the required filings.  The trader is either determined to be a commercial or 
noncommercial from the information provided on the Form 40 filing.  If a trader indicates they 
are engaged in bona fide hedging transactions, which classifies them as a commercial, then they 
are required to fill out Schedule 1 attached to Form 40 detailing their use of the futures markets 
for hedging.  Upon satisfaction of the reviewing staff, the trader would then be considered a 
commercial trader and given a sub classification based on his underlying business (e.g. producer, 
manufacturer, merchant, swaps dealer, etc.).  If a trader does not meet the requirements for a 
commercial trader, than they are classified as a noncommercial trader; which is commonly 
referred to as a speculator.  Form 40 provides a section allowing the reporting trader to check a 
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box indicating their registration under the Commodity Exchange Act; these noncommercial 
classifications include futures commission merchant (FCM), introducing broker (IB), associate 
person (AP) of an FCM, commodity trading advisor (CTA), commodity pool operator (CPO), 
floor broker (FB), and floor trader (FT).   For the purposes of research, noncommercial 
categories are commonly grouped into two groups, (i) managed money traders consisting of 
FCM’s, IB’s, CTA’s, CPO’s, and AP’s, and (ii) floor broker traders consisting of FB’s and FT’s.  
Any traders classified as noncommercial traders without a sub-classification are non-registered 
participants.  These traders meet the CFTC reporting requirements due to trading size but do not 
have to register under regulation of the Commodity Exchange Act.45   
The sub-classification of Commodity Index Traders (CITs) was created by the CFTC in 
2007 but is not a current category on Form 40.  As explained in Aulerich (2011a, 2011b), CITs 
are passive long traders who invest based on a pre-specified index.  This classification was 
created by staff within the CFTC and is composed of both commercial and noncommercial 
traders although CITs are typically separated from commercial and noncommercial traders to 
become a standalone category.   
Broadly, the LTRS divides traders into the four categories based on trading motivation; 
these include commercial, noncommercial, index, and nonreporting.  All of this daily data 
collected into the LTRS are released weekly to the public in variety of different reports including 
the Commitment of Traders report, Supplemental Commodity Index Trader report, 
Disaggregated Commitments of Traders report, and Traders in Financial Futures report.   
For the purposes of this research, daily futures and options positions from the LTRS 
cover the period from January 2000 to September 2009 for 3 commodities.46  The commodities 
are corn traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), live cattle traded at the Chicago 
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Mercantile Exchange (CME), and coffee traded on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE); these 
commodities are chosen to be representative of row crops, livestock, and soft commodity 
categories.  The traders analyzed are exclusively from the noncommercial category of traders but 
exclude those who are defined as Commodity Index Traders (CITs).47    
In this analysis the owner ID combined with the trader ID makes up the unique ‘trader’ 
identification used to isolate positions on a trader-by-trader basis.  Table 4.1 displays summary 
statistics for each of the main LTRS categories and commodities by detailing the number of 
unique traders, overall profits, percent of profitable traders, the number of business days with 
open interest, and the average daily notional value per trader.  The noncommercial category has 
the largest number of unique traders at 6,102 followed by commercial category with 2,524 and 
index trader category with 39.  Total profits for this sample are highest for commercial traders 
($3 billion) and lowest for index traders (-$4 billion); although noncommercial profits are 
reported at $1 billion, the losses are only present in coffee.  The noncommercial coffee traders 
tend to be on average less profitable, less active, and smaller than noncommercial traders in corn 
and live cattle.  This may be due to the international scope of coffee production and the 
difficultly in gathering and processing valuable information without direct involvement in the 
production and marketing of the underlying product, which may help explain the large profits to 
commercial coffee traders, although this is less clear for the commercial corn and live cattle 
participants.  Commercial traders use the futures market for hedging48 to offset a cash transaction 
in the course of business, and this creates limited sensitivity to profit or losses earned in futures 
markets.  Data are not available on cash market activity so a commercial trader’s total position 
profit and losses picture cannot be viewed.  For this reason, commercial traders are not analyzed 
in this study.  Commodity index traders are small subset of traders characterized by a buy and 
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hold passive long strategy, this strategy is shown to be unsuccessful over the time period studied 
and consequently, this essay will not delve further into the source of these losses.  Based on these 
previous arguments, the noncommercial traders will be the focal point of this research. 
Focusing on the noncommercial trader section of table 4.1, the unique trader total of 
6,102 is broken down further into the number of commodity markets in which a trader 
participates; a particular trader has the ability to participate in all three markets listed.  The 
majority of participants are in one market, but 758 participate in two and 462 trade in all three.  
On average half of these unique traders are profitable over any computed cross section (daily, 
monthly, quarterly, or yearly).  Traders participating in more than one market tend to be more 
profitable overall (except for coffee) although this is not true for the percentage of profitable 
traders.  Each of the 3,556 unique noncommercial traders in corn are on average in the market 
239 business days, a little less than a year, with an average notional value of $14 million per day.  
The live cattle noncommercial traders total 1,551, are in the market on average 217 business 
days, and have an average notional value of $11.5 million per day.  The noncommercial coffee 
traders total 2,677, but on average have the least amount of active days at 184, and have the 
lowest average daily notional value at $6.6 million.  The performance for noncommercial traders 
appears to be rather consistent with Mahani and Bernhardt’s first two regularities: in a given 
cross-section the majority of individual speculators lose money (here approximately 50%); and 
small, less active traders underperform while large, more active traders perform better.  The 
appropriateness of the regularities is strengthened when it is noted that the LTRS system does 
not include extremely small traders who are often in the market for a short period, lose money 
(Aulerich 2011b), and essentially leave.  To provide evidence for Mahani and Bernhardt’s third 
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assertion, that past performance predicts future performance, two testing procedures discussed in 
the following methodology section are implemented. 
  4.4  Methods 
Two methods are used to analyze the persistent ability of traders: the first is the Fisher 
Exact test, a nonparametric two-way winner and loser contingency table ranking analysis, and 
the second is the difference in magnitude of profits between top versus bottom decile performing 
traders across adjoining periods.  The tests have been widely applied in studies of investment 
performance (e.g., Malkiel 1995) and have the advantage of using information on both the 
ranking of traders and magnitude of trader profits.  Traders in each commodity are tested based 
on returns over monthly, quarterly, and yearly time horizons. 
4.4.1  Compute Profits 
Daily profits for each trader for each contract are calculated by multiplying the end of 
day positions on day t by the settlement price change for the corresponding contract between the 
current day t and the following day t+1.  The calculation assumes positions held at the end of 
day t are held throughout the trading day t+1 and all position adjustments occur at the settlement 
price on t+1.  Since the data only consists of end of day positions, any profits of day-traders or 
scalpers who mainly trade intra-day are not included in the analysis.  The profits do not account 
for commissions or margin requirements due to lack of available data.49   
4.4.2  Non-parametric Winners and Losers Rank Test 
The first test is a non-parametric two-way winner and loser contingency table analysis 
based on placing traders into winner and loser categories across adjacent pairs of time horizons.  
For a given commodity, the first step in the testing procedure is to create pairs of adjacent time 
periods, t and t+1 (e.g. 2000 and 2001, 2001 and 2002, 2002 and 2003).  The second step is to 
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form a sample of traders that actively trade in both t and t+1, any traders that are not in both 
periods are excluded.  The third step is to rank each trader by profitability in t; for example, the 
trader with the highest profit is ranked number one, and the trader with the lowest profit is 
assigned a rank equal to the total number of traders in the commodity in the given period.  Then 
the traders are sorted in descending rank order, with the top half of traders considered winners 
and the bottom half of the traders considered the losers.  The fourth step is to repeat the ranking, 
sorting, and creation of winner and loser groups for the second period, t+1, based on profits.  
The fifth step is to compute the following counts for the traders in the pair of adjacent time 
periods, winner t & winner t+1, winner t & loser t+1, loser t & winner t+1, and loser t & loser 
t+1.   
Persistence is determined by whether the number of traders who are winners (or losers) in 
two consecutive periods is significant; conversely, if approximately the same counts of traders 
are found in each of the four combinations, then the null of random distributions of profits is not 
rejected and no persistence is discovered.  The appropriate statistical test is the Fisher’s Exact 
Test (Conover, 1999, pp.188-89), a nonparametric test that is robust to outliers, which may be 
important when analyzing the profitability of traders.  The Fisher’s Exact test can be computed 
on each pair of adjacent time periods individually and then can be pooled to include all pairs of 
adjacent time periods of the same length (e.g. yearly, quarterly, and monthly). 
4.4.3  Top and Bottom Performance Deciles Test 
While predictability may be limited or nonexistent across all traders, it may be possible 
for subgroups of traders to exhibit predictability, particularly in the context of “large” traders.  
For instance, persistence may exist at the extremes where top and/or bottom performing traders 
in one period may perform well in the next period but midrange traders do not exhibit 
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persistence.  In addition, the magnitude of performance differences of top and bottom performing 
groups can provide insights into the degree in which these two groups differ.  This is the 
motivation for the second test of predictability that compares the magnitude of profits of top 
subgroups of traders to bottom subgroups across adjacent time periods. 
The start of this testing procedure is very similar to the Winners and Losers test.  First 
create the pairs of adjacent time periods, exclude any traders not in both periods, and then rank 
traders in the first period by profits with the most profitable trader as number one.  Then for a 
given commodity, sort traders by profits in the first period (t) and form deciles of traders based 
on this ranking.  Now use the deciles of traders formed in period t and compute how the same 
traders performed in period t+1.  For example, take the best performing decile, decile 10, in 
period t and without resorting or re-forming groups of traders, determine how the 10th decile of 
traders from period t performed in period t+1.  Was the performance of these traders at the same 
level in the next period?   Compute the difference in the profit levels between the top and bottom 
performing trader groups and test the null hypothesis that the difference between the trader 
groups is zero.  If the performance for the top and bottom groups is significantly different than 
zero using a paired t-test, than the null hypothesis can be rejected and the conclusion reached that 
traders persistently perform.  The paired t-test assumes a normal distribution and independent 
observations; when the normality assumption fails to hold, the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank test is used. 
These two tests analyze traders’ profits by first testing the persistence in ranking of 
traders across pairs of adjacent time periods and second, by determining if the magnitude of 




4.5  Included and Excluded Traders 
As explained in the methods section, in order to examine the forecasting ability of traders 
across time horizons a trader must be present in adjoining periods.  For example if a trader is 
analyzed using a yearly time horizon in 2000 (t) and 2001(t+1), the trader would need to be 
present in both time periods.   If a trader is not present in 2000 and 2001, than the trader is 
dropped from the analysis for this pair of time horizons.  The trader only has to be in any two 
adjoining time horizons (t, t+1) to be included in the analysis, not in all time horizons of the 
dataset.  Regardless, this leads to an analysis design were some traders are excluded.  This relates 
to survivorship bias in mutual fund or hedge fund research because funds or traders that fail to 
have records (or sufficient records) in the period analyzed are dropped from the analysis.  Fund 
survivorship bias occurs because a fund fails to exist and this normally happens when 
performance is poor and the fund is closed.  Removing the funds with bad performance from the 
analysis would in turn place an upward bias on the performance results.  On the other hand, 
individual traders who are removed from the analysis due to inactivity in period t+1 may not 
always be due to performance.  A trader could fail to be present in two adjoining periods because 
he has decided to trade in a different commodity, fallen below the reporting threshold, 
temporarily ceased trading, or has permanently stopped trading for performance or other reasons.  
The barriers of entry and exit for an individual trader are much lower than for funds and 
consequently more entry and exit occur.  Past researchers also dealt with the excluded trader 
problem.  Hartzmark (1991) only includes traders with 25 or more observations.  Leuthold et al. 
(1994) includes the top 50 largest traders and top 20 largest spreaders.  Fishe and Smith (2010) 
include traders with 30 or more observations.  The impact of trader exclusion on results depends 
on the characteristic of the excluded traders. 
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Table 4.2 compares the included versus excluded traders by profitability, size of 
investment, and activity.  One day of open interest per period is the minimum threshold for 
inclusion.  The percentage of excluded traders is approximately 40%, 25%, and 16% using a 
yearly, quarterly, and monthly horizons, respectfully; these excluded traders are present in the 
first period (t)  but drop out in the second period (t+1).  The percentage is computed by taking 
the traders who were active in t but not in t+1 (dropped out) divided by the total number of 
traders in period t.50  The size of traders, measured by total absolute notional value, is smaller for 
the excluded trader group which averages just ten percent or less of the size of the included 
trader group.  The excluded traders are less active than included traders, measured as business 
days with open interest.  The average number of open interest days per excluded trader is 50% or 
fewer days compared to an included trader.  For corn and live cattle the profitability of the 
excluded trader group vastly underperforms included traders, with losses from -$12 to -$400 
million compared to included traders profits between $1 to $2 billion.  This profitability 
comparison does not hold for coffee, where both included and excluded traders experience losses 
but the included traders losses are larger, approximately -$1 billion, and excluded traders loses 
are -$400 to -$150 million.  As shown in table 4.1, the noncommercial traders in coffee lost to 
the commercial coffee traders who earn a positive $2.6 billion.  Overall, the traders excluded 
from the analysis are smaller and less active compared to included traders.  In the case of corn 
and live cattle the excluded traders experience losses while included traders are profitable.  
These comparisons also support Mahani and Bernhardt’s (2007) theoretical model that large, 
more active speculators outperform small, less active speculators. 
Since the excluded traders are smaller, less active, and in general less profitable than 
included traders, both the ranking winners and loser test and the deciles tests (first and second 
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methods) can potentially be affected.  The exclusion of the traders with losses that are smaller in 
magnitude removes traders from mid to low-mid part of the distribution since the majority of 
these traders are not large enough to incur the magnitude of losses required to be in the very 
bottom of the distribution.  For example if a trader starts trading in period t with a small amount 
of starter capital, discovers that he is not skilled and ceases trading during the same period t, then 
this trader would be excluded from the t and t+1 analysis.  In the ranking tests, removing 
observations from the middle of the trader ranking may make the top and bottom traders more 
distinct.  For the deciles test, excluding the middle performing traders may make little difference 
when comparing only the top and bottom decile traders; although, the exclusion could increase 
the standard deviation of profits.  The systematic exclusion of these traders could make finding 
persistence easier in the ranking tests but may have little impact on the deciles test.  This 
scenario is partly addressed by using multiple time horizons to capture these types of traders.  In 
table 4.2, the percent of excluded traders decreases from 40% in the yearly horizon to 15% using 
a monthly horizon, exemplifying the larger inclusion rates with the shorter observation periods.  
For example, if a trader is not in year t and t+1, he may be in the shorter quarterly or monthly 
horizon t and t+1.  The high correspondence across the three different commodities indicates that 
traders behave similarly regardless of the commodity studied. 
4.6  Results 
The Winners and Losers contingency results in table 4.3 test the persistence in rankings 
across groups of adjacent years (9 pairs) for corn, live cattle, and coffee and the pooled results 
from 2000-2009 are at the bottom of the table.  As an example, consider the results for corn 
where 2001 is t and 2002 is t+1, of the 234 winners in 2001, 133 are winners and 101 are losers 
in 2002.  Of the 234 loser in 2001, 101 are winners and 134 are losers in 2002.   In other words, 
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the conditional probability of a winner from 2001 repeating in 2002 is 57% (133/234) and 
conditional probability of a loser from 2001 repeating in 2002 is 57% (134/234).  These 
conditional probabilities are compared to the conditional probability expected of a random 
distribution of 50% (117/234), and in this example the trader counts are significantly different 
than 50% and the null hypothesis that profits are randomly distributed is rejected.  Out of all 9 
comparisons of the yearly periods, a significant difference (at the 5% level) exists in 3 out of the 
9 pairs for corn, 2 of 9 pairs for live cattle, and 4 of 9 pairs for coffee although some are 
marginally significant.  For the pooled results, traders deviate from the random distribution (of 
50%) with 53.5% (1436/2683) of traders exhibiting persistence for corn, 53.8% (562/1045) for 
live cattle, and 56.3% (863/1532) for coffee.  The pooled tests have more power because of the 
increased number of observations; the results for corn, live cattle, and coffee reject the null 
hypothesis that profits are randomly distributed and support that notion that traders exhibit 
persistence in performance. 
The conditional winner and loser ranking analyses are also tested on both quarterly and 
monthly time horizons for each commodity.  Quarterly results span from quarter 1 in year 2000 
through quarter 3 in year 2009, a total of 38 pairs.  Monthly results span from January in year 
2000 through September in year 2009, a total of 116 pairs.  The individual groups of period 
results will not be displayed in a table due to space constraints, but the pooled results from all 9 
conditional winner and loser tests are in table 4.4.  These pooled results show widespread 
significance across all commodities and time periods.  The only p-value larger than 5% is the 
monthly horizon coffee test of trader persistence with an 11% p-value.  The italicized 
percentages below each quadrant count compares to the 50% expected under the null hypothesis 
of random distribution of profits.  On average 53% to 54% of winners in t are also winners in 
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t+1.  The exceptions are quarterly live cattle and monthly coffee where traders are split almost 
evenly between winners and losers.  Overall the contingency table results support that traders 
show evidence of persistence in earning profits.51  
The next set of results take into account the magnitude of profit differentials between top 
and bottom performing groups and allow for the possibility that top deciles of traders persist 
when other midrange traders do not.  Table 4.5 displays the average profits for the out-of-sample 
periods (t+1) for each decile and the differences between top and bottom deciles over different 
time horizons.  For example, in the live cattle yearly results the top decile is 10 and is formed by 
ranking the profits for an in-sample period t (2000, 2001,…or 2008) and summarizing the profits 
of those same top decile traders in the out-of-sample period t+1 (2001, 2002,….or 2009).  The 
average of all out-of-sample periods t+1 is $3.5 million for the top decile and -$208,000 the 
bottom decile.  The difference between the top and bottom deciles is $3.7 million which is 
significantly different than zero at the 5% level.  If we expect traders to persist in earning profits 
then the top out-of-sample deciles should have greater average profits than the bottom out-of-
sample deciles.   
The yearly results for corn in panel A are not statistically significant but the top 10% of 
traders do show substantial skill, with an average profit of $1.1 million.  The lack of statistical 
significance is due to high profits in the bottom decile and not due to superior gains in the 
intermediate deciles.  The large gains in the bottom decile may reflect successful loss-aversion 
behavior where losses in the prior period motivate traders to increase their risk taking to recoup 
losses.  The yearly results for both live cattle and coffee show substantial skill in the top 10%; 
the top traders in live cattle earn $3.7 million more than the bottom and the top traders in coffee 
experience $2.6 million smaller losses than bottom 10%.  Overall on a yearly horizon, the top 
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10% of traders show a substantial persistence in performance.  The quarterly and monthly time 
horizon results are more varied.  For corn, the top 10% of traders show significant skill at both 
the quarterly and monthly horizons of $976,000 and $259,000, respectively.  For live cattle, the 
quarterly results identify the top 10% is not greater than the bottom decile but is greater than 
deciles 9 through 2; in monthly results, the top decile is significantly greater than the bottom 
decile.  For coffee, the quarterly losses appear symmetric around the middle decile with the 
greatest losses in the top and bottom deciles; in the monthly results, little evidence of persistent 
performance appears.   
The variability of persistence evidence in the shorter horizons indicates either traders 
focus on a long term investment horizon and are less sensitive to intermediate period profits, or 
that quarterly and monthly results may be more difficult to reconcile in light of noise which 
exists due to random price patterns.52  Overall the second set of results that take into account 
magnitudes of profits, provide conclusive evidence that the top 10% of traders show significant 
persistence in skill on the yearly horizon and support the conclusions of the first set of winner 
and losers rank contingency table tests. 
4.6.1  Comparison of Method 1 and 2 
Although the results from winner and losers ranking test and the top and bottom 
performing deciles tests generally support each other, differences in statistical significance exist 
in three out of nine scenarios.  The six matching tests are yearly live cattle and coffee, quarterly 
corn, and monthly corn, live cattle, and coffee.  The three non-matching tests are yearly corn, 
quarterly live cattle and coffee.  The quarterly live cattle results find persistence for method 1 but 
not for method 2; although the first method is statistically significant, economic significance is 
questionable because the difference between persistence and non-persistence is only 1%.  The 
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disparity between the first and second methods is pronounced for the quarterly coffee results; in 
the second method the difference between top and bottom deciles is an insignificant $10,000 but 
in the first method a statistically significant 52% of traders show persistence where as 48% do 
not.  The disparity is also apparent in yearly corn results, for the second method the difference 
between top and bottom deciles is large but statistically insignificant at $357,000 compared to 
the first method showing a significant difference between traders exhibiting persistence (54%) 
and traders who do not (46%).  The variation in statistical significance between the two 
procedures is likely reflective of the high degree of volatility during the period and as figures 
4.1-4.3 will demonstrate, the extreme changes in deciles 1 and 10 ultimately make it difficult to 
differentiate between trading returns. 
To help explain the results, figures 4.1-4.3 display a contingency table of initial and 
subsequent annual, quarterly, and monthly performance rankings.  A trader’s initial ranking in 
period t is on the z-axis and subsequent ranking in period t+1 is on the x-axis.  The y-axis is the 
probability of the subsequent ranking given the initial ranking.  In a case where all profits are 
random and no persistence exists, each bar would be 10%.  In a case where profits are not 
random and traders always rank exactly the same in every period, each bar on the diagonal (1/1, 
2/2,…9/9, 10/10) would be 100%.  The actual results from the data appear somewhere in 
between these two extremes.  In figures 4.1-4.3, all the diagonals are greater than 10%, and many 
traders either stay in the same profit decile or move one decile up or down.53  The tendency for 
traders to stay in or around their decile supports method 1 which finds that ranking persists 
among traders.  Although this tendency is strong for deciles 2 through 9, the extreme rankings, 
decile 1 and 10, behave somewhat differently.  A large portion of traders who initially rank in 
deciles 1 or 10 in period t either stay in the same decile or rank at the opposite end of the 
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performance spectrum in the subsequent period t+1.  This pattern is demonstrated by the tall four 
corners across the figures; traders who initially are in decile 1 in period t are highly likely to be 
in decile 1 or decile 10 in period t+1 but less likely to be in intermediate deciles.  Likewise, 
those traders who are initially in decile 10 in period t are highly likely to be in decile 10 or decile 
1 in period t+1 but less likely to be in intermediate deciles.   
These traders at the extremes may fall into one of two types, those who are skilled either 
superiorly or inferiorly and continue to rank in decile 1 or 10, and those who possess no skill but 
take large risks and alternate between the top and bottom decile as their fortunes “flip flop” with 
the market.  Persist performance in decile 10 encourages further participation through profits, but 
the continued performance of those in decile 1 is surprising since traders are continually earning 
negative returns.  Possibly the traders earning large negative profits are still exploring if they 
have skill or are compensating for losses with other investments.  The traders alternating 
between success and failure are less surprising based on the arguments of Hartzmark (1991), 
who argues profits are randomly distributed.  The large shift in profits earned by the non-skilled 
traders is likely the volatility that creates differing statistical results in the decile tests, method 2.  
The impact becomes clear when analyzing the 4 corner percentiles and comparing the rankings 
that persisted (10/10 or 1/1) versus the drastic shifting rankings (10/1 or 1/10).  When the 
extreme rankings 10/10 and 1/1 are larger than approximately 30% and the 10/1 and 1/10 shifts 
are approximately smaller than 25% then the decile tests are significant (e.g. corn quarterly and 
monthly, live cattle yearly and monthly, and coffee yearly).  If the drastic shifts in deciles 10/1 
and 1/10 are approximately equal to the other two corners of 10/10 or 1/1 then the decile tests are 
not significant (e.g. corn yearly, live cattle quarterly, and coffee quarterly and monthly).  In table 
4.5, the significance of the tests is consistent across differences between the deciles studies 
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(10%, 20%, and 50%), but in light of the figures 4.1-4.3 the significance in the 20th and 50th 
percentiles is likely driven by the 10th percentile traders.  
In general, the figures look similar across commodities indicating that traders perform 
similarly regardless of the market or time frame and allows for a visual assessment of the results 
presented by both statistical methods.  The tendency for traders to remain in the approximately 
the same decile across periods helps explains results for method 1, the persistent ranking tests.  
Conversely, the drastic shifts in deciles 1 and 10 are likely the volatility that creates differing 
results for method 2, the decile tests. 
4.7 Summary 
The rigorous assessment testing if past trader profits can determine future trader 
performance, indicates a  portion of traders do have the skill and the ability to persistently 
perform.  The result help to explain why speculative traders continue to participate if no risk 
premium exists in the futures market (Aulerich 2011b).  Traders are motivated by the ability to 
predictably perform and ability to expand trading when they determine themselves to have skill. 
The contributions of this essay are threefold.  First, to overcome previous time and scope 
limitations by using a dataset spanning ten years and across three main commodity contracts.  
Second, to test profits earned during monthly, quarterly, and yearly periods to account for 
investment horizons longer than a single day.  Third, to focus solely on the profitable category of 
noncommercial traders that removes noise from commercial traders.  Commercial traders are 
generally regarded as hedgers who may have both hedging and speculative motives for trading 
that makes profit interpretation problematic. 
As shown in Aulerich (2011b), the noncommercial category is the most profitable 
earning $7.9 billion over 12 commodity markets and subsequently provides the speculative 
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trader proxy to analyze in this essay.  Data from the CFTC Large Trader Reporting System 
database is the same as used by Aulerich (2011a, 2011b) and spans from 2000 to mid-2009 
analyzing corn traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), live cattle traded on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME), and coffee traded on Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) to represent 
field crops, livestock, and soft commodities. 
Two methods are used to analyze the persistent ability of traders; (i) the first is the Fisher 
Exact test, a nonparametric two-way winner and loser contingency table analysis and (ii) the 
second is the testing of trader by magnitude of profits using the rank of trader profits in the first 
period to identify top and bottom deciles.  A standard t-test or Wilcoxon signed-rank test is then 
used to determine whether profits from the traders in these deciles differ in the next period.  The 
tests have been widely applied in studies of investment performance (e.g., Malkiel, 1995), and 
are viewed as an out-of-sample assessment of trader ability to consistently generate profits.   
The first method’s pooled results for the Fisher Exact tests show evidence of persistence 
in rankings across the commodities and time horizons studied.  The annual, quarterly, and 
monthly results convincingly show that a portion of traders persistently rank among peers across 
time periods providing evidence that traders have trading skill.  The second method tests the 
difference in profitability levels between top and bottom deciles.  The annual results provide 
convincing evidence that the top 10% of traders persistently perform over the long term.  
Evidence from the quarterly and monthly performance horizons is strong for corn but more 
mixed for live cattle and coffee likely due to the high degree of price volatility during shorter 
time periods.  Despite the mixed results for the shorter time periods, a subset of noncommercial 





Relating results back to previous research by Hartzmark (1991), Leuthold et al. (1994) 
and Fishe and Smith (2010) is somewhat challenging because they use different methods and 
time horizons.  Despite these distinctions, this essay finds a larger portion of traders have skill in 
earning profits than previous studies.  Harztmark finds that out of 1,622 noncommercial traders 
about 5% perform persistently, Leuthold analyzes 2% of traders out of 3,171 and finds them to 
have skill, and Fishe and Smith find 1% to 3.5% of traders are informed.  This essay finds that 
the top 10% of traders have substantial ability to persistently perform relatively well.  The 
rigorous procedures in this essay provide evidence of skill to explain why speculative traders 
continue to participate in agricultural futures markets.  This emerges regardless of the sample, 
commodity, or method used, and supports the structure of the Mahani and Bernhardt model 
(2007) which is able to account for such a structure within a rational learning based model.  
What is still unknown is what trading strategies are used by successful traders?  Do successful 
traders using technical trading rules?  Fundamental commodity information?  Some 
combination?   The results from this paper provide evidence that skilled traders exist but are not 
able to determine the precise strategies used to earn persistent returns. 
4.8  Tables and Figures
Corn Live Cattle Coffee All Three Commodities Corn Live Cattle Coffee All Three Commodities Corn Live Cattle Coffee All Three Commodities
Number Unique Traders 1,401 747 548 2,524 3,556 1,551 2,677 6,102 39 39 39 0
Traders in 1 Market 1255 619 496 2,370 2445 712 1725 4,882
Traders in 2 Markets 128 110 34 136 649 377 490 758
Traders in 3 Markets 18 18 18 18 462 462 462 462
Overall Profits (,000) 98,078 666,470 2,598,487 3,352,754 1,527,886 958,738 -1,454,846 1,030,837 -1,622,264 -1,865,625 -791,388 -4,279,277
Traders in 1 Market 623,541 618,608 1,883,580 3,125,729 337,872 86,462 -36,924 387,410
Traders in 2 Markets -248,907 163,091 278,167 192,351 446,372 561,873 -91,492 916,752
Traders in 3 Markets -275,109 -117,711 424,761 31,942 742,816 308,792 -1,326,222 -274,614
Daily 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.45 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.43 0.50 0.49 0.47
Monthly 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.46 0.44 0.46
Quarterly 0.54 0.52 0.56 0.54 0.51 0.54 0.45 0.50 0.36 0.46 0.41 0.41
Yearly 0.53 0.51 0.57 0.54 0.50 0.55 0.43 0.49 0.32 0.46 0.42 0.40
Traders in 1 Market 0.54 0.51 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.56 0.46 0.51
Traders in 2 Markets 0.46 0.50 0.62 0.53 0.51 0.60 0.42 0.51
Traders in 3 Markets 0.53 0.41 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.39 0.45
Avg Number of Business 
Days with Open Interest per 
Trader 655 442 585 561 239 217 184 213 1,062 971 989 1,007
Traders in 1 Market 646 392 573 537 200 126 136 154
Traders in 2 Markets 682 645 692 673 228 216 171 205
Table 4.1  Summary Statistics of Major Trader Categories, 2000 - 2009
Percent of Profitable Traders for Cross Section
Commodity Index TraderNonCommericalCommercial
   
Traders in 3 Markets 1,127 929 737 931 456 357 379 397
Avg Daily Total Notional 
Value (,000) per Trader 13,970 6,578 11,516 10,688 13,970 11,516 6,578 10,688 165,111 94,997 51,356 103,821
Traders in 1 Market 10,180 6,958 4,772 7,303 10,180 6,958 4,772 7,303
Traders in 2 Markets 20,064 12,449 5,848 12,787 20,064 12,449 5,848 12,787
Traders in 3 Markets 25,465 17,778 14,095 19,113 25,465 17,778 14,095 19,113
Note:  Unique traders are the number of indiviudal traders who participate on at least one day over the entire time period.  Overall profits are total profits from 2000-2009.  Percent of profitable traders for a cross section is the average percent 
of profitable traders per cross section of computer profits.  Only the yearly cross section is broken down by trader in multiple markets.  The average number of business days represents trader activity and is the average number of days with open 
interest.  Mean daily total notional value per trader represent the size of a trader and is the average daily notional value per trader.
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Yearly (obs=9) Quarterly (obs=38) Monthly (obs=116)
Corn
Total Profits (,000)
Excluded Trdrs -94,851 -270,584 -395,160
Included Trdrs 2,003,651 1,884,074 1,954,539
Avg Daily Notional Value (,000)
Excluded Trdrs 226,469,053 45,738,377 5,546,531
Included Trdrs 3,040,642,971 1,715,013,413 276,357,989
Avg Number Trdrs
Excluded Trdrs 354 141 76
Included Trdrs 597 452 385
Pct Excluded Traders 37% 24% 16%
Avg Days in Market per Trdr
Excluded Trdrs 44 19 8
Included Trdrs 119 42 17
Live Cattle
Total Profits (,000)
Excluded Trdrs -44,016 -12,426 -68,296
Included Trdrs 1,073,398 1,003,430 1,042,140
Avg Daily Notional Value (,000)
Excluded Trdrs 59,470,488 12,776,533 1,852,208
Included Trdrs 1,066,435,258 476,807,113 95,855,266




Excluded Trdrs 149 55 29
Included Trdrs 233 183 157
Pct Excluded Traders 39% 23% 16%
Avg Days in Market per Trdr
Excluded Trdrs 36 16 7
Included Trdrs 119 42 17
Coffee
Total Profits (,000)
Excluded Trdrs -154,684 -162,340 -407,451
Included Trdrs -979,287 -1,160,054 -1,007,151
Avg Daily Notional Value (,000)
Excluded Trdrs 88,003,359 15,010,363 1,672,534
Included Trdrs 917,243,091 456,024,778 84,910,035
Avg Number Trdrs
Excluded Trdrs 273 96 47
Included Trdrs 341 266 228
Pct Excluded Traders 44% 27% 17%
Avg Days in Market per Trdr
Excluded Trdrs 42 17 7
Included Trdrs 114 41 17
Note:  Average is over each t period in each horizon studied.
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Period t Period t+1 Winner t+1 Loser t+1 Winner t+1 Loser t+1 Winner t+1 Loser t+1
2000 2001 Winner t 122 111 0.35 Winner t 47 51 0.67 Winner t 64 41 0.00
Loser t 111 122 Loser t 51 47 Loser t 41 65
2001 2002 Winner t 133 101 0.00 Winner t 45 45 1.00 Winner t 56 58 0.90
Loser t 101 134 Loser t 45 45 Loser t 58 57
2002 2003 Winner t 135 118 0.15 Winner t 52 48 0.67 Winner t 93 36 0.00
Loser t 118 135 Loser t 48 52 Loser t 36 94
2003 2004 Winner t 133 145 0.35 Winner t 55 43 0.12 Winner t 109 73 0.00
Loser t 145 133 Loser t 43 55 Loser t 73 109
2004 2005 Winner t 149 161 0.38 Winner t 63 32 0.00 Winner t 111 95 0.12
Loser t 161 149 Loser t 32 64 Loser t 95 112
2005 2006 Winner t 164 154 0.43 Winner t 75 54 0.01 Winner t 107 99 0.49
Loser t 154 165 Loser t 54 76 Loser t 99 107
2006 2007 Winner t 214 146 0.00 Winner t 80 66 0.13 Winner t 131 94 0.00
Loser t 146 215 Loser t 66 80 Loser t 94 132
2007 2008 Winner t 217 159 0.00 Winner t 71 78 0.49 Winner t 111 91 0.06
Loser t 159 218 Loser t 78 71 Loser t 91 111
2008 2009 Winner t 169 152 0.18 Winner t 74 66 0.34 Winner t 81 82 1.00
Loser t 152 170 Loser t 66 75 Loser t 82 82
2000-2009 Pooled Winner t 1 436 1 247 0 00 Winner t 562 483 0 00 Winner t 863 669 0 00
Two-Tail p-Value for 
Fisher's Exact Test
Table 4.3  Predictability of Trader Performance Based on Total Profits. Fisher Exact Test of Winner and Loser Categories between 
Adjacent Time Periods, 2000-2009
Corn Live Cattle
Number of Traders Two-Tail p-Value for 
Fisher's Exact Test
Coffee
Number of TradersNumber of Traders Two-Tail p-Value for 
Fisher's Exact Test
  , , .  .  .
Loser t 1,247 1,441 Loser t 483 565 Loser t 669 869
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Period Winner t+1 Loser t+1 Winner t+1 Loser t+1 Winner t+1 Loser t+1
Annual (9 pairs)
2000-2009 Pooled Winner t 1,436 1,247 0.00 562 483 0.00 863 669 0.00
54% 46% 54% 46% 56% 44%
Loser t 1,247 1,441 483 565 669 869
46% 54% 46% 54% 43% 57%
Quarterly (38 pairs)
2000-2009 Pooled Winner t 4,679 3,906 0.00 1,741 1,720 0.00 2,621 2,415 0.00
55% 45% 50% 50% 52% 48%
Loser t 3,906 4,702 1,720 1,757 2,415 2,640
45% 55% 49% 51% 48% 52%
Monthly (116 pairs)
2000-2009 Pooled Winner t 12,219 10,091 0.00 4,795 4,255 0.00 6,650 6,548 0.11
55% 45% 53% 47% 50% 50%
Loser t 10,091 12,281 4,255 4,856 6,548 6,707
45% 55% 47% 53% 49% 51%
Table 4.4  Predictability of Trader Performance Based on Total Profits. Pooled Fisher Exact Test of Winner and Loser Categories 
between Adjacent Time Periods, 2000-2009
Corn Live Cattle Coffee
Number of Traders Two-Tail p-Value 
for Fisher's Exact 
Number of Traders Two-Tail p-Value 
for Fisher's Exact 
Number of Traders Two-Tail p-Value 
for Fisher's Exact 
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Yearly (,000) Quarterly (,000) Monthly (,000)
Profits Profits Profits
Decile Avg t+1 StdDev t+1 Normal? Statistic P-value Statistic  P-Value Avg t+1 StdDev t+1 Normal? Statistic P-value Statistic  P-Value Avg t+1 StdDev t+1 Normal? Statistic P-value Statistic  P-Value
Panel A: Corn
10 (best) 1143 795 226
9 -36 173 52
8 3 5 15
7 53 40 22
6 68 -1 4
5 8 1 0
4 -70 17 2
3 80 -2 -11
2 90 -71 -16
1 785 -181 -33
Top v Bottom 10% 357 3,739 yes 0.29 0.78 -1.5 0.91 976 8,406 no 0.72 0.48 111.5 0.11 259 5,222 no 0.53 0.59 699 0.05
Top v Bottom 20% 115 1,922 yes 0.18 0.86 -0.5 1.00 610 4,694 no 0.80 0.43 123.5 0.07 164 2,956 no 0.60 0.55 684 0.06
Top v Bottom 50% 67 844 yes 0.24 0.82 1.5 0.91 250 1,997 no 0.77 0.45 114.5 0.10 76 1,250 no 0.65 0.52 686 0.06
Panel B:  Live Catte
10 (best) 3,482 529 420
9 464 75 80
8 319 115 17
7 266 47 19
6 351 29 15
5 79 2 14
4 36 14 5
3 -79 83 20
Signed Rank
Table 4.5  Predictability of Trader Profitability Based on Groups of Adjacent Pairs of Time Horizons for, Corn, Live Cattle, and 
Coffee, 2000-2009
Student's t Signed Rank Student's t Signed Rank Student's t
2 -195 10 15
1 -208 549 -79
Top v Bottom 10% 3,691 3,485 yes 3.18 0.01 19.5 0.02 -20 3,599 yes 0.03 0.97 -21.5 0.76 499 2,890 no 1.86 0.07 628 0.08
Top v Bottom 20% 2,175 2,099 yes 3.11 0.01 19.5 0.02 23 1,977 yes 0.07 0.94 -11.5 0.87 282 1,707 no 1.78 0.08 622 0.00
Top v Bottom 50% 1,050 856 yes 3.68 0.01 19.5 0.02 27 830 yes 0.20 0.84 0.5 0.99 115 743 no 1.67 0.10 584 0.11
Panel C:  Coffee
10 (best) -220 -431 -256
9 -186 -95 -91
8 -21 -56 -27
7 -39 -24 -14
6 -43 -34 4
5 7 6 -13
4 -43 -30 -4
3 -298 -63 6
2 -502 -106 -33
1 -2800 -465 -73
Top v Bottom 10% 2,580 4,311 yes 1.80 0.11 12.5 0.16 33 3,308 no 0.06 0.95 26.5 0.71 -183 3,686 no 0.54 0.59 56 0.88
Top v Bottom 20% 1,448 2,435 yes 1.78 0.11 12.5 0.16 22 1,869 no 0.07 0.94 21.5 0.76 -121 2,127 no 0.61 0.54 50 0.89
Top v Bottom 50% 625 935 yes 2.01 0.08 13.5 0.13 3 800 no 0.03 0.98 20.5 0.77 -53 915 no 0.63 0.53 29 0.94
Note:  Decile 10 is the highest and decile 1 is the lowest.  Traders are ranked according to profits in period t and the profits for the same trader are calculated in t+1.  Normality is tested, "yes" means the distribution is normal and Student's t-stat is used and "no" 
means distribution is non-normal and signed rank test is used.
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Figure 4.1  Contingency table of initial and subsequent annual performance rankings.
In each calendar year from 2000 to 2009,traders are ranked into decile portfolios based on one-year gross returns.  These initial 
decile rankings are paired with the trader's subsequent one-year gross return ranking.  Traders that do not survive into the 
subsequent year are dropped from the analysis.  The initial ranking is on the x-axis and the subsequent ranking is on the z-axis.  
The y-axis is the probability of the subsequent ranking given the initial ranking.
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Figure 4.2  Contingency table of initial and subsequent quarterly performance rankings.
In each calendar year from 2000 to 2009,traders are ranked into decile portfolios based on one-year gross returns.  These initial 
decile rankings are paired with the trader's subsequent one-year gross return ranking.  Traders that do not survive into the 
subsequent year are dropped from the analysis.  The initial ranking is on the x-axis and the subsequent ranking is on the z-axis.  The 
y-axis is the probability of the subsequent ranking given the initial ranking.
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Figure 4.3:  Contingency table of initial and subsequent monthly performance rankings.
In each calendar year from 2000 to 2009,traders are ranked into decile portfolios based on one-year gross returns.  These initial 
decile rankings are paired with the trader's subsequent one-year gross return ranking.  Traders that do not survive into the 
subsequent year are dropped from the analysis.  The initial ranking is on the x-axis and the subsequent ranking is on the z-axis.  The 
y-axis is the probability of the subsequent ranking given the initial ranking.
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Dec 1 Dec 2
Dec 3 Dec 4
Dec 5 Dec 6
Dec 7 Dec 8





























































Dec 1 Dec 2
Dec 3 Dec 4
Dec 5 Dec 6
Dec 7 Dec 8



























5.  REFERENCES 
Ai, C., A. Chatrath, and F. Song. 2006. “On the Comovement of Commodity Prices.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 88:574-588. 
Aulerich, N.M. 2011a.  “Evidence on the Relationship between Daily Positions of Index Funds 
and Price Changes in Agricultural Commodity Futures Markets.”  Ph.D. dissertation, 
Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, 
Urbana, Illinois. 
Aulerich, N.M. 2011b.  “Returns to Traders and Existence of a Risk Premium in Agricultural 
Futures Markets.”  Ph.D. dissertation, Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University 
of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, Urbana, Illinois. 
Aulerich, N.M., Hoffman, L.A., and G.E. Plato. 2009. “New Traders in Corn, Soybean, and 
Wheat Futures Markets Scrutinized.”  Economic Research Service Outlook  FDS-09G-
01:1-44  
[http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/FDS/2009/08Aug/FDS09G01/FDS09G01.pdf] 
Barchart, CRB Trader. "Option Implied Volatility and Futures Historical Volatility." 
(http://www.crbtrader.com/support/options.asp). Accessed on December 13, 2010. 
Bjornson, B. and C.A. Carter. 1997.  “New Evidence on Agricultural Commodity Return 
Performance under Time-Varying Risk.”  American Journal of Agricultural Economics  
79:918-930. 
Bodie, Z., and V. Rosansky. 1980. "Risk Return in Commodity Futures." Financial Analysts 
Journal  36:27-39. 
Brunetti, C, and B. Buyuksahin. 2009. “Is Speculation Destabilizing?” Working Paper, U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
162 
 
Brunetti, c. and D. Reiffen. 2010.  “Commodity Index Trading and Hedging Costs.”  Working 
Paper.  U.S.  Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
Bryant, H., D.A. Bessler, and M.S. Haigh. 2006. “Causality in Futures Markets.” Journal of 
Futures Markets 26:1039-1057. 
Buyuksahin, B., and J.H. Harris. 2009. “The Role of Speculators in the Crude Oil Futures 
Markets.” Working Paper, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
Carhart, M.M. 1997. “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance.” Journal of Finance 52:57-
82. 
Carhart, M.M., Carpenter, J.N.,  Lynch, A.W., and Musto, D.K.  2002.  “Mutual Fund 
Survivors.”  The Review of Financial Studies 15:1439-1463. 
Chang, E.C and Stevenson, R.A. 1985. “The Timing Performance of Small Traders,” Journal of 
Futures Markets 5:517-527. 
Chang, E.C. 1985. “Returns to Speculators and the Theory of Normal Backwardation,” Journal 
of Finance 40:193-208. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 2008a.“About the Commitments of Traders.” 
Accessed December 2009, available online at 
http://www.cftc.gov/marketreports/commitmentsoftraders/cot_about.html,  
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 2008b.“Staff Report on Commodity Swap 
Dealers & Index Traders with Commission Recommendations.”  Accessed December 





Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 2010.  “Large Trader Reporting Program.”  
Accessed November 2010, available online at 
http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/MarketSurveillance/LargeTraderReportingProgra
m/index.htm. 
Conover, W.J. 1999.  Practical Nonparametric Statistical, 3rd ed. New York:  Wiley and Sons. 
Coval, J.D., Hirshleifer, D.A., and T. Shumway. 2005. “Can Investors Beat the Market?” 
Working Paper No. 04-025.  http//ssrn.com/abstract=364000. 
Cumby, R.E. and Modest, D.M. 1987. “Testing for market timing ability: A framework for 
forecast evaluation.”  Journal of Financial Economics 19:169-190. 
Dewally, M., Ederington, L., and Fernando, C. “Determinants of Trading Profits of Individual 
Futures Traders:  Risk Premia, Information, and Luck.”  Working paper, August 2009. 
[http://cemr.ou.edu/cfs/paper/pdf/Trading%20paper%20Aug09.pdf]. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 2010.  Public Law No. 111-203.  
111th United States Congress. 
Domanski, D., and A. Heath. 2007. “Financial Investors and Commodity Markets.” Bank for 
International Settlements Quarterly Review, March, pp.53-67. 
Dusak, K. 1973. “Futures Trading and Investor Returns,” Journal of Political Economy 8:1387-
1406. 
Eglekraut, T.M., P. Garcia, and B.J. Sherrick. 2007. “The Term Structure of Implied Forward 
Volatility: Recovery and Informational Content in the Corn Options Market.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 89:1-11. 
Enders, W. 1995. Applied Econometric Time Series. John Wiley and Sons: New York, NY. 
164 
 
Engelke, L., and J.C. Yuen. 2008. “Types of Commodity Investments.” In The Handbook of 
Commodity Investing, F.J. Fabozzi, F. Roland, and D.G. Kaiser, eds. John Wiley and 
Sons: New York, NY. 
Fama, E.F. and K. French.  1993. "Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds". 
Journal of Financial Economics 33: 3–56 
Fenton, J., and G. Martinaitas. 2005. “Large Trader Reporting: The Great Equalizer.” Futures 
Industry, July/August, pp. 34-39. 
Fishe, P.H. and Smith, A.D. 2010.  “Identifying Informed Traders in Futures Markets” Working 
Paper.  [http://www.ace.illinois.edu/pdfs/smith.pdf]. 
Gilbert, C.L. 2009.  “Speculative Influences on Commodity Futures Prices, 2006-2008.”  
Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Trento. 
Gilbert, C.L. 2010.  “How to Understand High Food Prices. Journal of Agricultural Economics  
61 (2): 398-425. 
Gorton, G.B., and K.G. Rouwenhorst. 2006. "Facts and Fantasies about Commodity Futures." 
Financial Analysts Journal 62:47-68.  
Greer, R.J. 1978. “Conservative Commodities: A Key Inflation Hedge.” Journal of Portfolio 
Management 7:26-29. 
Grinblatt, M. and S. Titman. 1992. “The Persistence of Mutual Fund Performance.” Journal of 
Finance 47:1977-1984. 
Haigh, H.S., J Hiranaiova, and J.A. Overdahl.  2007. “Hedge Funds, Volatility, and Liquidity 
Provision in Energy Futures Markets.”  Journal of Alternative Investments 9:10-38. 
Hamilton, J.D. 1994. Time Series Analysis. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. 
165 
 
Hartzmark, M. L. 1987. "Returns to Individual Traders of Futures: Aggregate Results." Journal 
of Political Economy 95:1292-1306. 
Hartzmark, M.L. 1991. “Luck Versus Forecast Ability: Determinants of Trader Performance in 
Futures Markets.” Journal of Business 64:49-74. 
Hendry, D.F. 1996. Dynamic Econometrics. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK. 
Henriksson, R.D. and R.C. Merton. 1981. “On Market Timing and Investment Performance. II. 
Statistical Procedures for Evaluating Forecasting Skills.” Journal of Business 54:513-
533. 
Houthakker, H.S. 1957. “Can Speculators Forecast Prices?”  The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 39:143-151. 
Hull, J.C. Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, Fourth Edition, Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle 
River, NJ, 2000. 
Irwin, S.H., and D.R. Sanders 2010a. “The Impact of “Financialization in Commodity Futures 
Markets.”  Technical Report Prepared for the Organization on Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD). 
Irwin, S.H., and D.R. Sanders 2010b. “The Financialization of Commodity Futures Markets or: 
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Index Funds.”  Forthcoming in Applied 
Economic Policy and Perspectives.  
Irwin, S.H., Garcia, P., Good, D.L., E.L. Kunda. 2011.  “Spreads and Non-Convergence in 
CBOT Corn, Soybean, and Wheat Futures: Are Index Funds to Blame?”  Forthcoming in 
Applied Economics Perspectives and Policy. 
166 
 
Jegadeesh, N. 1991. “Seasonality in Stock Price Mean Reversion: Evidence from the U.S. and 
the U.K.” Journal of Finance 46:1427-1444. 
Kemp, J.  2010.  “CME’s Volatility Indices Round Out Markets.”  Reuters, March 8, 2010. 
Keynes, John, M., 1930, A Treatise on Money, Vol II (MacMillian, London). 
Kosowski, R., Timmermann, A., Wermers, R., and H. White. 2006.  “Can Mutual Fund ‘Stars’ 
Really Pick Stocks?  New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis.” Journal of Finance 
61:2551-2595. 
Leuthold, R.M., Garcia, P., and Lu R. 1994. “The Returns and Forecasting Ability of Large 
Traders in the Frozen Pork Bellies Futures Market.”  Journal of Business 67:459-473. 
Litner, John. 1965.  “The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in 
Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 47:13-37. 
Mahani, R. and Bernhardt D. 2007. “Financial Speculators’ Underperformance: Learning, Self-
Selection, and Endogenous Liquidity.” Journal of Finance 62:1313-1340. 
Malkiel, B.G. 1995. “Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1992.”  Journal of 
Finance 50:549-72. 
Masters, M.W., and A.K. White. 2008. “The Accidental Hunt Brothers: How Institutional 
Investors are Driving up Food and Energy Prices.” Accessed December 2009, available 
online at http://accidentalhuntbrothers.com/. 
Meyer, G.  “Commodity Investors Turn Active.”  Financial Times.  December 23, 2009. 
Meyer, G., and C. Cui. 2009. “U.S. Oil Fund Finds Itself at the Mercy of Traders.” The Wall 




Mou, Y. 2010. “Limits to Arbitrage and Commodity Index Investment Front-Running the 
Goldman Roll.”  Working Paper.  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1716841. 
Parkinson, M. 1980. “The Extreme Value Method for Estimating the Variance of the Rate of 
Return.” Journal of Business 53:61–65. 
Peck, A. E. 1980. The role of economic analysis in futures market regulation. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 62 (December): 1037-43. 
Petzel, T. 2009. “Testimony before the CFTC.” U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission.  
Accessed December 2009, available online at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/hearing072809_petz
el2.pdf 
Petzel, T.E. 1981. “A New Look at Some Old Evidence: The Wheat Market Scandal of 1925.” 
Food Research Institute Studies 18:117-128. 
Phillips, G.M. and Weiner, R.J. 1994. “Information and Normal Backwardation as Determinants 
of Trading Performance: Evidence from the North Sea Oil Forward Market.” Economic 
Journal 104:76-95. 
Raynauld, J. and Tessier J. 1984. “Risk Premiums in Futures Markets: An Empirical 
Investigation.” Journal of Futures Markets 4:189-211. 
Robles, M., M. Torero, and J. von Braun.  2009. “When Speculation Matters.”  International 
Food Policy Research Institute, IFPRI Issue Brief 57.  
Rockwell, C.S. 1967. “Normal Backwardation, Forecasting, and the Returns to Commodity 
Futures Traders.” Food Research Studies 7:107-130. 
Sanders, D.R., and S.H. Irwin. 2010. “A Speculative Bubble in Commodity Futures Prices? 
Cross-Sectional Evidence.” Agricultural Economics 41:25-32. 
168 
 
Sanders, D.R., S.H. Irwin, and R. Merrin. 2009. “Smart Money? The Forecasting Ability of 
CFTC Large Traders.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 34:276-296 
Sanders, D.R., S.H. Irwin, and R.P. Merrin. 2008. “The Adequacy of Speculation in Agricultural 
Futures Markets: Too Much of a Good Thing?” Marketing and Outlook Research Report 
2008-02, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign. 
Sharpe, W.F. 1964.  “Capital Asset Prices:  A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions 
of Risk.”  Journal of Finance.  19:425-442. 
Stoll, H.R., and R.E.Whaley. 2010. “Commodity Index Investing and Commodity Futures 
Prices.” Journal of Applied Finance 20: 7-46. 
Streeter, D. H., and W. G. Tomek. 1992. "Variability in Soybean Futures Prices: An Integrated 
Framework." Journal of Futures Markets 12:705-728. 
Summers, L. H. 1986. “Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?” 
Journal of Finance 41:591-601. 
Tang, K., and W. Xiong. 2009. “Index Investing and the Financialization of Commodities.” 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Princeton University. 
Telser, L.G. 1958.  “Futures Trading and the Storage of Cotton and Wheat.”  The Journal of 
Political Economy  66:233-255. 
United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (USS/PSI). 2009. “Excessive 




von Braun, J., and M. Torero. 2009. “Implementing Physical and Virtual Reserves to Protect the 
Poor and Prevent Market Failure.”  International Food Policy Research Institute.  IFPRI 
Policy Brief 10. 
Wang, C. 2003. “The Behavior and Performance of Major Types of Futures Traders.”  Journal of 
Futures Markets 23:1-31. 
Wright, B. 2009. “International Grain Reserves and Other Instruments to Address Volatility in 







6.  ENDNOTES 
 
1 The wheat traded on the Minnesota Grain Exchange is not included in commodity index funds. 
2 The source is the CFTC Quarterly Index Investment Data report found at: 
http://cftc.gov/marketreports/IndexInvestment/index.htm. 
3 In reality, a variety of investment instruments are typically lumped under the heading 
‘commodity index fund.’  Large institutional investors, such as pension funds, may enter directly 
into over-the-counter (OTC) contracts with swap dealers to gain the desired long exposure to 
returns from a particular index of commodity prices.  Some firms also offer investment funds 
whose returns are tied to a commodity index.  Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and structured 
notes (ETNs) have also been developed to make it easier for smaller investors to obtain 
commodity exposure in their portfolios.  ETFs and ETNs trade on securities exchanges in the 
same manner as stocks on individual companies.  See Engelke and Yuen (2008) and CFTC 
(2008b) for additional details. 
4 With the exception of Sanders and Irwin (2011), that utilizes weekly bank participation data as 
a proxy for index trader activity prior to 2006. 
5 RBOB stands for Reformulated Blendstock for Oxygenated Blending. 
6 Delta is the change in option price for a one percent change in the price of the underlying 
futures contract.  Adjusting options positions by delta makes options positions comparable to 
futures positions in terms of price changes. 
7 The data do not include positions of day traders or scalpers since these participants seldom 
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8 This assumption does not imply that the number of CIT traders is constant across the sample 
period.  In fact, the number of CIT traders rises over time in parallel with the rise in aggregate 
CIT positions.  For example, the number of CIT traders in corn increases from 7 in 2000 to 31 in 
2008.  Retroactive application of CIT classifications prior to 2006 could induce two types of 
misclassification error.  First, CITs that traded between 2000 and 2005 but ceased operation 
sometime before 2006 would be excluded from the CIT category over 2000-2005.  Second, 
traders classified as CITs over 2006-2008 would be incorrectly categorized as CITs over 2000-
2006 if they changed their line of business at some point before 2006.  Given the stability in CIT 
classifications over 2006-2008 the likelihood of either type of error is minimal.  
9 The patterns in the corn market are representative of those identified in other markets except 
where identified in the text.  Similar figures for the other commodities are available from the 
author. 
10 CITs did not trade in the August and September soybean contracts, August, September, and 
October soybean oil contract, May lean hog contract, or October cotton contract. 
11 This material can be found at the following website: 
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/services/securities/products/sp-gsci-commodity-index/roll-
period.html. 
12 Simple correlation between the two series is -0.94. 
13 Since non-stationarity tests have low power, Enders (1995) argues that rejection of the null 
with a constant and trend provides strong evidence that a series is stationary.  Detailed results are 
available from the authors. 




argued that, CITs do not make decisions during the roll period that are based on expectation of 
futures returns which makes positions and prices exogenous.  For this reason, equations 5 and 6 
are also calculated without lagging CIT positions, where j=0 instead of j=1.  The results were not 
markedly different from the results using lagged CIT positions and will therefore not be 
displayed. 
15 To clarify, the variables are lagged prior to removing the days outside the roll window.  For 
example, returns on day t may be the independent variable and lag of positions on day t-1 may be 
the explanatory variable.  If t is the first day of the roll period, then t-1 positions would not be in 
the roll period.   In this estimation t-1 positions are still used in the estimation as the roll period 
definition is only applied to the independent variable t. 
16 Research conducted by Brunetti and Reiffen (2010) determines that the absolute level of index 
traders in the nearby contract increase spreads by they do not look at the absolute level of index 
traders in the deferred contract.  Conversely, this methodology uses changes in index positions 
for both nearby and deferred contracts in an SUR system. 
17 Research done by Mou (2010) argues that commodity index traders do impact commodity 
spreads during the roll period but the methodology does not use actual index trader positions.  
Mou uses a yearly estimate of CIT investment value divided by average market value, unlike this 
essay that uses actual daily CIT positions by maturity during the roll period.  Conversely, Irwin 
et. al (2011) finds that an increase in spreads occurs during the roll period even before index 




18 This is slightly different than examining volatility when aggregate CIT positions are the 
explanatory variable.  In this short roll period, the transfer of open interest from the nearby to 
first deferred would be expected to increase volatility in both contracts. 
19 Due to the negative position change the coefficient would also have to be negative.  A negative 
position multiplied by a negative coefficient is positive overall impact on volatility. 
20 If spreads widen, then nearby prices would decrease and/or deferred prices would increase.  If 
spreads narrow, then nearby prices would increase and/or deferred prices would decrease. 
21 Delta measures the rate of change in option value with respect to changes in the underlying 
asset price.  Adjusting options positions by delta makes options positions comparable to futures 
positions in terms of price changes. 
22 The data does not include positions of day traders or scalpers since these participants seldom 
carry positions overnight. 
23 The reporting levels for the commodities in this paper include coffee and feeder cattle at 50 
contracts, cotton, cocoa, live cattle, and lean hogs at 100 contracts, CBOT wheat and KS wheat 
at 150 contracts, soybean oil at 200 contracts, corn at 250 contracts, and sugar at 500 contracts. 
24 The CFTC released a new weekly Disaggregate COT report on October 20, 2009.  The first 
iteration of the report covers 22 major physical commodity markets; on December 4, 2009, the 
remaining physical commodity markets were included.  The Disaggregated COT report increases 
transparency from the legacy COT reports by separating traders into the following four 
categories of traders: Producer/Merchant/Processor/User; Swap Dealers; Managed Money; and 
Other Reportables.  The new Disaggregated COT report does not break out Commodity Index 




on July 22, 2010.  The new report separates large traders in the financial markets into the 
following four categories: Dealer/Intermediary; Asset Manager/Institutional; Leveraged Funds; 
and Other Reportables. 
25 This assumption does not imply that the number of CIT traders is constant across the sample 
period.  In fact, the number of CIT traders rises over time in parallel with the rise in aggregate 
CIT positions.  For example, the number of CIT traders in corn increases from 7 in 2000 to 31 in 
2009.  Retroactive application of CIT classifications prior to 2006 could induce two types of 
misclassification error.  First, CITs that traded between 2000 and 2006 but ceased operation 
sometime before 2007 would be excluded from the CIT category over 2000-2006.  Second, 
traders classified as CITs over 2007-2009 would be incorrectly categorized as CITs over 2000-
2006 if they changed their line of business at some point before 2006.  Given the stability in CIT 
classifications over 2006-2009 the likelihood of either type of error is minimal.  
26 Both futures and options positions are used because they are closely linked and provide a 
comprehensive picture of a trader’s exposure to the market.  Aulerich (2011a) does not use 
options because index traders have little open interest in option markets as the majority of index 
funds invest solely in futures. 
27 The same profit methodology is implemented in Hartzmark (1987, 1991) and Leuthold (1994). 
28 Since commercial traders are more likely to be exchange members (with lower transactions 
costs), the dollar profits for the noncommercial traders would probably be reduced more than 
those of commercial traders if it were possible to include these costs (Hartzmark 1987). 
29 Since futures trading is a zero sum game, the nonreporting category is the residual from the 




30 Hartzmark (1987) used only monthly returns when calculating significance.  This testing 
procedure also employs daily returns for robustness and to account for varying investment 
horizons. 
31 Skewness and Kurtosis is not reported in the table. 
32 The three series graphs for all commodities are provided in Appendix A. 
33 An inconsistent return on investment could be symptomatic of a shift in CIT objectives for 
investment. 
34 Using notional value is plausible when measuring CIT return on investment because CITs 
invest in an unleveraged manner.  In practice CITs pay the required margin and invest the 
remaining value in low risk short term investments such as 3 month treasury bonds (Engelke 
2008). 
35 Notional value is calculated as CIT open interest multiplied by both the contract size and 
settlement price summed over all maturities and commodities. 
36 This phenomenon may possibly only be seen with intraday data if any price distortions caused 
by the rolling traders dissipate before the trading day is complete.  In this case, the end of day 
data would not capture this cost. 
37 The roll period is defined as the 10th business day and greater in 2nd month before expiration 
through business days 1 through 10 in month before expiration.  The roll period is shown to 
encompass the greatest amount of roll activity with the shortest time period (Aulerich 2011a).  




5th through 9th business days in the month before expiration.  The conclusions do not change 
substantially. 
38 The debate surrounding investment skill is also hotly debated in the analysis of mutual fund 
and hedge fund managers as these funds contend for investment dollars.  Commonly, the studies 
try to determine if managers can persistently earn ‘alpha’ or a return beyond that of a comparable 
naïve benchmark (Merton, 1981; Zeckhauser, 1993; Carhart, 1997; Wermers, 2000; Kosowski, 
2006).  The various testing methodologies using in mutual fund and hedge fund literature are 
more relevant to this essay than the actual results because this essay focuses on individual trader 
performance and not overall portfolio performance. 
39 Row crops include corn, soybeans, soybean oil, CBOT wheat, and KS wheat.  These are 
seasonal commodities that are heavily produced in the United States and are easily stored.  
Livestock includes lean hogs, live cattle, and feeder cattle.  Livestock are non-seasonal 
production cycle and have little to no storage abilities.  Soft commodities include cocoa, coffee, 
cotton, and sugar.  These commodities are seasonal and storable but production is not focused in 
the United States. 
40 The commodities chosen have the largest number of traders in each respective category. 
41 CAPM is the Capital Asset Pricing Model described by both Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965).  The CAPM approach is calculating the return on a portfolio in excess of the one month 
T-bill return regressed on excess return on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of NYSE and 
Nasdaq stocks.  The significance of the y-intercept, or alpha, determines if the fund performance 




The CAPM approach is modified in Fama and French (1993) into a 3 factor model.  This 
model regresses the return on a portfolio in excess of the one month T-bill return regressed on 
excess return of a value weighted aggregate market proxy and value weighted factor mimicking 
portfolios for size and book-to-market equity.  Carhart (1997) then expanded the 3 factor model 
into a 4 factor model by adding an additional regression variable, one year momentum on stock 
returns.  The resulting regression is then return on a portfolio in excess of the one month T-bill 
return regressed on excess return of a value weighted aggregate market proxy and value 
weighted factor mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market equity, and one year momentum 
on stock returns ) by using his 4 factor model but apply a new bootstrap statistical technique that 
accounts for the complex non-normal distribution of mutual fund alphas, heterogeneous risk-
taking by funds, and non-normalities in individual fund alpha distributions. 
42 Delta is the change in option price for a one percent change in the price of the underlying 
futures contract.  Adjusting options positions by delta makes options positions comparable to 
futures positions in terms of price changes. 
43 The data do not include positions of day traders or scalpers since these participants seldom 
carry positions overnight. 
44 The reporting levels for the commodities in this paper include corn at 250 contract, live cattle 
at 100 contracts, and coffee at 50 contracts. 
45 There are a small portion of traders that report to the CFTC but are not required to do so.  
These commonly are entered into the database as non-classified since they have no Form 40 or 
Form 102 associated with the records. 




47 As shown in the second essay, CITs fall outside the category of traditional speculators and are 
not profitable over the time period studied. 
48 Commercial traders may also use the futures market for speculative positions but must have a 
significant amount of hedging activity to be classified as a commercial. 
49 Since all of traders in this analysis are noncommercial traders, the differencing in transaction 
costs between traders is likely to be smaller than comparison across trader categories.  For 
example, commercial traders are more likely to be exchange members and would possibly have 
lower transactions costs than non-exchange members. 
50 The absolute number of traders is calculated as the average number of unique traders per 
month, per quarter, or per year.  Therefore the number of excluded and included traders is less 
for shorter time horizons (e.g. monthly is less than quarterly and quarterly is less than yearly). 
51 The contingency table results are also conducted on two additional measures of performance 
for robustness checks.  In addition to profitability levels, total profit for a period is first 
normalized by average daily total notional value for the period and second by average net daily 
notional value.  Two different notional value measures are used because spread traders notional 
value would be over represented by using total notional value but underrepresented using net 
notional value.  Therefore, both measures are used for normalization of profits by investment 
size.  Ultimately both measures produce similar results both to each other and the total profits 
measure reported in the main body of this essay. 
52 Outliers could also be a factor that makes it impossible to find consistent patterns in a 




scatter plot with a trader performance in time t on the x-axis and time t+1 on the y-axis.  The 
biggest impact outliers that would bias findings in the direction of significance lie in the upper 
right corner of quadrants I and lower left corner of quadrant III, and outliers that would bias 
findings in the direction of not finding significance lie in the upper left corner of quadrant II and 
lower right corner of quadrant IV.  Upon analyzing the scatter plots and stem and leaf plots, 
outliers do not appear to be a major concern in this analysis. 
53 This is more easily seen from the tables of underlying data which are not provided in this 
paper. 
7.  APPENDIX
Panel A: Nearby Prices
Panel B: Net Positions
Panel C: Cummulative Daily Profits



















































Figure 7.2  Futures Contract Prices, Positions, and Profits for Coffee, 2000-2009
Panel A: Nearby Prices
Panel B: Net Positions






















































Figure 7.3  Futures Contract Prices, Positions, and Profits for Cotton, 2000-2009
Panel A: Nearby Prices
Panel B: Net Positions






















































Figure 7.4  Futures Contract Prices, Positions, and Profits for Sugar, 2000-2009
Panel A: Nearby Prices
Panel B: Net Positions
















































Figure 7.5  Futures Contract Prices, Positions, and Profits for FeederCattle, 2000-2009
Panel A: Nearby Prices
Panel B: Net Positions
















































Figure 7.6  Futures Contract Prices, Positions, and Profits for Live Cattle, 2000-2009
Panel A: Nearby Prices
Panel B: Net Positions



















































Figure 7.7  Futures Contract Prices, Positions, and Profits for Soybean Oil, 2000-2009
Panel A: Nearby Prices
Panel B: Net Positions




















































Figure 7.8 Futures Contract Prices, Positions, and Profits for Soybeans, 2000-2009
Panel A: Nearby Prices
Panel B: Net Positions
























































Figure 7.9  Futures Contract Prices, Positions, and Profits for Wheat CBOT, 2000-2009
Panel A: Nearby Prices
Panel B: Net Positions





















































Figure 7.10  Futures Contract Prices, Positions, and Profits for Wheat KS, 2000-2009
Panel A: Nearby Prices
Panel B: Net Positions
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